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Summary
The U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities market has attracted intense attention
during and after the widespread financial turmoil of 2007-2009. Most commentators
have reached a consensus that an underestimation of the risks associated with these
products led to problems for the entire financial system. Therefore, this thesis seeks to
provide a better understanding of these complex financial instruments and their role
in the propagation of the crisis.
We focus on three main issues. The first issue (Chapter 3) analyses the risk factors
underlying this market. The goal is to identify key variables that may potentially
explain its decline. Measures of the U.S. real estate market, interbank liquidity and
counterparty risk, as well as market volatility are all found to play a role. Furthermore,
we find that the importance of these risk factors changed as the crisis evolved from a
real estate problem to a broader global credit crisis.
The second issue (Chapter 4) concerns identifying interdependencies and contagion
within this market during the crisis. We adapt the vector autoregressive (VAR) frame-
work of Longstaff (2010) to estimate the intra-market relationships using a spliced
ABX dataset and two traded ABX vintages. We find contagious effects during the
subprime crisis, emanating mainly from shocks to the higher-rated assets.
Finally, the third issue (Chapters 5 & 6) examines contagion from the subprime
mortgage-backed securities market to several other asset markets using both the origi-
nal and an extended version of Longstaff’s (2010) VAR framework. Using the original
specification, evidence of contagion is found but we uncover important differences be-
tween the choice of index used to proxy for the subprime mortgage-backed securities
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market. Furthermore, employing a more innovative econometric tool, namely a time-
varying transition probability Markov-switching VAR, shows that although contagion
played a role in transmitting the shock to other markets, it may not have been as
prevalent as suggested by the original VAR framework. We conclude that accurately
dating the crisis is crucial to the analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contains four essays examining various aspects of the financial crisis of
2007-2009 by focusing on the widely cited source of the problem, the United States’
subprime mortgage-backed securities market. In order to do so the ABX.HE indexes
are employed to represent this market and so these are the focus of this study. This
thesis analyses three issues in relation to this market’s role in the crisis. The issues
examined include an empirical examination of the risk underlying this market; an anal-
ysis of contagion within this market; and finally an investigation of contagion from this
market to other financial markets during the crisis.
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of the crisis and the role that subprime
mortgage-backed securities played in it while the subsequent four chapters all involve
empirical analysis of the ABX.HE indexes. Principal component analysis (PCA) is
employed in Chapter 3 in order to reduce the dimensionality of noisy ABX returns
and uncover common driving factors. OLS regression and rolling regression analyses
are also used to trace the evolution of the crisis from a real estate problem to a much
broader global credit crisis. Several vector autoregressive (VAR) analyses are esti-
mated throughout the thesis to test for contagion as a significant increase in market
linkages following a shock, e.g. a traditional VAR model (Chapter 4), a VAR model
with dummy variables included to account for crisis periods (Chapter 5) and a time-
varying transition probability Markov switching VAR (Chapter 6). The VAR models
employed in Chapters 4 and 5 allow us to test for contagion under a framework in
which crisis and non-crisis regimes are exogenously selected while the VAR employed
12
in Chapter 6 enables regimes to be determined endogenously by the data.
The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, dis-
cusses the subprime mortgage-backed credit derivatives that were its focal point and
describes the ABX indexes, traded credit indexes backed by U.S. subprime mortgages
that are empirically analysed throughout this thesis. These indexes provide the only
available proxy for the distressed asset-backed security market and there is a growing
literature analysing their role in the crisis and their underlying risk factors (such as
Dungey, Dwyer & Flavin, 2013; Fender & Scheicher, 2008; Gorton, 2009; and Mizrach,
2011).
Chapter 3 investigates the risk underlying the ABX indexes, an important issue as it
became clear in the aftermath of the crisis that, in the majority of cases, this risk had
been grossly underestimated, leading these products to be mispriced and precipitating
the crisis. Prior empirical research in this area reports that risk factors affecting the
indexes changed over the evolution of the crisis and highlights the heterogeneous nature
of ABX vintages, as well as differences across the ratings tranches comprising these
securities (Dungey, Dwyer & Flavin, 2013; Fender & Scheicher, 2008). Preliminary
OLS regression analysis indicates that house prices are the main driver of variation in
ABX returns over the sample period. However, as related literature (Brunnermeier,
2008; Gorton, 2009) suggests that other factors had a role to play in the crisis, principal
component analysis (PCA) is performed on the ABX returns to reduce the dimension-
ality of such a noisy data set and uncover the common factors driving the variation in
the ABX. The results suggest that commonality fell across vintages (consistent with
findings by Fender & Scheicher, 2008), suggesting that they are unique, distinct assets
(as suggested by Dungey, Dwyer & Flavin, 2013). The main principal component is
13
then included in further OLS regression analysis in place of ABX returns in an attempt
to obtain clearer results. The results show that factors other than house prices, such
as liquidity and counterparty risk, drive ABX returns during the sample period. To
examine the behaviour of the regression coefficients over time a rolling regression anal-
ysis is then employed, the results of which suggest that, over the evolution of the crisis,
concerns regarding house prices became overshadowed by concerns regarding liquidity
and counterparty risk (as suggested by Brunnermeier, 2008).
Chapter 4 analyses contagion within the ABX indexes in a further effort to understand
these complex securities. To date there exists no prior empirical work addressing this
question, although Longstaff (2010) tests for contagion from the ABX to other finan-
cial markets during the crisis. Chapter 4, along with Chapters 5 and 6, therefore
treats Longstaff (2010) as the benchmark test for contagion during the recent crisis.
The spliced ABX index of Longstaff (2010) is analysed, along with two traded ABX
vintages, using a VAR framework. The results indicate evidence of contagion within
the three ABX series analysed during the 2007 “subprime-crisis” period, which then
dissipates in the 2008 “global-crisis” period as markets suffered the liquidity freeze,
before increasing slightly during the 2009 “post-crisis” period, as markets rebounded
following the crisis. The sum of lagged coefficients indicate that persistent shocks em-
anate from the higher-rated assets in the traded vintages but from the lower-rated
assets in the spliced ABX, indicating that splicing the data may affect results.
Chapter 5 analyses contagion from the ABX to several fixed income, equity and volatil-
ity markets following Longstaff (2010). Contagion during a catastrophic crisis such as
that experienced in 2007-2009 is clearly of importance to both investors and institu-
tions and there is a growing literature testing for its presence during the recent crisis.
Empirical analysis has found evidence of contagion, during the subprime crisis, in the
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interbank markets of both emerging and developing countries and the capital markets
of developed countries (Abbassi & Aschnabel, 2009; Hwang, In & Kim, 2010; Horta,
Mendes & Vieira, 2008). As yet, only Longstaff (2010) uses the ABX to test for conta-
gion during the crisis so Chapter 5 applies his VAR framework to two traded vintages
to test for contagion to other asset markets during the crisis. Evidence of contagion
is found, but results differ across ABX assets. One limitation of the methodology pre-
sented in Longstaff (2010) is that crisis regimes are imposed exogenously on the data.
The subsequent chapter therefore attempts to address this issue.
Chapter 6 also investigates contagion from the ABX to asset markets during the crisis,
by extending the methodology of Chapter 5. To allow regimes to be endogenously
determined by the data a time-varying transition probability Markov-switching VAR
(TVTP MS-VAR) is employed. We identify two regimes; a non-crisis regime classified
by low volatility and a crisis regime characterized by high volatility. The change in
regime occurs in mid-2007, with the risky regime dominating thereafter. We find lim-
ited evidence of contagion during the crisis regime, and certainly not as widespread
as in Longstaff (2010). This indicates that correctly dating the crisis is crucial to the
analysis and suggests that risk may have filtered down through channels more closely
related to the ABX before reaching the financial markets analysed.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents an overview of the main contributions and results of this
dissertation along with proposing a number of future avenues of research that have
arisen from this work.
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Chapter 2
Credit Derivatives, Securitization and the U.S. Subprime Mortgage
Crisis
2.1. Introduction
In mid-2007 the United States’ financial system suffered its most severe crisis in almost
a century, a crisis that led to a global recession worse than that experienced during the
Great Depression of the 1930s (Eichengreen & O’Rourke, 2010). In the aftermath of
the crisis it became clear that it had originated in the market for innovative financial
products, namely structured finance products backed by U.S. subprime mortgages
(Levitin et al., 2009). Such mortgages are granted to borrowers with poor or even no
credit history and so are riskier than their prime counterparts. However, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1, the market for securities backed by these mortgages was relatively small
in 2007 compared to overall global securities markets and was, in fact, approximately
one hundred times smaller than government and corporate markets (Dwyer & Tkac,
2009).
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here]
It is now apparent that the risk underlying these structured finance products was
extremely underestimated and subsequently grossly mispriced (Orlowski, 2008). Fol-
lowing the crisis there have been calls for a complete review of the entire sector, par-
ticularly in the regulation of these securities and the incentives driving those trading
them (Caprio et al., 2008). It is likely that the quality of the underlying asset will
become crucial in future trading, as investors cautiously re-enter the market (Buiter,
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2007).
This chapter describes how this tiny sector of the financial system contributed to one
of the worst global financial crises experienced by examining the complex securities
underlying this market. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section
2.2 describes credit derivatives in detail, while section 2.3 examines the process of se-
curitization and the creation of asset-backed securities. It also gives details of traded
credit indexes based on subprime mortgage-backed assets which are utilized in empir-
ical applications throughout this thesis. Section 2.4 provides an overview of the U.S.
crisis in relation to subprime mortgage-backed assets. A final section then concludes.
2.2. Credit Derivatives
In order to comprehend how structured finance products contributed to the collapse
of the U.S. financial system it is important to first gain an understanding of how these
structures operate at a fundamental level, and so this section describes the two central
credit derivatives that formed the majority of these securities; credit default swaps
(CDS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). A simple derivative security may
be classified as a bilateral financial contract in which pay-off is derived from an under-
lying asset or event. A credit derivative may be defined as a contract in which pay-off
depends upon the creditworthiness of one or more companies or countries, referred to
as reference entities. Default by a reference entity is known as a credit event. In recent
years such securities have provided exciting advancements in derivatives markets, with
gross notional principal outstanding for credit derivative contracts reaching almost $60
trillion in 2007, an increase from below $2 trillion in 2002 (Weistroffer et al., 2009).
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Credit derivatives provide ways for financial institutions to diversify credit risk as they
enable these organisations to reduce their credit exposure to borrowers.1 These con-
tracts allow institutions to actively manage and trade credit risks in a similar way to
how they trade market risks (Hull & White, 2000) with banks the main buyers of this
protection and insurance companies the main sellers (Bonfim, 2005). An important
feature of credit derivatives is that neither the buyer nor the seller of the contract is
required to possess the underlying asset, a characteristic that contributed to the mar-
kets rapid growth, but also to its opacity. Wagner (2007) argues that, although credit
derivatives initially generated asset liquidity and led to a more stable banking system,
this stability eventually weakened because banks began to engage in riskier behaviour.
This moral hazard problem became a key contributing factor to the evolution of the
crisis (Brunnermeier, 2008).
Credit derivatives may be classified as “single-name” or “multi-name”. The most pop-
ular single name credit derivative is known as a credit default swap (CDS).
2.2.1. Credit Default Swaps (CDS)
Credit default swaps (CDS) are a type of pure credit derivative and form the basis of
the credit derivatives market (Hull, 2010).2 These are privately negotiated contracts
in which the buyer makes periodic payments to the seller so as to obtain a payment if
a specified credit event occurs. The periodic payments are typically made in arrears
every quarter, every half-year, or every year until the end of the life of the CDS or
until a credit event occurs. In the event of a default the seller pays the amount insured
to the buyer and receives the impaired asset. Consider, for example, two parties who
1Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) define credit risk as the risk that a loss will be experienced due to a
default by the writer of the derivative security or by the asset underlying the security.
2Pure credit derivatives allow institutions to purchase protection on a single exposure.
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enter into a five-year CDS on November 1, 2013, with a notional principal of $500
million in which the buyer is contracted to pay 70 basis points annually for insurance
against default by the reference entity. Should the reference entity default, the seller
of the CDS will be required to pay the face value of the bonds worth $500 million in
return for the impaired asset. In the absence of a default the buyer receives no pay-off
and pays $3,500,000 on November 1 for the next five years. Figure 2.2 illustrates this
basic contract.
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here]
An institution’s CDS spread is the amount paid per annum for insurance against de-
fault by the company, as a percentage of the notional principal. These spreads provide
a measure of credit risk as a high cost of insurance would indicate the market’s percep-
tion that the reference entity is more likely to default. CDS contracts enable financial
institutions to actively control their risks, allowing credit risk to be transferred and
diversified, thus reducing financial institutions credit exposure to particular reference
entities (O’Kane, 2011).
However, credit default swaps operate in a, thus far, highly unregulated over-the-
counter (OTC) market. This means that buyers of credit default swaps can essentially
“naked short” companies’ debts without restriction (Bender & Schneider, 2008). This
lack of regulation in one of the world’s largest and most active financial markets sug-
gests that authorities either presumed that institutions would self-regulate or they
simply did not expect a crash of major proportions. This market also suffers from
an acute asymmetric information problem (Nicolo´ & Pelizzon, 2008) as some market
participants undoubtedly have more information regarding particular companies than
others, and sellers of insurance could potentially use this information to speculate.
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In the wake of the crisis the Squam Lake Working Group (2009), among others, has
suggested that there may be a role for a form of clearing house to attempt to regulate
these derivatives and tackle the problem of asymmetric information.
Although the CDS market was, of course, hit by the crisis of 2007 it has, thus far, sur-
vived it remarkably well and financial institutions continue to use these instruments to
manage their credit risks, with the notional amount outstanding at over $14 billion as
of December 2012 (Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review, June 2013).
2.2.2. Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)
A typical multi-name credit derivative is the collateralized debt obligation (CDO). A
CDO is a financial claim to cash flows produced by a portfolio of debt securities and
so can facilitate the trade of the credit risk of entire portfolios. This removal of credit
risk from the balance sheet of the originator is one motivation for CDO issuance.
CDOs have been in existence since the late 1980s but were not widely traded until
after 2000, with global CDO issuance increasing from just under $67 billion to over
$520 billion between the years 2000 and 2006 (Securities Industry & Financial Markets
Association). This growth is evident in Figure 2.3, as is the negative effect of the
2007-2009 crisis on issuance volumes.
[Insert Figure 2.3 about here]
In a CDO the assets are pooled together and then tranched according to the order in
which investors will receive payment and the order in which they will be affected by
defaults.3 A basic CDO structure is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
3This is a form of asset securitization which is dealt with in more detail in the following section.
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[Insert Figure 2.4 about here]
It is clear from Figure 2.4 that the senior tranche dominates, causing the structure to
appear top heavy. This tranche offers the lowest return in the CDO and its investors
receive payment first. In order for this tranche to be negatively affected sufficient
defaults to wipe out both the mezzanine and equity tranches must take place, thus
providing the senior tranche with a “virtual cushion” to absorb those losses. This
cushion was one of the main reasons that this tranche usually received a AAA-rating,
a process known as “credit enhancement” (Benmelech & Dlugosz, 2009). By this pro-
cess financial protection is provided to cover losses on securitized assets, thus improving
these asset’s credit profiles and increasing their overall credit rating.
The equity tranche is located at the bottom of the CDO structure. As this is the first
tranche to be affected by defaults it is the most risky in the CDO, therefore offering
the highest return. Holders of this tranche are paid last. This risky security is usually
unrated and highly illiquid, leading it to be labelled “toxic debt”, and “toxic waste”
at the height of the crisis. Due to its unpopularity with investors it was often held by
the issuing financial institution, however in most cases it did not hold it directly on its
books. Instead the bank held it in a separate legal entity, often owned by the parent
bank itself, known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV).4 An SPV is a bankruptcy-remote
company that financial institutions utilize to raise cheaper financing by issuing short-
term debt.5 It may also be used to help remove credit risk from a balance sheet by
moving risky loans to the SPV. SPVs are usually funded using short-term borrowing
by issuing asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) which is continuously rolled over
4Also known as a special purpose entity (SPE), a structured investment vehicle (SIV) or simply a
conduit.
5Bankruptcy-remote means that it should not be affected by bankruptcy of the originating bank.
21
to invest in long-term assets that are less liquid but pay higher returns.6 The ABCP
market was considered to be the most liquid part of the market in the years preceding
the crisis. The maturity mismatch resulting from the combination of long-term lend-
ing and short-term borrowing was a major contributing factor to the liquidity crisis
that followed the subprime crisis as institutions became unable to roll over their debt.
These SPVs also helped to create what became known as a “shadow banking system”
(Adrian et al., 2010).7
As well as a way of dealing with a lack of demand for these assets another motiva-
tion for the SPV to hold the equity tranche would be to inspire investor confidence in
these assets. However, appreciating property prices caused by the housing bubble in
the run-up to the crisis meant that these institutions had little qualms about holding
such a risky security. For many the reasoning at the time was that if defaults did
occur they would gain possession of an apparently continuously appreciating asset. It
appears that the possibility of mass defaults was not seriously considered by many of
these banks in the period preceding the crisis.
The mezzanine tranche lies between the senior and equity tranches, and is usually
rated between AA and BBB. As the senior tranche was most popular with investors
during the period preceding the crisis and the equity tranche was usually held by the
SPV, there existed no natural buyer for the mezzanine tranche, causing it to become
the most difficult to sell. To increase the appeal of the mezzanine tranche to investors
the creators of these structures began to repackage the mezzanine tranches of several
deals together to create new CDOs. These CDOs were then rated as separate entities,
6ABCP typically has a maturity of between 90 and 180 days.
7The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of 2010 defines shadow banking as, “...bank-like activities
that are conducted outside the traditional commercial banking system, many of which are unregulated
or lightly regulated.”
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with the senior tranches of the new securities usually receiving AAA ratings, as dis-
cussed by Watterson (2005). These CDOs backed by portfolios of other CDOs became
known as CDO squareds, and the growth in popularity and subsequent increase in
demand for these securities then led to the creation of CDO cubeds, which are CDOs
backed by a portfolio of CDO squareds. Unsurprisingly this form of financial alchemy
resulted in these securities becoming increasingly complex and interconnected. This
meant that a default in one, instead of remaining isolated to that security, negatively
affected others, leading to mass losses. The AAA rating that approximately 80% of
the structure subsequently received led investors to believe that a AAA-rated CDO
security was equivalent to a similarly rated corporate bond and, as these new struc-
tured finance products were yielding higher returns, demand for them sky-rocketed
(Wojtowicz, 2011).
Scheicher (2008) estimates the relationship between CDO tranche premia and market-
based measures of credit, liquidity and interest rate risk. It is found that the observed
increase in tranche premia can be largely attributed to a declining risk appetite and
increased concerns about liquidity. The CDO market was severely damaged during the
crisis and there followed a “flight to quality”, during which investors turned to safer
assets such as government bonds (Longstaff, 2010).
2.3. Securitization and Asset-Backed Securities (ABS)
As the credit derivative market began to experience rapid growth so did the process of
credit securitization (Henke et al., 1998) and by the early 2000s the two had become
interlinked, together laying the foundations for the crisis of 2007. Securitization is a
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process by which institutions reconstruct assets that they hold into tradable securities
which are then sold on to investors. The transformation of an illiquid asset into a
tradable security has the effect of making it more liquid than the loan underlying it.
The security usually takes on the tranche structure described in section 2.2.
Mortgages are among the most commonly securitized assets (Minton et al., 1997) and
were historically considered to be part of the relatively stable housing market, a trend
observed up until approximately 2000, illustrated by Figure 2.5.
[Insert Figure 2.5 about here]
Securitization of mortgages began in the 1970s, with Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac the main market participants (Barth et al., 2008).8 However, it was not
until the 2000s, with the surge in popularity of innovative financial products, such as
CDOs, that the market for these securities really took off. This led to what became
known as the “originate and distribute” model, in which financial institutions issue
loans which are then pooled together and tranched in order to resell to investors. This
is opposed to the conventional “originate and hold” strategy that banks traditionally
followed, in which financial institutions issue loans and then simply maintain them on
their balance sheet. These two models are illustrated by Figure 2.6.
[Insert Figure 2.6 about here]
It is clear from Figure 2.6 that this new system brought more players into this market
while also causing it to become highly interconnected. Instead of the originating insti-
tution bearing all of the credit risk from loans, as in the “originate and hold” model,
8The Government National Mortgage Association, the Federal National Mortgage Association and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, respectively.
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the risk is distributed among several investors and the SPV in the “originate and dis-
tribute” model, meaning that all are negatively affected by defaults. These linkages
led to the entire financial system suffering when mass mortgage defaults did occur.
The securitization process enabled investors to select securities according to their risk
preferences and was initially hailed by many as a valuable instrument for reducing risk.
In 1999 the then chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, stated in a speech
to the Futures Industry Association that these derivatives were, “an important vehicle
for unbundling risks”. However, as the demand for these securitized loans rapidly in-
creased in the mid-2000s, the “originate and distribute” model ultimately contributed
to a severe reduction in lending standards (Purnanandam, 2011; Keys et al., 2010; and
Kiff & Mills, 2007). To meet this demand for mortgages to securitize, many lenders
relaxed their screening methods and granted loans to borrowers who were ultimately
unable to repay them. Wall Street banks began demanding more and more loans from
mortgage lenders and suddenly people who previously had not qualified for a mort-
gage had their choice of loans from brokers. Brunnermeier (2008) suggests that it was
this “originate and distribute” model, along with the maturity mismatch of financial
institutions loans and borrowings, that led to the recent financial crisis.
2.3.1. The ABX.HE Indexes
2.3.1.1 Overview of Indexes
The exceptional growth of the subprime mortgage-backed securities sector during the
early 2000s led to the creation of the ABX.HE indexes, standardized indexes that
provided credibility, transparency and liquidity to this relatively new and innovative
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structured finance market.9 Produced by the Markit Group, trading on the ABX was
launched on January 19, 2006, to enthusiastic investors. Indeed, volume on the first
trading day was reported to be approximately $5 billion, although this decreased in
subsequent trading days (Whetten, 2006). The name ABX.HE denotes “Asset-backed
securities index-home equity” and it represents a standardized basket of home equity
asset-backed reference obligations, basically a basket of synthetic CDOs underlying
subprime mortgages.10 The indexes track twenty equally weighted, static U.S. portfo-
lios of credit default swaps backed by subprime mortgages. Each vintage takes on a
CDO structure, covering specifically rated reference obligations (AAA, AA, A, BBB,
and BBB-).11 Ratings are the lower of those issued by Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s (S&P’s). AAA-rated ABX securities thus reference a specific AAA-rated class
from each of the twenty portfolios of subprime mortgage-backed credit default swaps,
while AA-rated ABX securities reference AA-rated class from the pool and so on down
to BBB-. However, considering that there are approximately fifteen tranches in each
mortgage-backed security and the indexes only take into account five of these the ABX
cannot be seen as a perfect representation of the market. Nonetheless it is the closest
proxy available (Finger, 2007).
2.3.1.2 Overview of Index Construction
Each ABX vintage is based on twenty subprime mortgage-backed securities issued over
the previous six-month period and vintages are renewed or “rolled” every six months.
9Throughout this thesis the ABX.HE indexes may be referred to as the “ABX”, the “ABX indexes”
or “ABX vintages”. Note that the terminology “ABX index” and “ABX vintage” is used interchange-
ably. “ABX asset”, “ABX ratings class” and “ABX rating tranche” refers to the assets comprising
each index/vintage
10In a synthetic CDO the underlying credit exposures are obtained using a credit default swap. In
comparison to cash CDOs, which have a referenced portfolio comprised of cash assets such as loans,
the reference portfolio of a synthetic CDO is made up of credit default swaps.
11See section 2.2.
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Only four vintages have been issued, with the fifth subject to several postponements
and unlikely to go ahead.
Each vintage is a synthetic CDO in which the ratings do not differentiate borrowers
according to how risky they are. Instead they simply distinguish the order in which
investors bear losses and receive payments. The misconception that a AAA-rated ABX
asset was equal to that of a corporate bond led many mandate-driven bodies, such as
pension funds and universities, to heavily invest in these securities.
2.3.1.3 ABX Construction Process
In order to construct each ABX vintage the Markit group submit a list to each licensed
dealer of two deals from the largest 25 subprime home equity issuers. To be included
in the ABX indexes each residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) must meet
stringent requirements, such as deal size must be at least $500 million, the weighted
average Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) score of the creditors backing the securities
issued in the RMBS transaction may not be greater than 660 and at least four of
the required tranches must be registered pursuant to the U.S. Securities Act of 1933.12
Deals must pay on the 25th of each month, at least 90% of the deals’ assets must be 1st
lien mortgages, referenced tranches must bear interest at a floating rate benchmark of
one-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and, at issuance, each deal must
have tranches of the required ratings with a weighted average life greater than four
years, except the AAA which must have an average life of longer than five years.
On the following day, each dealer submits to Markit a ranking of their preference of
12In the U.S. an individual’s credit risk is commonly measured by a FICO score. These scores range
from 300 to 850 and are based on analysis of the individual’s credit history. A mortgage issued to a
borrower with a FICO score of 620 or less is classified as a subprime mortgage.
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deal for each issuer. From these submissions Markit creates a master list of 20 deals
conditional on no more than four deals with loans from the same originator and no
more than six deals with the same master servicer. These conditions are an attempt
to ensure diversification within each vintage.
At least four days prior to the creation of each new vintage Markit notifies dealers of
its composition, then publishes this information.
Each vintage contains this same list of reference obligations until all reference obli-
gations have been fully paid off or have matured. On the day before each vintage
creation date, each market maker submits to Markit a fixed rate for it, based on their
calculations. The average of these spreads rounded up to the nearest basis point then
serves as the fixed rate.
2.3.1.4 ABX Pricing Mechanics
As the crisis of 2007 unfolded it became clear that the ABX indexes had been grossly
mispriced. Fender & Scheicher (2008) propose one way to calculate ABX prices as:
p = 100 + c
n∑
l=1
zisitifi − (1− δ)
n∑
l=1
zi(si − 1− si)fi, (2.1)
in which p=index price, c=coupon payment, z=risk-free discount factor, s=probability
of no default, t=time period, δ = recovery rate (i.e. the price of the bond immediately
after default as a percentage of its face value) andf=bond factor measuring prepay-
ments on ABX bonds. This may be written in simplified terms as:
Price = 100 + PV (Coupons)− PV (Writedowns), (2.2)
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in which 100 is the par value of the index. The present value of the coupons is fixed as
a percentage of notional over the life of the vintage on it’s initiation. It is paid by the
protection buyer to the protection seller for insurance should a credit event occur. The
present value of write-downs or losses is variable and is paid from the protection seller
to the buyer in the case of a credit event. Equations (2.1) and (2.2) highlight that it is
vital that the value of the coupons be high enough to cover potential losses. However,
as it transpired, they were not and when defaults began accumulating write-downs
rapidly increased. Protection sellers simply could not afford to cover losses.
An alternative way to consider ABX prices is presented below:
ArtificalCDOprice = HypotheticalRiskFreeBondPrice−ObservedCDSPremium
(2.3)
A CDO, like a bond, has an observable price. However, a CDS has only an observable
premium. Because each ABX vintage is a synthetic CDO created using a CDS we
must create an artificial CDO price by subtracting the observed CDS premium from a
hypothetical risk-free bond price.
In order to further understand ABX pricing mechanics consider the following example.
Suppose on March 6th 2006 we wish to purchase $10 million of the ABX 06-1 AAA-
rated tranche. The coupon, fixed at initiation, is 20 basis points and the ABX price
on that day is 98. The price we pay is as follows:
Price = [Notional(Coupon+ (100− price)Factor)], (2.4)
=[10,000,000 x (.0020 + (100% - 98%))x 1] = 220,000,
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As equation 2.4 indicates, we pay pay the notional amount of $10 million multiplied by
the coupon plus a once-off payment of the difference between par and the quoted ABX
price. This is then multiplied by the factor, which is a measure of current notional
outstanding. A factor of one indicates that no deals in the vintage have defaulted.
Now, suppose that one of the twenty deals in the vintage completely defaults. In this
case we receive:
10,000,000 (Change in Factor) = 10,000,000 x 0.05 = 500,000
and we now pay:
[10,000,000 (.0020 x 0.95)] = 19,000
which is the notional amount multiplied by the product of the coupon and the new
factor.13
Figure 2.7 plots ABX raw prices for each vintage from its issuance date until December
31, 2009.14
[Insert Figure 2.7 about here]
There is clearly a steep decline in prices in all four vintages over the sample period.
As the subprime deals underlying the ABX 06-1 vintage were issued in the second half
of 2005 the assets underlying this vintage would be of considerably better quality than
those included in later issuances. It is clear that all assets in this vintage traded at
or near par for all of 2006 before declining rapidly during 2007, a trend evident in the
13Note that the difference between par and the quoted ABX price is only paid when the contract is
entered into.
14Note that as each vintage was issued six months subsequent to the previous issuance the data are
unbalanced.
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other three vintages. However, the AAA-rated asset in the ABX 06-1 vintage does
not reach the lows of later issued AAA assets and it is clear that the two later issued
vintages were hardest hit by the crisis. Sabry & Okongwu (2009) calculate that a $100
investment in the ABX 07-1 vintage BBB asset in January 2007 was worth just $5 by
September 2008. Trading in the ABX came to almost a complete halt following the
subprime crisis of mid-2007. It did resume following the shock as investors tentatively
re-entered the market but it is highly unlikely that trading volumes will ever reach the
highs experienced in the months leading up to the crisis. However, the Markit Group
Ltd. did report a 39% increase in the price of AAA-rated assets within the ABX 06-1
vintage in 2012 and a report issued in November 2012 by Goldman Sachs recommended
its clients invest in the ABX indexes, reflecting improvements in the housing market.
2.4. The 2007 U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis
As mentioned earlier, in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis it transpired that it had orig-
inated in the subprime mortgage-backed securities market. However, before looking
into this market in more detail it is useful to investigate the environment that facili-
tated its development. In 1998 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York organised a $3.6
billion bailout of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), hailing the return of the
“too big to fail” doctrine (Dowd, 1999). The early 2000s witnessed the burst of the
dotcom bubble, sending financial markets into chaos. This situation was compounded
by the U.S. terrorist attacks of 2001, prompting central banks worldwide to imple-
ment strategies aimed at creating liquidity and stimulating the global economy. Many
adopted accommodative interest rate policies, particularly the Federal Reserve. In fact
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the Federal Funds Rate, the rate at which depository institutions lend to each other
overnight, was decreased eleven times between January and December 2001 (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York) creating readily available credit in markets. In order to
take advantage of this investors began to undertake riskier investments with the aim
of obtaining higher absolute returns. This encouraged lenders to take on greater risks
also, thus leading to an unprecedented increase in the issuance of risky subprime mort-
gages. Originations of such mortgages reached record levels of $665 billion in 2005, as
illustrated in Figure 2.8, and this contributed to the inflation of a housing bubble.
[Insert Figure 2.8 about here]
Along with taking on riskier loans there was also an increase in institutions undertak-
ing the process of securitizing debt.15 This practice was not new, however previously
securitized debt was usually held on balance sheet and used as collateral to fund bor-
rowing. Now institutions began securitizing different types of underlying assets, such
as credit card debt, and moving loans off balance sheet. During the mid-2000s sub-
prime mortgages were extensively securitized, with approximately 80% of subprime
loans repackaged as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) between 2001 and 2005 (Barth
et al., 2008).
Such mortgages relied upon the constant appreciation of house prices in order for the
system to function as many borrowers were refinancing in order to keep afloat (Gor-
ton, 2009). The decrease in house prices in 2007 therefore burst the bubble, leading
to numerous foreclosures and defaults and, consequently, the financial crisis (Shiller,
2008).
As mentioned earlier a subprime mortgage may be defined as a mortgage granted to a
15See section 2.3.
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borrower with poor credit history or, in some cases, even no credit history (Hull, 2010).
As illustrated in Figure 2.8 between 2003 and 2006 issuance of these subprime mort-
gages increased rapidly and home ownership grew for the first time in nearly twenty
years (U.S. Census Bureau). In fact at the height of the mortgage selling frenzy brokers
were issuing what became known as “NINJA” mortgages, in which the borrower had
“no income, no job or assets”. It also became common to accept little or no down
payment, with many lenders offering as high as 150% mortgages. It is now clear that
this new model created incentive problems for those issuing mortgages as ultimately
they did not bear the credit risk, motivated to simply originate as many as possible.
It led to an acute asymmetric information problem as institutions purchasing packages
of these mortgages had little knowledge of their risk, the reality being that the banks
knew much more about the holders of the mortgages than those buying the loans did.
These problems compounded one other and these products became extremely opaque
and obscure. It is estimated that up to 80% of loans issued to subprime borrowers
during this time were “hybrid” loans (U.S. Structured Finance Newsletter, October
2005) such as adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) with low “teaser” rates that enticed
people to take these loans out. As soon as the teaser rate expired, interest rates in-
creased; often at an alarming pace. In most instances institutions were required to
hold the loans for a minimum of three months to prove that the mortgage payer was
credit worthy, so these ARMs could have led those purchasing the mortgages to believe
that they were much less risky than in reality. As the institutions were then selling
the loans on and therefore transferring the credit risk to those purchasing them the
creditworthiness of the borrower was of little concern to them. As mentioned earlier
many borrowers were refinancing and living off the equity on their houses, a system
that functioned well as long as house prices continued to appreciate. Indeed during
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this boom period the U.S. saw an increase in the practice of what became known as
“flipping houses”, in which people bought houses, kept them a short period of time
until the price appreciated and then sold them on, making a profit. However, by the
third quarter of 2006 this system came under pressure as house price appreciation
began to slow (Federal Housing Finance Agency). New buyers found it increasingly
difficult to obtain mortgages and house prices began to decline. This led to those al-
ready with mortgages unable to refinance, which then led to mortgage delinquencies by
both prime and subprime borrowers. These delinquencies mounted and it soon became
clear that a major mispricing of the risk of these mortgage-backed structured securi-
ties had occurred. Many of the AAA-rated subprime mortgage-backed securities were
downgraded to junk overnight (Connor et al., 2010). These announcements caused
widespread panic for institutions holding these products. In August 2007 France’s
largest investment bank, BNP Paribas, announced that it had temporarily suspended
valuation of three funds invested in U.S. asset-backed securities and that it had also
frozen redemptions until liquidity returned to the market. This shook up the entire
system, causing the crisis to spread to interbank lending and leading to a worldwide
liquidity crisis in the fall of 2008, initiated by the collapse of Wall Street giant Lehman
Brothers on September 15th. Brunnermeier (2008) offers a detailed explanation of the
crisis by examining what led to its occurrence, describing four main economic devices
that may have enabled the mortgage crisis to evolve into the far-reaching liquidity
crisis. The instruments presented are the balance sheet effects of borrowers, the disin-
tegration of liquidity, and the influence of bank runs and network effects on financial
institutions’ wealth. When considering balance sheet effects it is important to bear
in mind capital requirements as once these requirements are met the average return
earned on loans may be less appealing than that on other assets. Therefore loans can
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behave in an almost illiquid manner and maintaining them on the balance sheet may
seem disadvantageous.
The most widely used international regulations for capital requirements are outlined
in the Basel Accords. The first Basel Accord of 1988 required banks to hold 8% of
regulatory capital, a requirement reduced under Basel II in 2007. These capital require-
ments are intended to provide banks with suitable motivation to properly control their
risk. However, in the early 2000s, banks discovered that they themselves could reduce
these requirements by pooling their loans into SPVs, as discussed in section 2.2.2. The
repositioning of a group of the banks loans into such an off-balance sheet vehicle and
the subsequent credit line that the bank then awarded it in order to promote liquidity
and encourage confidence ensured that these institutions could decrease their required
regulatory capital without altering their risk. This is known as “regulatory arbitrage”.
However, even though it did not appear on the banks balance sheet the majority of
credit risk remained with the banks as they still held the loans, albeit in a conduit.
This left them exposed to substantial funding liquidity risk. As banks were relying
more and more upon liquidity in order to sustain this new system they simply could
not afford it to suddenly evaporate.
The credit line, known as “liquidity backstop”, also ensured that the pool received a
AAA-rating, achieved through the diversification of non-systematic risk. It is impor-
tant to note that this rating was awarded to the CDO tranche, not the individual assets
comprising that tranche. As discussed in section 2.2.2 this became known as “credit
enhancement”, the phenomenon that each asset individually may be of low quality but
once pooled together a large proportion of the security receives a AAA-rating. Pen-
sion funds, universities and police retirement funds tend to have ratings mandates by
which they may only invest in AAA-rated securities. Therefore these investors were
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now able to enter the market. Also, as Basel II was based on asset ratings this strategy
succeeded in substantially reducing capital charges.
It is noteworthy that credit rating agencies received higher fees for structured finance
products and also made their software available to those that they were rating. Also,
the statistical models used to rate these securities were based on historical house prices
over a relatively short period of time, ten years in some cases, and the assumption that
they could only appreciate. They therefore provided overly confident estimates regard-
ing the risk of default. In hindsight it appears that the models used to rate these assets
were extremely complex and unrealistic. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission re-
port into credit ratings in 2010 quoted former Moody’s Managing Director Jerome
Fons as describing methods of credit analysis as “beyond the grasp of many investors”.
The third mechanism Brunnermeier (2008) outlines is the effects of runs on financial
institutions. He concludes that the first-mover advantage may make these institutions
subject to such runs. The final mechanism described is network effects, whereby insti-
tutions lend and borrow simultaneously, a practice undertaken by many institutions
preceding the crisis. Here, network and gridlock risk are encountered as each institution
cannot pay its debts because other market participants are not paying theirs.
2.5. Conclusions
The majority of literature available on the subject suggests that distorted incentives
and moral hazard problems had a large role to play in the recent financial crisis. It also
claims that what occurred was a standard, albeit large in magnitude, crisis following the
burst of a housing bubble. Demyanyk & Hemert (2011) examine subprime mortgage
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loan quality and calculate that it was in decline for six years in the run up to the crisis.
Interestingly they also claim that those repackaging the loans had some knowledge of
this. They conclude that the crisis followed a typical boom-bust cycle and could have
been avoided had the high house prices caused by the bubble not served to mask the
underlying problems.
Purnanandam (2011) concludes that a distortion in screening incentives and excessive
risk-taking led to the crisis, while Mah-Hui (2008) compares this crisis to past crises
and concludes that they are similar in nature. Financial innovation, and particularly
its contribution to systemic risk, is cited as a contributing factor. Whalen (2008) cites
failure of regulatory bodies and government policies as the largest contribution to the
crisis while Murphy (2008) places the blame with the unrealistic assumptions adapted
by the financial models employed at the time.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, employed by the United States government
with the aim of investigating what caused the crisis, concluded in its final report in
January 2011 that “the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: Widespread failures
in financial regulation, including the Federal Reserves’ failure to stem the tide of toxic
mortgages; Dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including too many financial
firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; An explosive mix of excessive
borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial system on
a collision course with crisis; Key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking
a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in
accountability and ethics at all levels”.
It is clear that a severe deterioration in incentives, failures in regulatory organisations
and complex, innovative structured finance products led to the financial crisis of 2007.
It was preceded by a period of uncertainty and turbulence, fuelled by accommodative
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interest rates and policies intended to restore the economy and brought to unparalleled
heights by corruptive behaviour, irrational risk taking and a lack of regulation.
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Figure 2.1: Relative Size of Global Financial Markets (2007 Figures).
Figure compiled using data sourced from the Bank of England Stability Report, 2007.
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Figure 2.2: Credit Default Swap (CDS).
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Figure 2.3: Global CDO Issuance 2000-2013.
Figures in USD billions. Figure compiled using data sourced from the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
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Figure 2.4: Basic CDO Tranche Structure.
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Figure 2.5: United States’ House Prices.
Inflation adjusted U.S. house prices. Figure compiled using data sourced from the
Federal Housing Finance Agency.
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Figure 2.7: ABX Indexes Raw Prices.
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Figure 2.8: Subprime Mortgage Origination Volume.
The left hand side vertical axis illustrates subprime mortgage originations in USD
billions; the right hand side vertical axis illustrates these subprime mortgage origina-
tions as a percentage of total originations. Figure compiled using data sourced from
Inside Mortgage Finance.
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Chapter 3
Identifying Risk Factors Underlying the U.S. Subprime
Mortgage-Backed Securities Market
3.1. Introduction
The years preceding the 2007 financial crisis saw the United States enter an environ-
ment of unprecedented growth and prosperity, the “great moderation” as it became
known, a period in which the financial system experienced some of its largest gains in
history (International Swaps & Derivatives Association) and many Americans achieved
their dream of home ownership. Ownership grew most rapidly amongst previously dis-
advantaged groups such as African Americans and Hispanics, as illustrated in Figure
3.1.
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here]
This period followed the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the terrorist attacks of
2001, creating a need to encourage growth and confidence back into the system. In
an attempt to do so the U.S. government introduced many accommodative interest
rate policies which led to an abundant availability of credit and a boom in the housing
market, causing home ownership to increase for the first time in two decades. Home
ownership increased from 66.8% in 1999 to 69% by the end of 2005, leading many to
conclude that the market was experiencing a speculative bubble (Goodman & Thi-
bodeau, 2008). As with any bubble, a bust was inevitable. And the bust that did
occur led to one of the worst recessionary periods experienced in almost a century
(Sapir, 2009). In the aftermath it became clear that the root of the problem lay in
47
the market for innovative subprime mortgage-backed securities, a relatively new and
small market (Dodd, 2007). It also became clear that these complex securities had
been misunderstood and vastly mispriced by the majority of those trading them, a
serious error that led to chaos in the U.S. financial system and sent financial markets
worldwide into turmoil (Sanders, 2008).1 Therefore this chapter aims to explore the
risk underlying these complex securities, in order to gain an insight into how a crisis
that began in the relatively small subprime mortgage-backed securities sector did not
remain isolated to the real estate market, instead spreading rapidly across global finan-
cial markets, affecting investor confidence, general market liquidity and real economies
worldwide.
In order to examine this market this chapter focuses on the ABX.HE indexes, the
only available proxy for the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities market.2 These
indexes became a key barometer of subprime mortgage market conditions for insti-
tutions and investors in the run-up to the crisis. In order to analyse the ABX OLS
regression analysis is initially performed to establish correlation between the vintages
and several macroeconomic variables that proxy for risk factors, namely house prices,
market volatility, liquidity and counterparty risk. The results suggest that mainly U.S.
house prices are significantly related to ABX returns over the sample period. Next,
principal component analysis (PCA) is performed on the four ABX vintages, in or-
der to reduce the dimensionality of such a noisy data set. The results suggest that
the importance of the principal components driving variation in ABX returns differed
across vintages, indicating that these were heterogeneous assets with different risk pro-
files. These principal components are used in subsequent OLS regression analysis in
1These products are examined in detail in Chapter 2.
2See Chapter 2.
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place of ABX returns to establish correlation between these and the above-mentioned
macroeconomic variables. The results indicate that these principal components are
significantly related not just to house prices, but general market volatility, liquidity
and counterparty risk. A rolling regression analysis is then performed to observe coef-
ficient behaviour over the crisis period. The results illustrate the development of the
crisis from a real estate problem to a much broader global crisis. The analysis is also
performed according to asset rating, the results of which suggest that the rating of the
asset had an effect on the principal components underlying it more so than the vintage
that it was issued in and that lower-rated assets were susceptible to more risk factors
than higher-rated tranches.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a timeline of the crisis, out-
lining important events, and section 3.3 discusses related literature. Section 3.4 then
describes the data used in the analyses with section 3.5 reviewing the methodology
and discussing the results. Section 3.6 discusses the analysis performed according to
ratings tranche and section 3.7 then concludes.
3.2. Timeline of the 2007 United States financial crisis
As discussed in Chapter 2 the foundations of this crisis were set in the early 2000s in
response to a slump in the markets caused by the bursting of the dotcom bubble and
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 (Kregal, 2008). Low interest rates fuelled
a housing bubble and investors began to realise large gains from mortgage-backed se-
curities. However, by 2006 some players in the market were beginning to question the
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quality of the assets underlying these securities. By December 2006 mortgage delin-
quencies and foreclosures were increasing (Sapir, 2009) and Goldman Sachs altered the
firms’ position on the mortgage market from positive to negative, although this infor-
mation was not released publicly (New York Times, December 2009). On February
27th 2007 Freddie Mac declared its intention to cease the purchase of the most risky
subprime mortgages and mortgage linked securities. On April 2nd a leading subprime
lender, New Century Financial Corporation, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protec-
tion and by June mass downgrades of subprime mortgage-backed securities had begun.
June 1st saw S&P’s and Moody’s rating agencies downgrade more than one hundred
bonds backed by these securities and on July 11th S&P’s placed 612 such products on
credit watch.3 By the end of the year interbank liquidity was rapidly drying up; with
the LIBOR-OIS spread, widely seen as a measure of strength in the banking system,
reaching an all time high of 108 basis points on December 6th (Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis). This contrasts with a spread of just 10 points before the full force of the
subprime crisis hit markets in August 2007. Such a high spread is a clear indicator of
uncertainty and mistrust within the banking system as institutions became less willing
to lend to each other due to concerns about increasing counterparty risk.
Numerous measures were implemented in an attempt to rescue the failing banking
system, such as several cuts of the Federal Funds Rate and the introduction of the
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 in February. Nonetheless, things continued to deterio-
rate and in early March the 85-year old Bear Stearns collapsed and was subsequently
acquired by JP Morgan for $2 a share (Wall Street Journal, March 2008). One year
prior to this Bear Stearns had been trading at almost $160 per share and just five days
before the takeover the share price stood at over $68, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
3Credit watch indicates that, following a review of the company or security in question, that com-
pany’s or security’s credit rating may be changed.
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[Insert Figure 3.2 about here]
In autumn 2008 the crisis reached a critical turning point. On the 15th of September
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States, Lehman Brothers, filed for
bankruptcy following drastic losses as the market rapidly lost confidence in the 158-year
old Wall Street giant. The bank had failed to receive a bailout from the government or
a buyout from another institution and became the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.
The fact that one of the largest investment banks in the United States was allowed
to fail shook up Wall Street, causing even more panic and loss of confidence in the
financial system. Also, Lehman Brothers was one of the largest players in the ABCP
market, meaning that their demise curtailed liquidity in the system. On the same day,
Bank of America announced its intention to purchase one of the “Big Five” U.S. in-
vestment banks, Merrill Lynch, for $50 billion.4 The following day the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York was authorized to lend up to $85 billion to the American Inter-
national Group (AIG), a company that mainly traded credit default swaps. In early
October the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was passed by congress,
establishing the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was an-
nounced publicly on October 14th. In early January 2009 the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York had begun to purchase fixed-rate mortgage-backed securities guaranteed
by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae and the U.S. Treasury Department pur-
chased a total of $4.8 billion in preferred stock from forty three U.S. banks under the
Capital Purchase Program. The remainder of the year saw the introduction of several
strategies aimed at saving the banking system and promoting economic recovery, such
4Prior to the crisis the top five investment banks were 1: Goldman Sachs, 2: Morgan Stanley, 3:
Merrill Lynch, 4: Lehman Brothers and 5: Bear Stearns. In 2010 the Financial Times reported that
the “Big Five” were now: 1: JP Morgan, 2: Goldman Sachs, 3: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 4:
Morgan Stanley and 5: Citi.
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as the “American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009”, which included a variety
of spending measures and tax cuts, and “The Homeowner Affordability and Stability
Plan”. In July Congress announced the members of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission, an organisation established to investigate the causes of the crisis. Despite such
measures, the crisis continued to worsen and spread to other countries and markets.
From the events outlined above it is clear why the period of September 2008 is viewed
by many as the climax of the crisis (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010). Table 3.1 outlines
important market events that occurred during that month.
[Insert Table 3.1 about here]
3.3. Related Literature
As yet the literature examining the ABX indexes remains relatively sparse. Fender &
Scheicher (2008) perform principal component analysis (PCA) and regression analysis
on the first two vintages issued in order to ascertain the relevance of several pricing
factors and how they may have changed over time. They find that for the higher-rated
assets risk appetite and liquidity risk become more significant while becoming less
important for the lower quality ratings. They suggest that these factors had a large
role to play in the deterioration of ABX prices as it was established that there were
considerable unobserved factors driving subprime mortgage risk. However, it should
be noted that the data analysed in Fender & Scheicher (2008) end in mid-2008, before
the onset of the credit crunch. Dungey et al. (2013) analyse three ratings classes over
three vintages of the ABX by using a latent factor model in order to uncover the factors
behind the decline in the mortgage-backed securities market. They find that common
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and liquidity effects have an increasing influence on the performance of the ABX.
They also find that the influence of vintage factors varies significantly over the period
analysed, ultimately declining in significance as they become swamped by common risk
factors. Gorton (2009) analyses the relationship between repurchase agreements and
the ABX and finds the two to be intricately related to one another. Mizrach (2011)
analyses jump and co-jump frequency in the ABX and CME housing futures and finds
that jumps appear prior to 2007, and that these are more pronounced in the housing
futures markets. It is also found that almost 85% of jumps can be explained by news
and housing futures. Though closely related to both Fender & Scheicher (2008) and
Dungey et al. (2013), our analysis covers a longer sample than the former and extends
the asset coverage of the latter. Hence, this study can provide additional insights into
the behaviour of the subprime mortgage-backed securities market.
3.4. Preliminary Analysis
This chapter uses daily price data from four ABX vintages as described in Chapter
2. Returns have been generated from daily index prices using log differences and the
sample ranges from January 19, 2006, until December 31, 2009. Table 3.2 reports
summary statistics for the daily log returns of each vintage.
[Insert Table 3.2 about here]
It is clear from Table 3.2 that normality is rejected in all cases, indicated by high
excess kurtosis. Unsurprisingly, we observe negative means throughout, along with
negative skewness. The minimum values exceed the corresponding maximum values
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in most cases, indicating that the losses experienced outweighed the gains realised.
The lower-rated assets and the later vintages display higher standard deviations than
the higher-rated assets and earlier issuances, suggesting these assets were riskier. Raw
correlation coefficients between the assets in each vintage are presented in Table 3.3.
[Insert Table 3.3 about here]
The degree of correlation among almost all assets fell with each subsequent vintage
issuance, suggesting that the strength of these relationships diminished with time.
However, the correlation coefficients vary among vintages, indicating that these were
not homogeneous assets and should be treated as separate distinct securities. Figures
3.3 - 3.6 plot the time series of ABX returns for each vintage over the sample period.
[Insert Figures 3.3 - 3.6 about here]
The effect of the crisis on ABX returns is evident. Returns in all ratings tranches are
relatively stable until mid-2007, after which they all became extremely volatile as the
subprime crisis hit markets.
A number of macroeconomic variables are included as explanatory variables in the
analysis. Each of these variables provides a proxy for a different risk factor that could
affect the ABX and has been used in related literature to date, such as Fender &
Scheicher (2008), Murphy & Murphy (2010) and Dungey et al. (2013). Log returns of
the Dow Jones Equity Real Estate Investment Trust Index (REIT) provide a proxy for
U.S. house prices, seen by many as the driver of the financial crisis. In the absence of a
high frequency property price index we follow Dungey et al. (2013) in using this as an
indicator of the U.S. real estate sector. The Chicago Board Options Exchange Market
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Volatility Index (VIX) provides a measure of volatility. The LIBOR-OIS spread, con-
sidered to be a measure of strength of the banking system, is included as a proxy for
credit risk, as described by Mc Andrews et al. (2008). The OIS-Tbill spread provides
a proxy for liquidity risk, as explained by Eichengreen et al. (2012). First differences
of the VIX, LIBOR-OIS spread and OIS-Tbill spread are also analysed, in order to
examine if changes in these variables could influence ABX returns. Summary statistics
for the macroeconomic variables are reported in Table 3.4.
[Insert Table 3.4 about here]
There is a large difference in magnitude between the house price proxy and the other
variables due to the fact that the REIT is reported in log returns while the other
variables are reported in levels. Relatively high standard deviations indicate the high
volatility of these variables during the sample period, which is reinforced by the large
difference between the minimum and the maximum values. High levels of excess kur-
tosis indicate that normality is rejected in all cases. Unsurprisingly, the house price
proxy log returns experience both a negative mean and negative skewness while the
other risk proxies are all mean positive. The differenced VIX and LIBOR-OIS spread
both experience negative means, indicating that changes in the VIX were negative over
the whole sample period and the LIBOR-OIS spread was narrowing. Changes in the
OIS-Tbill spread are mean positive, suggesting that this spread was widening, perhaps
as investors turned to more safer assets.
All macroeconomic variables are graphed for the full sample period in Figures 3.7 and
3.8, which clearly show the effect of the crisis on these variables. For example, we
observe jumps in the VIX and the two spreads in mid-2008, indicating an increase in
volatility, credit risk and liquidity risk at this time.
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[Insert Figures 3.7 - 3.8 about here]
3.5. OLS Regression Analysis 1
The two regression equations employed are:
ABXi,t = α+ β1REITt + β2V IXt + β3LIBOROISt + β4OISTBILLt + t, (3.1)
and
ABXi,t = α+ γ1REITt + γ2δV IXt + γ3δLIBOROISt + γ4δOISTBILLt + t, (3.2)
in which ABXi,t denotes ABX vintage daily log returns, REIT denotes U.S. real
estate investment trust daily log returns, V IX denotes daily VIX volatility index
levels, LIBOROIS denotes daily LIBOR-OIS spread levels and OISTBILL denotes
daily OIS-Tbill spread level. δ denotes that the indicated variable is differenced. Table
3.5 reports OLS results for equation 3.1. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
[Insert Table 3.5 about here]
The house price proxy is significant in almost all cases, suggesting that this variable
was a major driver of variation in ABX returns. In the ABX 07-1 and 07-2 vintages
only house prices are significant, although this is mostly in the higher-rated assets.
This is probably due to the fact that the two lower-rated assets in the two riskiest
vintages would have experienced very low trading volumes once the crisis hit and so
may have been subject to “stale” prices. It is also possible that variation in these
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lower-rated assets may have been driven by something other than house prices. The
results suggest that the higher-rated tranches in the later vintages are most sensitive
to house price changes over the sample period, which is not surprising as the mortgages
underlying these vintages were issued during the crisis period and so would have been
of lower quality than those included in the earlier vintages and among the first to enter
negative equity.
Table 3.6 reports OLS results for equation 3.2. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
[Insert Table 3.6 about here]
Again, house prices are found to be the main driver of ABX returns, with other vari-
ables largely irrelevant. However, as discussed above, related literature, such as Dungey
et al. (2013) and Fender & Scheicher (2008), suggest that other factors had an influ-
ence on ABX returns as the crisis evolved. Therefore, in order to delve further into
these securities, and specifically into the risk underlying them, principal component
analysis (PCA) is performed in an attempt to extract the common factors underlying
the variation in the ABX data.
3.6. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
OLS regression analysis on noisy data such as ABX returns may lead to imprecise
results, as the analysis could potentially pick up noise in the data (Granger & New-
bold, 1974). It is therefore useful to reduce the dimensionality of the data, while still
maintaining as much of the variation as possible. Principal component analysis (PCA)
achieves this without losing any information from the data. Similar to factor analysis,
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PCA is designed to uncover a small number of factors that describe most of the varia-
tion in a large number of correlated variables. It focuses on variances and reduces data
dimensionality by performing a covariance analysis between factors. It is a useful de-
scriptive instrument used to reveal unidentified trends in data sets consisting of a large
number of interrelated variables, while retaining much of the variation present. This is
accomplished by transforming the principal components, which are uncorrelated and
ordered so that the first few contain most of the variation present, to a new set of vari-
ables.5 Mathematically PCA is an orthogonal linear transformation, meaning that the
principal components obtained are unrelated to each other. The data are transformed
to a new coordinate system such that the greatest variance lies on the first coordinate,
and so is the first principal component. The second largest variance lies on the second
coordinate and is the second principal component, and so on.
The results of PCA are usually considered in terms of component scores, which cal-
culate how much of the variance of each data point is associated with a particular
principal component, and factor loadings, which indicate the extent to which the prin-
cipal components are related to the original variables. PCA is a statistical procedure
that provides an alternative way to visualize the data and so it does not provide in-
formation regarding what the principal components actually are or what they are a
result of, just the extent to which they contribute to the variation in the data.
5PCA consists of the following steps: 1.Organise the data set. 2.Calculate the empirical mean.
3.Calculate deviations from the mean. 4.Calculate the covariance matrix. 5.Find the eigenvectors
and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. 6.Rearrange the eigenvectors and eigenvalues. 7.Choose
components and form a feature vector. 8.Derive the new data set (Smith, 2002).
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3.6.1. PCA Results According to Vintage
Figure 3.9 plots the time series of principal components for each vintage over the entire
sample period.
[Insert Figure 3.9 about here]
Between 2006 and 2007 there is almost no movement as this was a relatively tranquil
period for these assets during which the realisation of price risk was low. Moving
into the crisis period from mid-2007 onwards they fluctuate widely, as the subprime
crisis and subsequent credit crunch hit. In order to analyse the individual components
the average relative importance of each component in each vintage is calculated and
graphed in Figure 3.10.
[Insert Figure 3.10 about here]
The first principal component, the main contributing factor to the variation in the
data, accounts for over 60% of variation in ABX returns in each vintage. PCA is suc-
cessful in reducing the dimensionality of the problem with the first three components
capturing approximately 90% of all variation in each vintage. However, the first prin-
cipal component actually falls in importance between the first and last vintage. This
suggests that the components driving the variation in the ABX data differed across
vintages which could be due to the fact that each subsequent vintage was issued in
an increasingly volatile time period, during which these assets were exposed to more
risk factors, such as the liquidity crisis in September 2008. It also highlights the fact
that these vintages were unique and not simply an extension of the previous issuance,
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indicating that these assets were heterogeneous and should be treated as separate en-
tities, a finding consistent with Dungey et al. (2013). The chief driving factor is not
as important in the later vintages and the four remaining components contribute more
to the variation in the data in subsequent issuances. Possible reasons for this could
be that during this time investors were rapidly losing confidence in these assets upon
realising that they were more risky than they had first appeared and were beginning to
reassess them. What followed was a period of accelerated “selling off” of these prod-
ucts during which investors not only exited the lower-rated tranches but the entire
mortgage-backed securities market. Retrenchment and re-structuring of the banking
sector during this volatile period could account for the increasing importance of the
other principal components here. During this time it is possible that house prices were
not as important for ABX returns as liquidity and counterparty risk as institutions
were rapidly losing trust in each other and were becoming increasingly unwilling to
engage in interbank lending. As stated, the first three components capture most of the
commonality and therefore the remainder of the analysis focuses on these three only
as the main driving factors in this market.
As mentioned earlier because each new vintage was issued six months following the
previous vintage each data set analysed has a different starting point. In order to
ascertain if this had any effect on the behaviour of the principal components, the anal-
ysis is also carried out with all the data starting at the same point, the beginning of
the ABX 07-2 vintage in July 2007, and the results do not change considerably. This
suggests that this phase, during the crisis, contributed most variation to these assets.
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3.7. Regression Analysis 2
OLS regression analysis is re-performed using the three main principal components
obtained from each vintage as dependent variables instead of the noisy, higher di-
mensional ABX returns in an attempt to obtain clearer results relative to the initial
regression analysis. The two regression equations employed are:
PCi,t = α+ β1REITt + β2V IXt + β3LIBOROISt + β4OISTBILLt + t, (3.3)
and
PCi,t = α+ γ1REITt + γ2δV IXt + γ3δLIBOROISt + γ4δOISTBILLt + t, (3.4)
in which PCi,t denotes the principal component. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report OLS results
for equations 3.3 and 3.4. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
[Insert Tables 3.7 - 3.8 about here]
House prices are still significant throughout, again indicating that they play a role in
explaining the variation in the data. However, we now observe more factors coming
into play relative to the initial regressions performed, such as volatility, liquidity and
credit risk, suggesting that these factors also have an effect on ABX returns over the
sample period. This corresponds with investor concerns during the crisis switching
from the downturn in the housing market to the credit worthiness of financial insti-
tutions and the declining availability of credit in the banking sector. We again see
differences between vintages. For example, the strongest relationships between the
principal components and the macroeconomic variables occur in the first two vintages,
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indicating that these earlier issuances reacted to the risk factors examined more so than
the later issued vintages. This is interesting as these two vintages, and particularly
the January 2006 issuance, would have been perceived to be the safest as they were
issued before the crisis hit. However, it is possible that the realisation by investors that
this was not the case led to an increased sensitivity to risk. These vintages issued at
the tail end of the boom period would have been in higher demand than those issued
later during the crisis phase and so when the crisis hit it is possible that there were
in fact more investors in these two vintages than the subsequent issuances, who were
then panicking and attempting to offload these assets. This again reinforces the idea
that there were marked differences between vintages and that these assets should be
treated as heterogeneous. Also, it again suggests that the risk factors driving ABX
returns varied as time went on, changing from predominantly house prices to liquidity,
volatility and credit risk. This change highlights the crisis’ move from the housing
market into the broader credit sector. Fender & Scheicher (2008) also find support for
the relevance of risk appetite and liquidity risk for the ABX vintages.
However, from the results it is clear that, although there is some significance, the co-
efficients themselves are quite small and the R2s range only from 0.008 to 0.04 and so
explain very little of the variation in the data. One possible reason for the small co-
efficient estimates could be that the independent variables are highly correlated with
each other. In order to investigate this further correlation coefficients between the
independent variables are reported in Table 3.9.
[Insert Table 3.9 about here]
The VIX is highly correlated with both the LIBOR-OIS spread and the U.S. real estate
price index. This relatively high correlation may have impacted the previous results
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reported. Another potential problem OLS regression analysis can suffer from is that,
by imposing a constant coefficient, it does not capture the time varying property of
the variables (Wooldridge, 2003). One possible method to overcome this problem is to
employ univariate rolling regression analysis.
3.8. Rolling Regression Analysis
Rolling regression analysis calculates parameter estimates over a rolling or “moving”
window of a fixed size throughout the sample. Due to the short data range in our
analysis a relatively small window of fifty observations is chosen.6
3.8.1. Rolling Regression Results
We perform the rolling regression analysis using the first three principal components
of all vintages as dependent variables. However, to conserve space we only present
graphical results for the first vintage in Figures 3.11 - 3.16. Since the graphs for later
vintages are similar, we refer to any differences without including the additional nine
graphs.7
[Insert Figure 3.11 - 3.16 about here.]
The solid lines in the graphs presented in Figures 3.11 - 3.16 are point estimates; the
dashed lines are confidence bands. From these results it is clear that all risk proxies
exhibit considerable time variation once the crisis period kicks in. In the time period
6In order to confirm the robustness of the results larger window sizes, such as 100, are also employed
and the results do not change qualitatively.
7All results are available on request.
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before it, between 2006 and 2007, we see no variation due to the lack of variability in
the ABX returns and principal components during the relatively tranquil period.
The proxies for house prices and volatility begin to exert an influence in 2007, corre-
sponding with the beginning of the fall of the housing market (Di Martino & Duca,
2007). We also see that the proxies for liquidity and counterparty risk come into play
much later, around mid-2008. The liquidity crisis occurred between September 15th
and October 12th 2008 (Sapir, 2009), with events such as the acquisition of Merrill
Lynch by Bank of America (September 14th), the fall of Lehman Brothers (September
15th) and the $85 billion bailout of AIG (September 16th), which can be viewed as
critical points in the crisis. From this we can conclude that the risk factors underly-
ing the subprime mortgage market changed over time as the crisis wore on, and these
changes correspond to the evolution of the crisis from a purely real estate problem to a
liquidity problem for the entire banking system. We see a shift from house prices and
volatility having an influence to liquidity and counterparty risk becoming important.
This suggests that concerns about liquidity and the strength of the banking system be-
came at least as important as concerns regarding the housing market, as Brunnermeier
(2008) also argues.
3.9. Analysis According to Ratings Tranche
As we have seen there are considerable differences in the behaviour of the assets anal-
ysed across vintages. The next step is to ascertain if there also exists differences in the
assets across ratings classes. Therefore the analysis is performed according to the five
ratings tranches in an effort to examine if the different ratings classes exhibit various
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sensitivities to different risk factors.8 Table 3.10 reports summary statistics according
to ratings class.
[Insert Table 3.10 about here]
Table 3.10 indicates that these assets are highly volatile during the sample period,
with normality rejected in all cases. Mean returns are negative for every asset, and in
almost every instance are monotonically related to vintage, again indicating the higher
volatility of later issuances. Table 3.11 reports correlation coefficients between each
ratings tranche and equivalent assets in the other vintages.
[Insert Table 3.11 about here]
There is a weakening degree of co-movement as asset rating declines. This indicates
that the higher-rated assets had more in common than the lower tranches during the
sample period. The relative importance of the principal components obtained for each
ratings class is presented in Figure 3.17.
[Insert Figure 3.17 about here]
Differences between the assets of each vintage are evident from Figure 3.17. We see that
the AAA-rated tranche contains most commonality of all ratings classes with really
only one factor contributing to the variation of this asset. As this was perceived to be
the safest asset on sale it may be the case that there is less noise trading in this rating
class. While it is clear that there is much commonality in the AAA tranche the BBB-
tranche shows the most variation between principal components, implying that it was
8Note that in this analysis all data have the same starting point, July 19, 2007, the date that the
final vintage was issued.
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driven by risk factors that were not impacting the higher tranches. Fender & Scheicher
(2008) also find differences between the lower- and higher-ratings, particularly that the
higher-rated assets react more to the declining financial market environment while the
lower tranches are more sensitive to fundamental factors.
These results imply that the risk factors underlying the ratings classes of ABX assets
changed more dramatically than those underlying the vintages, suggesting that the
rating of the asset has a large bearing on how it behaves in crisis times. As it is clear
that the AAA-rated tranche holds the most commonality OLS regression and rolling
regression analyses are performed on this asset over the four vintages to ascertain
whether the macroeconomic variables employed had an effect on them. Table 3.12
reports OLS results for equations 3.3 and 3.4. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
[Insert Table 3.12 about here]
The only significant effect comes from the house price proxy for the first principal
component, reinforcing the theory that real estate market movements were the driving
factor in this tranche over the sample period and indicating that, for the highest-
rated assets on sale, only house prices have a significant influence. Again, however,
the coefficients and R2’s are very small and so rolling regression analysis is employed.
As AAA-rated assets comprised most of the CDO structure and the main principal
component accounts for 90% of the variation only results for the principal component
underlying this asset are reported as this indicates that this was the dominant force
driving returns. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 plot the rolling regression analysis results and
display a similar pattern to previous results.
[Insert Figure 3.18 - 3.19 about here]
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Firstly, all coefficients display time variation. Secondly, we see that house prices and
volatility have an effect throughout the time period and the other proxies have very
little influence until late 2008, with the onset of the liquidity crisis. This suggests that,
for these highest-rated assets, house prices are significant in their returns throughout
but, as investor concerns regarding liquidity and counterparty risk increase, these other
factors begin to have a significant effect on ABX products.
3.10. Conclusions
This chapter examines the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities market by using
the closest proxy available for it, the ABX indexes. OLS regression analysis, principal
component analysis (PCA) and rolling regression analysis are performed on the ABX
vintages in an attempt to examine this complex market, and to better understand the
risk underlying it. The overall results suggest that different risk factors came into play
at different times over the course of the crisis of 2007-2009. Analysis according to
vintage suggests that proxies for U.S. house prices and volatility are more significant
during 2007, corresponding with the beginning of the deflation of the housing bub-
ble. As the crisis wore on, proxies for liquidity and credit risk change from exhibiting
very little significance to playing a more important role, consistent with the onset of
the liquidity crisis in September 2008. Analysis according to ratings class suggests
marked differences between ratings classes, with the highest-rated tranche containing
most commonality, a finding in line with Dungey et al. (2013). Rolling regression
analysis shows house prices and volatility have a consistent influence throughout the
period analysed, with liquidity and counterparty risk again coming into play during
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the 2008 credit crisis. Brunnermeier (2008) also highlights the growing importance of
liquidity, credit risk and counterparty risk during the crisis.
These results indicate that concerns about house prices and volatility became com-
pounded by concerns about liquidity and credit risk, a trend consistent with the evo-
lution of the crisis. They also suggest that the lower-rated tranches were exposed
to more risk factors than the higher-rated assets during the sample period and that
tranche effects supercede vintage effects. Fender & Scheicher (2008) highlight differ-
ences between ABX ratings classes, particularly that the higher ratings were impacted
by different risk factors than the lower ratings. To further analyse the ABX, and
specifically differences that may exist between tranches, Chapter 4 analyses contagion
within the indexes themselves.
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Figure 3.1: U.S. Home Ownership Rates According to Race and Ethnicity of House-
holder.
The home ownership rate is the percentage of home owning households among all
households in the given demographic group. Figure compiled using data sourced
from the Information Please Database, Pearson Education Inc.
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Figure 3.2: Bear Stearns Stock Price March 2007 - March 2008.
Figure compiled using data sourced from the Bloomberg system.
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Figure 3.3: ABX 06-1 Vintage Daily Log Returns.
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Figure 3.4: ABX 06-2 Vintage Daily Log Returns.
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Figure 3.5: ABX 07-1 Vintage Daily Log Returns.
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Figure 3.6: ABX 07-2 Vintage Daily Log Returns.
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Figure 3.7: Macroeconomic Variables 1.
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Figure 3.8: Macroeconomic Variables 2.
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Figure 3.9: Principal Components Time Series.
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Figure 3.10: Relative Importance of Principal Components by Vintage.
This Figure presents the relative importance of the principal components for the
indicated ABX vintage.
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Figure 3.11: Rolling Regression Analysis by Vintage.
Dependent variable: Principal component 1. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 3.12: Rolling Regression Analysis by Vintage.
Dependent variable: Principal component 1. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 3.13: Rolling Regression Analysis by Vintage.
Dependent variable: Principal component 2. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 3.14: Rolling Regression Analysis by Vintage.
Dependent variable: Principal component 2. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 3.15: Rolling Regression Analysis by Vintage.
Dependent variable: Principal component 3. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 3.16: Rolling Regression Analysis by Vintage.
Dependent variable: Principal component 3. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 3.17: Relative Importance of Principal Components by Ratings Tranche.
This Figure presents the relative importance of the principal components for the
indicated ABX ratings tranche.
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Figure 3.18: Rolling Regression Analysis by Ratings Tranche.
Dependent variable: Principal component 1. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 3.19: Rolling Regression Analysis by Ratings Tranche.
Dependent variable: Principal component 1. The horizontal axes labels denote the
independent variable employed. Window width = 50. The solid black lines are point
estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics For ABX Vintage Daily Returns
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the daily log returns for the indicated ABX vintage. Std. Dev. denotes stan-
dard deviation; Min. denotes minimum; Max. denotes maximum. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
Index Rating Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
ABX 06-1 Vintage AAA -0.0002 0.0091 -0.8358 18.69 -0.08 0.08
AA -0.0012 0.0190 -0.2819 13.53 -0.14 0.14
A -0.0023 0.0214 -0.4152 7.548 -0.13 0.10
BBB -0.0032 0.0.219 -2.8929 22.640 -0.21 0.11
BBB- -0.0031 0.0202 -1.8108 13.92 -0.19 0.11
ABX 06-2 Vintage AAA -0.0026 0.0098 -0.7704 15.91 -0.08 0.08
AA -0.0014 0.0204 -0.2358 11.42 -0.14 0.14
A -0.0027 0.0229 -0.3438 6.209 -0.13 0.10
BBB -0.0037 0.0234 -2.6457 19.30 -0.21 0.10
BBB- -0.0036 0.0216 -1.6369 11.74 -0.19 0.11
ABX 07-1 Vintage AAA -0.0003 0.0106 -0.6995 13.15 -0.08 0.07
AA -0.0017 0.0220 -0.1844 9.340 -0.14 0.14
A -0.0031 0.248 -0.2635 4.884 -0.13 0.10
BBB -0.0043 0.0253 -2.3965 15.99 -0.20 0.10
BBB- -0.0042 0.0234 -1.4483 9.569 -0.19 0.11
ABX 07-2 Vintage AAA -0.0003 0.0116 -0.6296 10.46 -0.08 0.07
AA -0.0020 0.0242 -0.1324 7.280 -0.14 0.14
A -0.0035 0.0270 -0.1983 3.679 -0.13 0.10
BBB -0.0048 0.0249 -2.2500 13.68 -0.21 0.10
BBB- -0.0044 0.0248 -1.3855 8.623 -0.19 0.10
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variables: ABX Returns)
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results for the following equation:
ABXi,t = α + β1REITt + β2V IXt + β3LIBOROISt + β4OISTBILLt + t,
in which ABXi,t denotes ABX vintage daily log returns, REIT denotes U.S. real estate investment trust daily log returns,
V IX denotes daily VIX volatility index levels, LIBOROIS denotes daily LIBOR-OIS spread levels and OISTBILL denotes
daily OIS-Tbill spread level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to December 31,
2009. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
ABX 06-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
AAA 5.12e-04 0.0702∗∗ -1.27e-05 1.08e-06 1.75e-06 0.07
(0.64) (8.26) (-1.51) (0.41) (0.70)
AA 1.42e-03 0.1171∗∗ −3.56e− 05∗∗ -6.00e-06 7.75e-06 0.06
(0.89) (6.58) (-2.02) (-1.09) (1.49)
A -1.45e-03 0.0993∗∗ -2.30e-05 -7.47e-06 1.39e− 05∗∗ 0.04
(-0.80) (4.90) (-1.14) (-1.19) (2.34)
BBB -6.89e-04 0.0618∗∗ −3.54e− 05 4.18e-06 1.85e-07 0.01
(-0.37) (2.94) (-1.70) (0.64) (0.03)
BBB- 1.67e-05 0.0632∗∗ −3.65e− 05∗ 5.31e-06 -4.42e-06 0.02
(0.01) (3.26) (-1.90) (0.89) (-0.78)
ABX 06-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
AAA 4.76e-04 0.1179∗∗ -2.10e-05 -2.45e-06 5.69e-06 0.07
(0.31) (7.44) (1.29) (-0.49) (1.21)
AA -2.04e-03 0.0924∗∗ -1.79e-03 -9.10e-06 1.52e− 06∗∗ 0.04
(0.99) (4.40) (-0.82) (-1.38) (2.40)
A -2.32e-03 0.0745∗∗ -2.05e-05 2.08e-06 2.21e-e06 0.01
(-1.00) (3.12) (-0.84) (0.28) (0.31)
BBB -1.61e-03 0.0667 4.67e− 06 -6.56e-06 -1.06e-05 0.02
(-0.71) (0.02) (0.20) (0.91) (-1.53)
BBB- -1.31e-03 0.0419∗ 2.93e-06 -5.96e-05 −1.29e− 05∗ 0.02
(-0.59) (1.83) (0.12) (-0.84) (-1.90)
ABX 07-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
AAA -3.30e-04 0.1429∗∗ -1.02e-05 -4.37e-06 -4.37e-06 0.07
(-0.45) (7.17) (-0.46) (-0.69) (0.64)
AA -2.92e-04 0.1006∗∗ 2.19e-05 -5.98e-06 1.10e-05 0.03
(-1.01) (3.98) (-0.78) (0.75) (1.42)
A -2.35e-03 0.0476∗ -1.86e-05 -1.14e-08 -2.54e-e06 0.01
(-0.75) (1.73) (-0.61) (-0.01) (-0.30)
BBB -2.41e-03 0.0663 4.38e-06 -2.73e-06 −1.40e− 05∗ 0.02
(-0.83) (0.15) (0.15) (-0.34) (-1.79)
BBB- -2.86e-03 0.0524∗ 8.54e-06 -4.52e-06 −1.20e− 05∗ 0.01
(-1.04) (2.18) (0.32) (-0.60) (-1.62)
ABX 07-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
AAA -1.24e-03 0.1385∗∗ -2.07e-06 -5.68e-06 4.95e-06 0.07
(-0.41) (6.36) (-0.08) (-0.81) (0.69)
AA -4.12e-03 0.1121∗∗ -1.12e-05 -2.60e-06 6.47e-06 0.03
(-1.09) (4.13) (-0.33) (-0.30) (0.72)
A -1.36e-03 0.0855∗ -2.80e-05 3.84e-06 -6.38e-e06 0.02
(-0.38) (3.35) (-0.88) (0.47) (-0.76)
BBB −6.91e− 03∗∗ 0.0296 2.45e-05 -6.05e-06 3.44e-06 0.003
(-2.03) (1.21) (0.80) (-0.77) (0.43)
BBB- −5.81e− 03∗ 0.0273 1.80e-05 -3.20e-06 -2.76e-07 0.0003
(-1.69) (1.11) (0.59) (-0.40) (0.03)
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variables: ABX Returns)
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results for the following equation:
ABXi,t = α + γ1REITt + γ2δV IXt + γ3δLIBOROISt + γ4δOISTBILLt + t,
in which ABXi,t denotes ABX vintage daily log returns, REIT denotes U.S. real estate investment trust daily log returns,
δV IX denotes daily VIX volatility index changes, δLIBOROIS denotes daily LIBOR-OIS spread changes and δOISTBILL
denotes daily OIS-Tbill spread changes. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to
December 31, 2009. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
ABX 06-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δLIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
AAA -2.09e-04 0.0711∗∗ -2.42e-06 1.13e-06 -2.20e-06 0.07
(-0.74) (6.52) (-0.05) (0.08) (-0.33)
AA −0.0012∗∗ 0.1108∗∗ -0.00007 -0.0002 -0.00001 0.05
(-2.06) (4.82) (-0.83) (-0.66) (-0.75)
A −0.0023∗∗ 0.0861∗∗ -0.0001 0.00008∗∗ -0.0000005 0.03
(-3.41) (3.30) (-1.19) (2.46) (-0.32)
BBB −0.0035∗∗ 0.0729∗∗ 0.00003 0.00008∗∗ -0.0000006 0.02
(-4.58) (2.71) (0.33) (2.26) (-0.04)
BBB- −0.0031∗∗ 0.0689∗∗ 0.000007 0.00006∗∗ -0.0000007 0.02
(-4.83) (2.77) (0.07) (2.14) (-0.49)
ABX 06-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δLIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
AAA -0.0009 0.1209∗∗ 0.000004 -0.00002 -0.00001 0.07
(-1.62) (5.90) (0.05) (-0.72) (-0.85)
AA −0.0026∗∗ 0.0889∗∗ -0.00006 0.00003 -0.00001 0.03
(-3.48) (3.23) (-0.52) (1.08) (-0.73)
A −0.0036∗∗ 0.0781∗∗ 0.00001 0.00009∗∗ −0.00003∗ 0.01
(-4.28) (2.55) (0.11) (2.29) (-1.75)
BBB −0.0036 0.0699 0.000007 0.00006 -0.00002 0.14
(-4.31) (2.33) (0.06) (1.51) (-1.95)
BBB- −0.0037∗∗ 0.0464 0.00001 0.00004 -0.000008 0.01
(-4.52) (1.57) (0.10) (0.97) (-0.42)
ABX 07-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δLIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
AAA −0.0014∗ 0.1451∗∗ 0.000002 -0.00002 -0.0000004 0.07
(-1.80) (5.64) (0.02) (-0.67) (-0.67)
AA −0.0043∗∗ 0.0893∗∗ -0.0001 0.00004 0.000002 0.03
(-4.42) (2.73) (-0.81) (1.06) (0.47)
A −0.0046∗∗ 0.0419 -0.00007 0.0008∗ 0.000002 0.01
(-4.37) (1.18) (-0.44) (1.85) (0.11)
BBB −0.0045∗∗ 0.0921∗∗ 0.00016 0.00004 -0.000006 0.01
(-4.65) (2.81) (1.16) (0.99) (-0.33)
BBB- −0.0045∗∗ 0.0723∗ 0.0001 0.00003 -0.00002 0.01
(-4.90) (2.35) (1.04) (0.83) (-1.08)
ABX 07-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δLIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
AAA −0.0017∗ 0.1375∗∗ -0.000009 -0.00004 -0.000009 0.07
(-1.80) (4.89) (-0.08) (-1.51) (-0.52)
AA −0.0047∗∗ 0.0949∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0000002 0.00001 0.03
(-4.23) (2.71) (-0.89) (-0.01) (0.64)
A -0.0047 0.0899∗ -0.000002 0.00006 0.000008 0.02
(-0.48) (2.74) (-0.01) (1.57) (0.40)
BBB −0.0047∗∗ 0.03223 0.00002 -0.00003 0.00001 0.004
(-4.61) (1.02) (0.17) (-0.66) (0.67)
BBB- −0.004∗∗ 0.0261 -0.000009 -0.000006 0.00002 0.003
(-4.28) (0.82) (-0.07) (-0.14) (0.96)
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variables: Principal Components)
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results for the following equation:
PrincipalComponenti,t = α + β1REITt + β2V IXt + β3LIBOROISt + β4OISTBILLt + t,
in which PCi denotes the principal component included as the dependent variable, REIT denotes U.S. real estate investment
trust daily log returns, V IX denotes daily VIX volatility index levels, LIBOROIS denotes daily LIBOR-OIS spread levels and
OISTBILL denotes daily OIS-Tbill spread level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample runs from January 19,
2006 to December 31, 2009. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the
10% level.
ABX 06-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
PC1 -4.63e-04 0.1729
∗∗ −6.53e− 05∗ -9.68e-07 8.07e-06 0.04
(-0.15) (5.19) (-1.97) (-0.09) (0.83)
PC2 -1.03e-03 −0.0765∗∗ 4.61e-06 9.86e− 06∗ 1.14e− 05∗∗ 0.03
(-0.69) (-4.59) (0.28) (1.91) (-2.34)
PC3 1.84e− 03∗ 0.0154 -1.53e-05 5.60e-06 −8.52e− 06∗∗ 0.01
(1.72) (1.29) (-1.28) (1.51) (-2.43)
ABX 06-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
PC1 -0.0034 0.1597
∗∗ -0.00002 -0.000009 -0.000003 0.03
(-0.93) (4.20) (-0.48) (-0.80) (-0.28)
PC2 1.46e-04 0.0749
∗∗ -2.84e-05 4.04e-07 2.23e− 05∗∗ 0.04
(0.07) (3.60) (-1.33) (0.06) (3.61)
PC3 8.89e-04 0.0465
∗∗ -7.65e-06 -7.645e-06 9.44e-07 0.02
(0.64) (3.24) (0.09) (0.09) (0.22)
ABX 07-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
PC1 -0.0050 0.1657
∗∗ -0.00002 -0.000007 -0.000008 0.03
(-1.05) (3.93) (-0.34) (-0.55) (-0.62)
PC2 -3.23e-04 −000727∗∗ 2.61e-05 1.89e-06 −1.99e− 05∗∗ 0.03
(-4.42) (2.73) (-0.81) (1.06) (2.47)
PC3 -5.08e-06 −0.0785∗∗ -8.24e-06 4.86e-06 -9.06e-07 0.02
(-0.01) (-4.02) (-0.38) (0.80) (-0.15)
ABX 07-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT VIX LIBOR-OIS OIS-Tbill R2
PC1 -0.0890 0.1704
∗∗ -0.0000006 -0.000005 0.000003 0.03
(-1.49) (3.93) (-0.01) (-0.39) (0.24)
PC2 3.99e-03 0.1059
∗∗ -3.32e-05 1.68e-06 2.23e-06 0.04
(1.19) (4.38) (-1.11) (0.21) (0.28)
PC3 -2.00e-03 0.0357
∗ 2.66e-05 -8.04e-06 8.84e-06 0.01
(-0.80) (1.99) (1.19) (-1.39) (1.50)
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Table 3.8: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variables: Principal Components)
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results for the following equation:
PCi,t = α + γ1REITt + γ2δV IXt + γ3δLIBOROISt + γ4δOISTBILLt + t,
in which PCi denotes the principal component included as the dependent variable, REIT denotes U.S. real estate investment
trust daily log returns, V IX denotes daily VIX volatility index levels, LIBOROIS denotes daily LIBOR-OIS spread levels and
OISTBILL denotes daily OIS-Tbill spread level. δ denotes that the indicated variable is differenced. T-statistics are reported
in parentheses. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5%
level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
ABX 06-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δLIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
PC1 −0.0050∗∗ 0.1728∗∗ -0.00007 0.0001∗∗ -0.00001 0.03
(-4.54) (4.03) (-0.41) (2.06) (-0.43)
PC2 −0.0011∗∗ −0.0616∗∗ 0.0001 0.00005∗ 0.000006 0.03
(-1.99) (-2.88) (1.24) (1.92) (0.47)
PC3 -2.08e-05 0.0262
∗ 7.26e-05 −4.51e− 06∗∗ -3.48e-06 0.01
(-0.05) (1.70) (1.14) (-2.31) (-0.37)
ABX 06-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δLIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
PC1 −0.0068∗∗ 0.1638∗∗ -0.000009 0.0001∗ -0.000003 0.03
(-5.06) (3.35) (-0.04) (1.72) (-0.28)
PC2 0.006 0.0708
∗∗ -0.00004 -0.000008 2.23e− 05∗∗ 0.02
(0.75) (2.61) (-0.34) (-0.51) (3.61)
PC3 0.0002 0.0448
∗∗ -0.00003 0.00001 9.44e-07 0.02
(0.34) (2.40) (-0.34) (1.19) (0.22)
ABX 07-1 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δ LIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
PC1 −0.0089∗∗ 0.1817∗∗ 0.00006 0.00009 -0.000008 0.02
(-5.55) (3.34) (0.28) (1.35) (-0.24)
PC2 -0.0005 -0.0441 0.0002
∗ 0.000006 -0.00002 0.02
(-0.55) (-1.44) (1.65) (0.16) (-0.90)
PC3 -0.0003 −0.0908∗∗ 0.000009 0.00005∗ 0.000009 0.03
(-0.35) (-3.61) (-0.84) (1.68) (0.57)
ABX 07-2 Index
Dependent Constant REIT δVIX δLIBOR-OIS δOIS-Tbill R2
PC1 −0.0093∗∗ 0.1638∗∗ -0.00007 0.000003 0.00002 0.03
(-5.19) (2.93) (-0.26) (0.04) (0.66)
PC2 0.0009 0.0988
∗∗ -0.00006 0.000009 0.00001 0.03
(0.97) (3.16) (-0.48) (0.24) (-0.70)
PC3 0.0091 0.0312 -0.000008 −0.00008∗∗ -0.000006 0.02
(1.24) (1.35) (-0.08) (-2.73) (-0.39)
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Table 3.10: Summary Statistics For ABX Tranche Daily Returns
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the daily log returns for the indicated ABX vintage ratings tranche. Std. Dev.
denotes standard deviation; Min. denotes minimum; Max. denotes maximum. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to
December 31, 2009.
AAA tranche
Index Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
ABX 06-1 Vintage -0.0003 0.0116 -0.6285 10.5 -0.08 0.08
ABX 06-2 Vintage -0.0013 0.0200 -0.2806 4.03 -0.08 0.11
ABX 07-1 Vintage -0.0017 0.0232 -0.0229 5.06 -0.11 0.14
ABX 07-2 Vintage -0.0017 0.0228 0.0570 6.02 -0.10 0.14
AA tranche
Index Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
ABX 06-1 Vintage -0.0020 0.0241 -0.1330 7.27 -0.14 0.14
ABX 06-2 Vintage -0.0036 0.0263 -0.1564 3.67 -0.11 0.13
ABX 07-1 Vintage -0.0051 0.0286 -0.7202 3.88 -0.16 0.10
ABX 07-2 Vintage -0.0049 0.0279 0.8774 5.76 -0.14 0.15
A tranche
Index Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
ABX 06-1 Vintage -0.0036 0.0270 -0.1956 3.68 -0.13 0.10
ABX 06-2 Vintage -0.0047 0.0290 -0.7942 4.38 -0.17 0.10
ABX 07-1 Vintage -0.0050 0.0307 -0.7991 4.10 -0.19 0.09
ABX 07-2 Vintage -0.0048 0.0261 -0.6280 3.50 -0.14 0.09
BBB tranche
Index Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
ABX 06-1 Vintage -0.0048 0.0273 -2.2431 13.6 -0.21 0.11
ABX 06-2 Vintage -0.0041 0.0275 -0.0847 5.49 -0.13 0.18
ABX 07-1 Vintage -0.0043 0.0271 -0.7815 5.46 -0.18 0.10
ABX 07-2 Vintage -0.0047 0.0248 -1.1982 7.99 -0.20 0.09
BBB- tranche
Index Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
ABX 06-1 Vintage -0.0043 0.0246 -1.3696 8.81 -0.19 0.11
ABX 06-2 Vintage -0.0039 0.0265 0.0755 2.94 -0.11 0.12
ABX 07-1 Vintage -0.0041 0.0256 -0.8406 5.41 -0.18 0.09
ABX 07-2 Vintage -0.0044 0.0250 -.8637 4.82 -0.16 0.09
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Table 3.11: Correlation Coefficients Between ABX Index Tranches
Notes: This table reports correlation coefficients between the indicated ABX index rating tranche. The sample runs from
January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
ρAAA0601,AAA0602 0.87 ρAAA0601,AAA0701 0.81
ρAAA0601,AAA0702 0.81 ρAAA0602,AAA0701 0.89
ρAAA0602,AAA0702 0.87 ρAAA0701,AAA0702 0.93
ρAA0601,AA0602 0.61 ρAA0601,AA0701 0.51
ρAA0601,AA0702 0.51 ρAA0602,AA0701 0.52
ρAA0602,AA0702 0.68 ρAA0701,AA0702 0.60
ρA0601,A0602 0.64 ρA0601,A0701 0.49
ρA0601,A0702 0.56 ρA0602,A0701 0.59
ρA0602,A0702 0.60 ρA0701,A0702 0.57
ρBBB0601,BBB0602 0.51 ρBBB0601,BBB0701 0.47
ρBBB0602,BBB0702 0.49 ρBBB0602,BBB0701 0.58
ρBBB0602,BBB0702 0.51 ρBBB0701,BBB0702 0.50
ρBBB−0601,BBB−0602 0.49 ρBBB−0601,BBB−0701 0.51
ρBBB−0601,BBB−0702 0.45 ρBBB−0602,BBB−0701 0.54
ρBBB−0602,BBB−0702 0.44 ρBBB−0701,BBB−0702 0.49
98
T
a
b
l
e
3
.1
2
:
O
L
S
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
(D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s:
P
ri
n
ci
p
a
l
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
ts
)
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
th
e
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
s:
P
C
i
,t
=
α
+
β
1
R
E
I
T
t
+
β
2
V
I
X
t
+
β
3
L
I
B
O
R
O
I
S
t
+
β
4
O
I
S
T
B
I
L
L
t
+

t
,
a
n
d
P
C
i
,t
=
α
+
γ
1
R
E
I
T
t
+
γ
2
δ
V
I
X
t
+
γ
3
δ
L
I
B
O
R
O
I
S
t
+
γ
4
δ
O
I
S
T
B
I
L
L
t
+

t
,
in
w
h
ic
h
P
C
i
,t
d
e
n
o
te
s
th
e
p
ri
n
c
ip
a
l
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
in
c
lu
d
e
d
a
s
th
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
,
R
E
I
T
d
e
n
o
te
s
U
.S
.
re
a
l
e
st
a
te
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
tr
u
st
d
a
il
y
lo
g
re
tu
rn
s,
V
I
X
d
e
n
o
te
s
d
a
il
y
V
IX
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
in
d
e
x
le
v
e
ls
,
L
I
B
O
R
O
I
S
d
e
n
o
te
s
d
a
il
y
L
IB
O
R
-O
IS
sp
re
a
d
le
v
e
ls
a
n
d
O
I
S
T
B
I
L
L
d
e
n
o
te
s
d
a
il
y
O
IS
-T
b
il
l
sp
re
a
d
le
v
e
l.
δ
d
e
n
o
te
s
th
a
t
th
e
in
d
ic
a
te
d
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
d
iff
e
re
n
c
e
d
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
ru
n
s
fr
o
m
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
,
2
0
0
6
to
D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r
3
1
,
2
0
0
9
.
T
h
e
su
b
sc
ri
p
t
∗∗
d
e
n
o
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
e
l;
th
e
su
b
sc
ri
p
t
∗
d
e
n
o
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
e
l.
A
A
A
-R
a
te
d
T
ra
n
ch
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
C
on
st
an
t
R
E
IT
V
IX
L
IB
O
R
-O
IS
O
IS
-T
b
il
l
R
2
P
C
1
-0
.0
00
4
0.
2
4
6
2
∗∗
-0
.0
0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
0
0
7
-0
.0
0
0
0
0
9
0
.0
8
(-
0.
09
)
(6
.7
7
)
(-
0
.4
8
)
(-
0
.6
0
)
(0
.7
5
)
P
C
2
−1
.8
8e
−
03
∗
-4
.2
3
e-
0
3
2.
0
6
e
−
0
5
∗∗
-2
.8
8
e-
0
6
-1
.0
6
e-
0
6
0
.0
1
(-
1.
65
)
(-
0
.5
1
)
(2
.0
2
)
(-
1
.0
9
)
(-
0
.3
9
)
P
C
3
1.
14
e-
04
-5
.9
7
e-
0
4
-7
.3
3
e-
0
7
-4
.2
5
e-
0
7
-7
.6
2
e-
0
8
0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.1
4)
(-
0
.1
0
)
(-
0
.1
0
)
(0
.2
2
)
(-
0
.0
4
)
P
C
4
-6
.2
8e
-0
4
-7
.1
4
e-
0
3
4
.3
0
e-
0
6
-2
.4
5
e-
0
6
1
.7
1
e-
0
6
0
.0
1
(-
0.
92
)
(-
1
.4
6
)
(0
.7
1
)
(-
1
.5
5
)
(1
.0
6
)
A
A
A
-R
a
te
d
T
ra
n
ch
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
C
on
st
an
t
R
E
IT
δV
IX
δL
IB
O
R
-O
IS
δO
IS
-T
b
il
l
R
2
P
C
1
−0
.0
02
6
∗
0.
2
4
8
0
∗∗
-0
.0
0
0
0
0
8
-0
.0
0
0
0
4
-0
.0
0
0
0
1
0
.0
8
(-
1.
70
)
(5
.2
8
)
(-
0
.0
4
)
(-
0
.7
6
)
(-
0
.4
9
)
P
C
2
-2
.9
6e
-0
4
-6
.7
4
e-
0
3
-5
.0
8
e-
0
6
-1
.4
0
e-
0
5
3
.1
5
e-
0
6
0
.0
0
3
(-
0.
86
)
(-
0
.6
3
)
(-
0
.1
1
)
(-
1
.0
6
)
(-
0
.4
8
)
P
C
3
9.
10
e-
05
-1
.9
1
e-
0
3
-5
.9
2
e-
0
6
-8
.2
7
e-
0
6
-2
.5
7
e-
0
6
0
.0
0
2
(0
.3
7)
(-
0
.2
5
)
(-
0
.1
8
)
(-
0
.8
8
)
(-
0
.5
5
)
P
C
4
-2
.9
9e
-0
4
-6
.9
9
e-
0
3
3
.4
7
e-
0
3
−1
.3
0
e
−
0
6
∗
-4
.3
2
e-
0
6
0
.0
1
(-
1.
48
)
(-
1
.1
1
)
(0
.1
3
)
(-
1
.6
6
)
(-
1
.1
1
)
99
Chapter 4
Analysing Contagion Within the U.S. Subprime Mortgage-Backed
Securities Market
4.1. Introduction
In 2007 the United States’ financial system was hit by its worst crisis in almost a
century, one that led the global economy into what has been dubbed the “Great Re-
cession” by former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker (Cetorelli et al., 2012).
Between October 2007 and March 2009 the S&P 500 lost approximately 56% of its
value, in November 2008 the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX)
increased steadily to an historical high of 80.86 percentage points, and it has been
estimated that global losses due to the crisis will amount to over $12 trillion (Better
Markets Report, September 2012).
As the crisis unfolded many attributed U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities as
the underlying source of the problem, such as Gorton (2009), Brunnermeier (2008)
and Mah-Hui (2008). The fledgling market for these structured finance products had
experienced rapid growth in the years prior to the crisis, trading not only in the United
States but by investors across the globe (Dodd, 2007). The tranche and ratings fea-
tures of these asset-backed securities appealed to investors as a means of spreading risk,
and soon suppliers of subprime mortgage-backed products were struggling to meet the
increasing demand for them, leading to lax loan standards and feeding market growth
even more (Mian & Sufi, 2009). The share of subprime mortgages increased from
approximately 9% of new mortgages in the early 2000s to over 40% in 2006 (Hell-
wig, 2009) and subprime mortgage-backed security issuance grew from $195 billion to
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$362.5 billion during the same period (Park, 2010).
The growth of this market led to the creation of the ABX.HE indexes, which reference
subprime mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).1 With the decline
of the real estate market in early 2007 things began to unravel rapidly as the threat of
vast defaults in the subprime mortgage market led investors to reassess the risk of these
asset-backed securities (Fender & Scheicher, 2008). Soon it became clear that in most
cases there had been a gross underestimation of this risk, resulting in vast mispricing of
these products (Whetten, 2006). This created widespread panic for the large number
of investors trading them and in most cases the originating financial institutions were
forced to take them back onto their books, resulting in warehousing risk and substan-
tial losses (Purnanandam, 2011). This financial market distress fuelled a lack of trust
between financial institutions, as many were unsure of even their own exposure to these
now “toxic” products, and so could not be confident of other institutions exposures.
This led to a widespread credit crunch in 2008, with September of that year seen by
many as a turning point in the crisis (Longstaff, 2010). Events such as the collapse
of Lehman Brothers and the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America caused
further distress in already unstable markets as stock prices plummeted and liquidity
came to a halt.
Contagion in financial markets during a crisis such as that experienced in 2007-2009 is
important to both investors and financial institutions keen to halt the spread of crises
and so this chapter tests for contagion within the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed se-
curities sector using the ABX indexes to represent this market. As Longstaff (2010)
tests for contagion from the ABX indexes to other financial markets during the crisis
that work is treated as a basis for this chapter. However, as this chapter deals with
1For a detailed discussion of the ABX please refer to Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.
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the ABX market only, we modify the definition of contagion used by Longstaff (2010),
which is that presented by Forbes & Rigobon (2002), to “an episode in which there
is a significant increase in intra-market linkages after a shock occurs in that market”.
Because we are testing for significant changes in existing linkages we are therefore test-
ing for a form of shift contagion and define contagion as linkages over and above those
experienced during “normal” market conditions.2
Following and modifying the VAR framework outlined in Longstaff (2010) we test if
returns in the ABX assets Granger-cause returns in other assets during the crisis pe-
riod. We then analyse the sum of lagged coefficients in order to ascertain if identified
shocks are short-lived or persistent in nature. The analysis is performed on the spliced
ABX index employed by Longstaff (2010) and two traded ABX vintages to investigate
if the results vary substantially across indexes.3
The results provide evidence for contagion within the three ABX indexes analysed dur-
ing the volatile 2007 “subprime-crisis” period which then dissipates during the 2008
“global-crisis” period, as liquidity came to a halt, before increasing slightly during the
“post-crisis” period of 2009, as markets rebounded. The higher-rated assets display
more evidence of contagion than the lower ratings, which may be due to the effect of the
common shock transferring risk from the lower to the higher rating classes. Persistent
shocks emanate from the higher-rated assets in the traded vintages but from the lower
ratings in the spliced ABX index, indicating that combining the four ABX vintages to
create an on-the-run spliced ABX index may influence results. The results also vary
across the traded ABX vintages, suggesting that these assets were heterogeneous in
2Shift contagion is defined as a change in existing relationships between markets during crisis times
while pure contagion is that unrelated to fundamentals, in other words a relationship that did not
exist prior to the crisis period.
3Note that “spliced ABX index” refers to the ABX series constructed in Longstaff (2010) while the
terms “ABX 06-1 index/vintage”, “ABX 06-2 index/vintage”, “ABX 07-1 index/vintage”, “ABX 07-2
index/vintage” refer to the traded ABX issuances.
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nature.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes the
literature analysing the ABX indexes in terms of both contagion and analysis of the
indexes themselves. Section 4.3 describes the data employed and the VAR framework
used. Section 4.4 presents preliminary data analysis while section 4.5 provides results
from the VAR analysis. Section 4.6 then presents those obtained from a modified VAR
analysis. A final section concludes.
4.2. Related Literature
The first two ABX vintages began trading in 2006 and soon became key measures of
subprime mortgage market conditions for investors and financial institutions (Marques-
Ibanez & Scheicher, 2009). As the crisis of 2007 unfolded many turned to this proxy
for the subprime mortgage-backed securities market in order to shed light upon what
had led the financial system to such a collapse. Gorton (2009) states that the ABX
lay at the very heart of the crisis and suggests that trades in the indexes caused infor-
mation regarding the decline of house prices to be exposed, revealing how interlinked
the housing market and the market for these securities had become. The creation of
this “common knowledge” fuelled the widespread panic that led to the liquidity crisis
of 2008, causing the ABX to become the central point of the crisis.
Stanton & Wallace (2011) investigate whether ABX prices efficiently aggregate infor-
mation regarding the credit performance of referenced subprime mortgage obligations
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and conclude that the indexes are in fact an imperfect benchmark for marking-to-
market mortgage portfolios. Caruana & Kodres (2008) highlight that the over-the-
counter (OTC) characteristics of ABX trading contributed to the opaque nature of the
market. They suggest that price behaviour of the ABX implies that these products
were used in place of actual liquid securities to absorb new information. Whetten
(2006) highlights the differences between corporate credit default swaps and asset-
backed credit default swaps and describes how the ABX enabled investors to convey
their view of the subprime mortgage-backed security sector by taking a position in a
credit default swap.
Despite a vast literature analysing the transmission of shocks across countries and
markets there is little consensus regarding exactly what constitutes financial conta-
gion. Early work, such as King & Wadwani (1990), Lee & Kim (1993) and Calvo
& Reinhart (1996), fail to differentiate between contagion and interdependencies that
occur between financial markets even in “normal” market conditions. In their seminal
paper analysing this problem Forbes & Rigobon (2002) show that tests for contagion
based on correlation coefficients alone provide misleading and biased results as they
do not correct for heteroskedasticity in market returns. Analysing three crises they
propose a correction for this bias, concluding that if there is no significant increase in
co-movement over and above what is experienced in tranquil times it is interdepen-
dence, not contagion, observed in markets.
Although there is a large body of work analysing contagion in financial markets litera-
ture utilizing the ABX indexes to test for its presence during the crisis of 2007-2009 is
not as extensive, and, as yet, there are no published works analysing contagion within
the ABX itself. Longstaff (2010) utilizes the ABX indexes to represent the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage-backed securities market and tests for contagion from this market to
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several fixed income, equity and volatility markets using a vector autoregressive (VAR)
framework.
Longstaff (2010) highlights that the literature examining contagion broadly classifies
three potential devices though which contagion may be transmitted to financial mar-
kets. The first mechanism is termed the “correlated-information channel”. In this
channel contagion occurs through the transmission of information by means of price
discovery and should cause instantaneous price effects following a crisis. The second
channel presented is known as the “liquidity channel”. This channel implies that a
crisis be related to credit shortages and increased trading in other financial markets.
The third outlet is labelled the “risk-premium channel” through which shocks to an
affected security may have predictive ability for subsequent returns of other securities.
Using a VAR framework Longstaff (2010) finds strong evidence of contagion in the
financial markets examined over the crisis period. It is also found that this conta-
gion is mainly transmitted through liquidity and risk-premium channels, rejecting the
correlated information channel. Significant price discovery supports this hypothesis.
4.3. Data
This chapter uses the spliced ABX index employed by Longstaff (2010) as a benchmark
case for testing for contagion within the indexes.4 These results are then compared to
those obtained using the traded ABX 06-1 and 06-2 vintages in order to ascertain if
there exist significant differences between vintages and also if splicing the data could
4The spliced ABX index is defined in the following section
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influence results.5 ABX data have been obtained from the Markit Group Ltd. and
weekly (Wednesday to Wednesday) percentage changes are used in the analysis.
The sample period ranges from January 19, 2006, to December 31, 2009, for both the
spliced ABX index and the ABX 06-1 vintage. Because the ABX 06-2 vintage was not
issued until July 19, 2006, the data set is unbalanced as the sample period runs from
July 19, 2006, to December 31, 2009, for this vintage.
4.3.1. Longstaff (2010) Spliced ABX Index
Longstaff (2010) constructs an on-the-run ABX index by splicing the series together
at the date that each new vintage is issued. The series is therefore spliced together
on 19 July 2006, 19 January 2007 and 19 July 2007, respectively. As each new series
began trading at par it is necessary to re-base the series at each splicing date.
The sample is divided into three separate one-year periods, the 2006 “pre-crisis” pe-
riod, the 2007 “subprime-crisis” period and the 2008 “global-crisis” period, to test for
contagion when moving from tranquil “normal” market conditions to a volatile crisis
period. We extend the original sample to include 2009 as a “post-crisis” period.
4.4. Preliminary Analysis
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 plot the time series of ABX weekly returns for each of the
ABX data sets analysed for the entire sample period.
[Insert Figures 4.1 - 4.3 about here]
5The ABX 07-1 and 07-2 vintages are not analysed due to the fact that they were both issued in
the volatile period of 2007 and so do not provide a tranquil non-crisis period with which to compare
results.
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These illustrate that during the 2006 “normal” period all five ABX assets were stable
in each ABX series analysed. From 2007 onwards, however, returns in all three indexes
become increasingly volatile as the crisis hit. This volatility continues throughout 2008
and 2009, although it does diminish somewhat. However, returns do not revert to the
stable values experienced during 2006, suggesting that this market was still subject to
volatility during the “post-crisis” period.
[Insert Tables 4.1 - 4.3 about here]
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 report summary statistics for weekly percentage returns for the
three ABX data sets examined in each of the four years in the sample period. The
results suggest that normality is rejected in all cases, evidenced by excess kurtosis and
negative skewness in almost all cases. In 2006 the two highest ratings in the spliced
ABX index experience positive mean returns, reflecting this relatively stable period.
All mean returns are positive for the ABX 06-1 vintage during 2006, contrasting with
the ABX 06-2 vintage, in which all assets are mean negative. These differences are
probably driven by the differing quality of the assets underlying the two traded vin-
tages as the deals included in the ABX 06-1 vintage would have been originated in the
second half of 2005 and so would be of considerably better quality than those included
in the ABX 06-2 vintage. The descriptive statistics for 2007 reflect the volatile period
entered into during that year. Mean returns are negative in all cases and are monoton-
ically related to credit rating, indicating that the lower-rated assets were hit hardest
during the subprime crisis. Unsurprisingly volatility of returns is considerably higher
in 2007, 2008 and 2009 relative to 2006 but is not inversely related to credit rating as
it suggests that the middle A-rated is the most volatile asset in both the spliced ABX
index and the ABX 06-2 vintage while the BBB-rated asset is the most volatile in the
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ABX 06-1 vintage. The effect of the crisis is also evidenced by the widening of the gap
between minimum and maximum values relative to 2006 with the absolute minimum
values exceeding the corresponding maximum values in all cases. The increase in the
size of this gap indicates that the magnitudes of returns were fluctuating more during
the crisis period.
Turning to 2008 mean returns become increasingly negative and standard deviations
remain high, suggesting that the global credit crunch negatively affected ABX returns
even more so than the subprime shock.
Summary statistics for the “post-crisis” period of 2009 exhibit some evidence of recov-
ery as markets rebounded with some positive mean returns and declines in volatility.
Overall, these descriptive statistics illustrate the effect of the subprime and global
crises on the ABX evidenced by falling mean returns and higher standard deviations.
The next step is to analyse if this higher volatility led to an increase in linkages be-
tween these assets. As a preliminary examination of how the relationship between
ABX tranches may have changed over the sample period Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 report
raw correlations for weekly percentage returns of the three ABX data sets examined
for each of the four years in the sample period.
[Insert Tables 4.4 - 4.6 about here]
The average correlation among ABX assets increases considerably between 2006 and
2007, indicating that during the “subprime-crisis” period these assets were subject
to higher degrees of co-movement, consistent with the assets experiencing a common
shock. This then decreases during the subsequent “global-crisis” and “post-crisis” pe-
riods, suggesting that linkages between these assets were strongest during the subprime
crisis. In order to further examine how the correlation among these assets may have
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changed over time rolling correlations are calculated using a window width of 24. This
window width is chosen due to the relatively short data range and also as the ABX
06-2 vintage was issued six months after the ABX 06-1 vintage. Alternative window
widths are also employed and our conclusions do not change.
[Insert Figures 4.4 - 4.6 about here]
Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 indicate that these experienced different relationships during
the sample period, and also that the relationships between the ratings tranches differed
across the three ABX series examined. For the traded assets this again suggests that the
vintages should be treated as separate entities and it also highlights differences between
the spliced ABX index and those ABX vintages that investors were actually purchasing
in the market. For example, the correlation between the two highest-rated assets in
the spliced ABX index increases during 2007, as the crisis hit, and then declines during
2008 before settling close to its pre-crisis pattern. However, the correlation between
the similarly rated assets in the ABX 06-1 vintage, while also increasing with the onset
of 2007, remained relatively high throughout 2008 and 2009 and does not revert to its
pre-crisis level. Comparing these with correlations between the AAA- and AA-rated
assets in the ABX 06-2 vintage we see an initial high correlation that remains until mid-
2008 before falling substantially. These differences could be due to the higher quality
of the underlying assets in the ABX 06-1 vintage causing the two higher ratings to
behave similarly during crisis periods, while those comprising the ABX 06-2 vintage
were of lower quality and so the two highest ratings tranches became increasingly
heterogeneous over the volatile sample period. Overall these results again indicate
that these assets became increasingly interrelated once the subprime crisis hit in 2007.
However, as Forbes & Rigobon (2002) prove, increased correlation does not necessarily
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constitute contagion. In order to examine the relationship between these assets we
therefore employ the VAR framework presented by Longstaff (2010).
4.5. VAR 1 Analysis
In order to test for contagion within the ABX a five variable VAR is estimated on
the ratings tranches of the three ABX data sets under analysis in line with Longstaff
(2010). The VAR specification takes the form:
ABXt = α+
K∑
k=1
βkABXt−k + t, (4.1)
in which ABXt denotes the ABX asset rating return that appears as the dependent
variable while ABX denotes the ABX asset ratings tranche returns whose lagged values
appear as explanatory variables. K denotes lag length, which is four weeks for the
spliced ABX index and ABX 06-1 vintage and two weeks for the ABX 06-2 vintage,
as suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion. The VAR system is estimated
individually for each of the five different ratings classes and for each of the three ABX
series considered.
In Longstaff (2010) the original application is characterized by a “normal” period in
which the ABX assets behave independently from the other assets considered. This is
unlikely to be true analysing the ABX vintages in isolation since the assets are inter-
related in the pool structure. As our definition of contagion requires an increase in
co-movement in excess of that experienced in non-crisis times we must first establish
the interdependencies of the assets by examining the VAR results for 2006 only.
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4.5.1. VAR 1 Results
Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 provide results for the VAR estimation performed on the three
ABX indexes for 2006. Reported are the Newey-West adjusted t-statistics for the
individual coefficients estimated, as the residuals are likely to have a non-constant
variance, along with the p-values of the F-test that β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0. This
is a test of the hypothesis that ABX asset returns in one ratings class Granger-cause
subsequent returns in other ratings classes. Also reported are the R2s for each VAR
estimated.
[Insert Tables 4.7 - 4.9 about here]
It is clear that the ABX assets included in all three analyses were subject to varying
degrees of interdependencies during 2006. In the spliced ABX index the highest-rated
tranche returns Granger-cause returns in every other asset class and are, in turn, sig-
nificantly impacted by every other asset class. One possible reason for this could be
that this tranche would have dominated the CDO structure which could have led to it
significantly impacting all other tranches. The lower two asset classes are significantly
affected only by the highest-rated asset and, in the case of the BBB- rating, by the
middle A-rated tranche. In turn, these asset returns have a significant effect upon only
the AAA-rated asset, and the BBB- has a marginal significant effect upon the A-rated
asset. This may be due to the fact that during this tranquil period these lower-rated
assets would have been the least liquid within the CDO and so they may not have had
much of an impact upon the rest of the index. Turning to the individual t-statistics
we see that many of the higher-rated assets have significant predictive ability of up to
four weeks ahead during 2006, suggesting price discovery existed during this “normal”
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period. The R2’s for the VARs decline considerably as the credit rating of the depen-
dent variable employed decreases, suggesting that the higher-rated assets have more
power when it comes to explaining variation in the ABX data.
The VAR estimation results for the ABX 06-1 vintage show greater evidence of inter-
dependencies during the 2006 tranquil period when compared to those for the spliced
ABX index. Returns in all ratings tranches are Granger-caused by almost all other
ratings classes, with few exceptions.
The VAR estimation results for the ABX 06-2 vintage suggest that there are lower
levels of interdependencies among the ABX assets in this vintage than in the previous
ABX 06-1 vintage and the spliced ABX index. The two highest-rated assets are sig-
nificantly affected by almost every other ratings tranche in the vintage. As reported
earlier these two tranches were highly correlated during this period so it is possible
they would have been impacted by other tranches in a similar fashion. The lower three
tranches are relatively unaffected, and for the most part behave independently of each
other during this “normal” market period. Again, this could be due to the illiquid
nature of these riskier tranches. The fact that this later issued vintage displays less
evidence of interdependencies among ratings than the earlier issuance could be due to
differing risk profiles among vintages along with higher volatility and lesser degrees of
co-movement among assets, as reported in section 4.4.
Altogether, these results emphasize that the assets comprising the two traded ABX
vintages behaved differently, even in “normal” periods. The results also highlight the
differences between the spliced ABX index and those traded in the market. In terms
of testing for contagion, the existence of interdependencies among assets in the “nor-
mal” period of 2006 implies that we cannot use the VAR framework as presented by
Longstaff (2010) to test for significant changes in the relationships between these assets
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in the crisis periods of 2007 and 2008 and so a modified version must be employed.
4.6. VAR 2 Analysis
Many tests for the presence of contagion employ dummy variables to account for a
change in regime, such as Forbes & Rigobon (2002), Favero & Giavazzi (2002) and Bae
et al. (2003).6 This is the approach taken here. We define three dummy variables. To
account for the “subprime-crisis” period of 2007 a dummy variable, D1, is included,
taking a value of one during 2007 and zero otherwise. To account for the “global-crisis”
period of 2008 a dummy variable, D2, is included, taking a value of one during 2008
and zero otherwise. To account for the “post-crisis” period of 2009 a dummy variable,
D3, is included, taking a value of one during 2009 and zero otherwise. The dummy
variables are thus defined as:
D1 =

0 if 2006
1 if 2007
0 if 2008
0 if 2009
, D2 =

0 if 2006
0 if 2007
1 if 2008
0 if 2009
, D3 =

0 if 2006
0 if 2007
0 if 2008
1 if 2009
.
These dummy variables are then included in the following model:
ABXt = α0 +
K∑
k=1
αkABXt−k + β0D1 +
K∑
k=1
D1(αk − βk)ABXt−k,
+δ0D2 +
K∑
k=1
D2(αk − δk)ABXt−k + γ0D3 +
K∑
k=1
D3(αk − γk)ABXt−k + t, (4.2)
6For a detailed discussion and comparison of these and other tests for contagion please see Dungey
et al. (2005).
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in which α0 denotes the 2006 constant term, β0D1 denotes the 2007 constant term,
δ0D2 denotes the 2008 constant term, γ0D3 denotes the 2009 constant term, ABXt
denotes the ABX ratings tranche included as a dependent variable and K denotes
lag length which, as before, is four weeks for the spliced ABX index and the ABX
06-1 vintage and two weeks for the ABX 06-2 vintage, as determined by the Akaike
Information Criterion.
In this study dummy variables are included to test for contagion by testing for stability
of regression coefficients. They are used to test the hypothesis that the crisis periods
examined have a significant impact on the coefficients. If the estimated coefficients on
the dummy variables are statistically significant this would indicate the presence of
contagion. The inclusion of dummy variables enables us to test whether the relation-
ships between assets during 2007, 2008 and 2009 are significantly different than during
the “normal” period of 2006. Therefore, if we observe no change then we conclude that
the assets are subject only to “normal” market interdependencies.
4.6.1. VAR 2 Results
Table 4.10 provides the VAR estimation results for each of the three ABX series anal-
ysed. Reported are the p-values of the F-tests that the indicated coefficients are jointly
zero.
[Insert Table 4.10 about here]
The results for 2007 indicate evidence of contagion within the ABX during 2007 and
that this contagion mainly affected the three higher-rated assets. As all tranches are
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significantly affected to some degree this suggests that the ABX assets were hit by a
common shock, which is reasonable based on the documented evolution of the crisis.
During 2007 this common shock was the bursting of the property bubble and the
subsequent collapse of the real estate market, leading to mass mortgage defaults and
thus to investors reassessing the risk of mortgage-backed securities. In both the spliced
ABX index and the ABX 06-2 vintage the AAA-rated asset significantly impacts all
other ratings tranches and is also significantly affected by all other asset classes, as are
the AA- and A-rated tranches. There are several possible reasons for the consistent
significant effect of the AAA-rated asset. Firstly, this tranche accounts for over 80% of
the CDO structure and so dominates the ABX indexes. Secondly, this tranche would
have been the most popular with investors prior to the crisis due to the misconception
that it was equivalent to a AAA-rated corporate bond and so it would have been the
most liquid ABX asset. This tranche would have continued to be the most liquid in
the indexes even during the volatile “subprime crisis” period as many of the assets
underlying the lower-rated assets would have been wiped out by defaults and investors
would have lost all confidence in these lowest ratings. Finally, as Coval et al. (2009)
state, a common shock can effectively transfer risk from lower- to higher-rated tranches.
The results for the ABX 06-2 vintage in 2007 also suggest that it was the higher-rated
assets that were significantly affected.7 There is more evidence of contagion in this
traded vintage than in the spliced ABX index suggesting that the latter may not
provide an accurate depiction of what was happening in this market during the sample
7As stated above a lag length of three or four weeks is not feasible in this ABX 06-2 vintage model.
As an alternative to this the analysis was performed on daily data over the same period, however the
shortage of data led to imprecise estimated coefficients. A possible reason for this could be that, as
discussed by Armour et al.(1996), a shortcoming of using such high frequency data in a VAR is that
this data can be quite noisy, causing larger standard errors and leading to less meaningful conclusions.
Also, Silklos (1993) states that increasing frequency in order to increase sample size is not equivalent
to using a longer sample and is insufficient when it comes to analysing long term relationships between
variables. A lag length of two is employed, which must be kept in mind when comparing results to
those obtained using a lag length of four weeks.
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period. There is less evidence of contagion in the ABX 06-2 vintage than in both the
spliced ABX index and the ABX 06-1 vintage, again highlighting differences among
vintages.
Turning to the results for the “global-crisis” period of 2008 we see decreased evidence
of contagion relative to 2007. This is likely due to the fact that the market for these
securities came to almost a complete halt with the onset of the liquidity crisis in
September 2008 as investors became increasingly unwilling to invest in these opaque
products. The lack of trades effectively closed down the transmission channels for
contagion. There is increased evidence of contagion in 2009, relative to 2008, probably
due to the market rebounding following the credit crunch, leading to increases in
trading volumes.
4.6.2. Analysing the Sum of Lagged Coefficients
To investigate the total impact of ABX tranche returns on other tranches over the
sample period we analyse the sum of lagged coefficients from the VAR results discussed
in the previous section. This sum can be seen as a measure of persistence of a shock to
the process (Mikusheva, 2007) and allows us to ascertain if any contagious effects are
short-lived or long-term in nature. Table 4.11 provides the sum of lagged coefficients
for the three ABX indexes. Reported are the sum of the coefficients on the lagged
terms of each variable, along with the p-values of the Wald test of the null hypothesis
that the coefficients sum to zero.
[Insert Table 4.11 about here]
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The two traded ABX vintages show evidence of persistent shocks emanating from the
higher-rated assets, suggesting that these markets remained in a state of turmoil and
did not quickly revert to a pre-crisis state following the shock. This is probably due
to the lack of investor confidence causing them to stay out of the market, particularly
during the autumn of 2008 as market wide reassessments of the risk of these products
were still under way following the subprime crisis. The effect emanating from the
higher-rated assets only is probably due to the reasons outlined above.
For the spliced ABX index, persistent shocks emanate from the lower-rated assets, a
result in direct contrast to those presented for the two traded vintages. Therefore, any
shocks emanating from the higher ratings were short-lived in nature, essentially “dying
out” by the end of the sample period. The effect of splicing the data probably causes
this result, as the riskier 07-2 traded vintage would have dominated this index.
4.7. Conclusions
The crisis of 2007 has been linked in no small part to the innovative U.S. subprime
mortgage-backed securities market. The ABX.HE indexes, a basket of these securities,
were followed closely by investors and financial institutions as a barometer of subprime
mortgage market conditions in the years preceding the crisis, yet no published liter-
ature examines whether the ABX indexes were subject to contagion during the 2007
crisis. The seminal work that tests explicitly for contagion from the ABX, Longstaff
(2010), provides the basis for this study. Employing the spliced ABX index and VAR
framework presented by Longstaff (2010) we test for contagion within the ABX to try
to uncover a driving force within the indexes. An initial analysis of the ABX during
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2006 suggests that interdependencies between assets existed during this “normal” mar-
ket period and so dummy variables are included in the VAR framework to account for
crisis periods and test for contagion.
The results provide evidence of contagion following the onset of the crisis. During the
2007 subprime crisis there is evidence of contagion among the higher-rated assets in
the ABX. Once the “global-crisis” period of 2008 hits, the predictive power of lagged
ABX returns decreases. However, during 2009 evidence of Granger-causality increases
within the ABX, perhaps due to a resumption of trades in the ABX following the 2008
credit crunch.
It is clear that the market turmoil was widespread with increased sensitivities across
all assets. It is not possible to identify one consistent driver of the system of assets.
At best, we have shown that the higher-rated assets were the source of more persistent
shocks with price changes in lower-rated assets mostly associated with short-lived noise.
Furthermore, we find important differences between asset interactions in the actual-
traded assets and those in the constructed index. The latter tends to overweight the
final, and thus most risky, vintage of asset and consequently displays different patterns
of contagion.
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Figure 4.1: Spliced ABX Index Weekly Returns.
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Figure 4.2: ABX 06-1 Vintage Weekly Returns.
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Figure 4.3: ABX 06-2 Vintage Weekly Returns.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics For Spliced ABX Index Weekly Percentage Returns
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the weekly percentage returns for the spliced ABX index for the indicated
year. Std. Dev. denotes standard deviation; Min. denotes minimum; Max. denotes maximum. The sample runs from January
19, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
Year Rating Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
2006 AAA 0.002 0.022 2.145 8.699 -0.045 0.090
AA 0.008 0.042 0.361 3.171 -0.119 0.130
A -0.012 0.100 -1.000 0.918 -0.301 0.140
BBB -0.067 0.393 -2.443 10.945 -1.979 0.465
BBB- -0.087 0.462 -1.834 5.692 -2.081 0.535
2007 AAA -0.551 3.465 -1.025 6.116 -12.230 9.737
AA -1.447 6.867 -1.940 9.411 -29.754 21.416
A -2.229 8.077 -1.338 4.036 -28.787 18.774
BBB -2.779 6.666 -0.764 1.717 -21.429 13.595
BBB- -2.840 6.824 -1.173 3.393 -26.618 12.940
2008 AAA -1.016 6.443 0.004 0.938 -16.573 14.839
AA -3.499 8.527 -0.885 1.967 -29.697 14.838
A -3.544 6.996 -1.216 2.168 -23.980 9.845
BBB -3.407 5.373 -0.995 1.294 -20.000 6.594
BBB- -3.203 5.792 -0.379 0.403 -16.238 12.030
2009 AAA -0.242 5.999 -0.367 0.368 -15.494 13.593
AA -0.262 2.987 -1.887 6.697 -13.239 5.576
A 0.226 3.102 0.417 1.190 -7.459 8.883
BBB -0.094 2.661 1.642 5.843 -5.789 10.104
BBB- -0.094 2.714 1.497 5.277 -5.948 10.104
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics For ABX 06-1 Vintage Weekly Percentage Returns
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the weekly percentage returns for the ABX 06-1 vintage for the indicated
year. Std. Dev. denotes standard deviation; Min. denotes minimum; Max. denotes maximum. The sample runs from January
19, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
Year Rating Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
2006 AAA 0.002 0.021 1.936 6.610 -0.030 0.090
AA 0.012 0.043 0.273 1.706 -0.110 0.130
A 0.005 0.073 -0.947 2.400 -0.229 0.150
BBB 0.008 0.196 -0.289 -0.294 -0.408 0.457
BBB- 0.011 0.310 -0.395 -0.340 -0.681 0.594
2007 AAA -0.135 1.091 -1.253 12.187 -5.275 3.779
AA -0.321 2.384 -1.219 7.013 -10.233 6.889
A -0.931 6.145 -0.429 6.440 -22.199 21.685
BBB -2.056 8.288 -1.609 8.730 -39.969 19.365
BBB- -2.334 7.033 -1.344 5.567 -31.649 15.069
2008 AAA -0.294 3.624 -1.231 8.637 -16.173 11.520
AA -1.809 7.186 -1.483 4.306 -30.580 10.949
A -3.123 9.251 0.020 -0.265 -21.270 19.165
BBB -3.442 8.227 -1.349 1.454 -25.726 8.319
BBB- -3.183 7.536 -1.941 3.361 -26.890 5.422
2009 AAA 0.030 3.608 -0.219 0.801 -9.590 8.812
AA 0.019 8.001 0.934 3.658 -17.493 30.176
A -0.151 4.563 1.149 5.084 -10.756 17.258
BBB -0.416 2.813 0.064 1.750 -7.640 7.911
BBB- -0.364 2.814 0.097 2.192 -7.886 8.205
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics For ABX 06-2 Vintage Weekly Percentage Returns
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the weekly percentage returns for the ABX 06-2 vintage for the indicated
year. Std. Dev. denotes standard deviation; Min. denotes minimum; Max. denotes maximum. The sample runs from January
19, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
Year Rating Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max.
2006 AAA -0.0004 0.011 -0.648 1.462 -0.030 0.020
AA -0.001 0.014 -0.470 2.095 -0.040 0.030
A -0.032 0.111 -0.675 0.361 -0.301 0.140
BBB -0.170 0.519 -1.902 6.331 -2.000 0.464
BBB- -0.220 0.587 -1.478 3.591 -2.103 0.534
2007 AAA -0.274 1.827 -0.820 4.480 -6.991 4.754
AA -0.903 5.320 -0.922 4.803 -20.328 14.643
A -1.758 7.562 -1.198 3.653 -29.020 13.527
BBB -2.981 6.892 -1.032 2.427 -26.474 10.451
BBB- -3.100 6.500 -0.347 0.509 -21.164 10.782
2008 AAA -1.062 6.606 -0.759 3.031 -24.349 14.495
AA -3.056 9.258 -0.067 0.171 -25.764 20.556
A -3.821 9.210 -1.176 2.448 -36.741 13.423
BBB -3.620 7.397 -0.554 0.160 -22.155 13.562
BBB- -3.482 6.287 -0.810 0.404 -20.303 8.684
2009 AAA -0.164 6.336 -0.539 0.311 -15.992 12.789
AA -0.261 4.780 1.062 5.321 -11.340 19.535
A -0.156 3.519 -0.020 4.199 -12.157 11.077
BBB 0.982 5.951 0.996 5.449 -17.327 22.452
BBB- 0.978 5.639 1.371 4.493 -12.215 21.357
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Table 4.4: Spliced ABX Index Correlation Coefficients
Notes: This table reports raw correlation coefficients for the weekly percentage returns for the spliced ABX index for the
indicated year. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009
2006
Average Correlation: 0.50
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.44 1.00
A 0.36 0.50 1.00
BBB 0.23 0.32 0.77 1.00
BBB- 0.33 0.44 0.76 0.85 1.00
2007
Average Correlation: 0.74
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.85 1.00
A 0.80 0.89 1.00
BBB 0.58 0.69 0.80 1.00
BBB- 0.51 0.60 0.77 0.95 1.00
2008
Average Correlation: 0.59
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.75 1.00
A 0.44 0.69 1.00
BBB 0.44 0.62 0.53 1.00
BBB- 0.39 0.59 0.52 0.90 1.00
2009
Average Correlation: 0.40
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.36 1.00
A 0.29 0.69 1.00
BBB 0.04 0.38 0.39 1.00
BBB- 0.09 0.39 0.45 0.94 1.00
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Table 4.5: ABX 06-1 Vintage Correlation Coefficients
Notes: This table reports raw correlation coefficients for the weekly percentage returns for the ABX 06-1 vintage for the
indicated year. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009
2006
Average Correlation: 0.55
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.32 1.00
A 0.41 0.65 1.00
BBB 0.42 0.51 0.71 1.00
BBB- 0.35 0.56 0.70 0.84 1.00
2007
Average Correlation: 0.77
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.87 1.00
A 0.58 0.81 1.00
BBB 0.72 0.78 0.88 1.00
BBB- 0.68 0.69 0.74 0.93 1.00
2008
Average Correlation: 0.70
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.84 1.00
A 0.55 0.79 1.00
BBB 0.54 0.68 0.78 1.00
BBB- 0.52 0.64 0.70 0.92 1.00
2009
Average Correlation: 0.42
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.85 1.00
A 0.42 0.48 1.00
BBB 0.14 0.20 0.44 1.00
BBB- 0.13 0.22 0.41 0.86 1.00
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Table 4.6: ABX 06-2 Vintage Correlation Coefficients
Notes: This table reports raw correlation coefficients for the weekly percentage returns for the ABX 06-2 vintage for the
indicated year. The sample runs from July 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009.
2006
Average Correlation: 0.48
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.69 1.00
A 0.24 0.43 1.00
BBB 0.03 0.21 0.83 1.00
BBB- 0.26 0.44 0.80 0.86 1.00
2007
Average Correlation: 0.77
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.91 1.00
A 0.72 0.86 1.00
BBB 0.63 0.76 0.86 1.00
BBB- 0.59 0.65 0.76 0.95 1.00
2008
Average Correlation: 0.63
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.76 1.00
A 0.56 0.77 1.00
BBB 0.38 0.59 0.75 1.00
BBB- 0.37 0.53 0.65 0.92 1.00
2009
Average Correlation: 0.50
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 1.00
AA 0.46 1.00
A 0.33 0.65 1.00
BBB 0.15 0.53 0.65 1.00
BBB- 0.07 0.53 0.68 0.95 1.00
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Table 4.7: Spliced ABX Index 2006 VAR 1 Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results for the following VAR equation:
ABXt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkABXt−k + t,
in which ABXt denotes the ABX asset rating weekly percentage return that appears as the dependent variable while ABX
denotes the ratings tranche weekly percentage returns whose lagged values appear as explanatory variables. Four lags are
suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009. The subscript
∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 p
AAA AAA 0.70 −3.96∗∗ 2.27∗∗ 3.82∗∗ 0.49 0.00∗∗
AA -0.69 −3.12∗∗ −2.42∗∗ −1.74∗ 0.00∗∗
A 2.04∗∗ 0.16 0.65 −4.90∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB -1.39 −2.70∗∗ -1.58 2.87∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB- 1.98∗ 0.86 1.26 -1.49 0.00∗∗
AA AAA 0.46 -0.63 2.83∗∗ 1.51 -0.41 0.00∗∗
AA −3.41∗∗ −3.61∗∗ −2.04∗∗ −1.93∗ 0.00∗∗
A 0.37 -1.42 −1.69∗ -1.07 0.33
BBB 0.41 0.17 0.28 0.78 0.86
BBB- 0.86 0.77 0.38 1.28 0.55
A AAA 0.41 −2.45∗∗ -0.22 3.02∗∗ 0.60 0.00∗∗
AA −3.08∗∗ 1.99∗ −2.19∗∗ −1.89∗ 0.00∗∗
A 0.56 -1.51 0.15 -1.56 0.00∗∗
BBB -0.27 -1.24 -1.57 0.73 0.50
BBB- 0.79 2.40∗∗ 1.02 0.31 0.06∗
BBB AAA 0.24 −1.85∗ 0.01 3.30∗∗ 1.45 0.00∗∗
AA -0.81 −1.83∗ -0.75 -0.61 0.42
A -0.11 0.09 -0.31 -0.74 0.43
BBB 0.21 -0.27 -0.75 0.99 0.84
BBB- -0.08 1.04 0.78 -0.91 0.58
BBB- AAA 0.39 −2.41∗∗ 0.65 1.65 1.63 0.00∗∗
AA -1.50 -1.19 -1.54 0.12 0.27
A 0.12 -0.86 0.05 −3.05∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB 0.42 0.25 -0.10 1.14 0.80
BBB- 0.53 0.78 0.32 -0.31 0.61
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Table 4.8: ABX 06-1 Vintage 2006 VAR 1 Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results for the following VAR equation:
ABXt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkABXt−k + t,
in which ABXt denotes the ABX asset rating weekly percentage return that appears as the dependent variable while ABX
denotes the ratings tranche weekly percentage returns whose lagged values appear as explanatory variables. Four lags are
suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion. The sample runs from January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009. The subscript
∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX R2 β1 β2 β3 β4 p
AAA AAA 0.61 −2.23∗∗ -1.29 7.30∗∗ 0.06 0.00∗∗
AA 2.75∗∗ −1.92∗ -0.13 −2.63∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A -0.30 0.20 1.33 0.20 0.63
BBB -0.91 -0.53 −2.81∗∗ 1.82∗ 0.01∗∗
BBB- -0.25 1.89∗ 0.45 −2.51∗∗ 0.08∗
AA AAA 0.58 1.66∗ -1.09 4.98∗∗ -1.00 0.00∗∗
AA 0.27 −4.51∗∗ -0.79 −3.40∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A −2.66∗∗ -1.50 -1.44 0.20 0.00∗∗
BBB -1.54 1.81∗ −4.36∗∗ 0.41 0.00∗∗
BBB- 0.82 0.41 2.91∗∗ 0.37 0.00∗∗
A AAA 0.53 -0.51 0.40 3.21∗∗ -0.82 0.08∗∗
AA -1.26 2.94∗∗ -1.58 −2.49∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A -1.27 −1.78∗ 0.69 -0.21 0.01∗∗
BBB 0.69 -0.87 −1.83∗∗ -0.85 0.01∗∗
BBB- 0.37 2.39∗∗ 1.05 1.49 0.00∗∗
BBB AAA 0.56 −1.97∗ 2.01∗∗ 5.18∗∗ 0.14 0.00∗∗
AA -0.45 −2.85∗∗ -1.25 -1.05 0.01∗∗
A −1.83∗ -0.48 0.50 -0.34 0.00∗∗
BBB 2.68∗∗ -0.22 −1.99∗ -0.15 0.01∗∗
BBB- 0.00 0.96 1.23 0.65 0.02∗∗
BBB- AAA 0.38 -0.25 0.54 2.87∗∗ -0.15 0.01∗∗
AA -0.82 −1.76∗ -0.72 -0.85 0.14
A -1.44 -0.44 -1.27 -1.03 0.00∗∗
BBB 1.70 -0.18 -1.08 0.34 0.27
BBB- 0.51 0.35 1.66∗ 0.52 0.00∗∗
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Table 4.9: ABX 06-2 Vintage 2006 VAR 1 Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results for the following VAR equation:
ABXt = α +
2∑
k=1
βkABXt−k + t,
in which ABXt denotes the ABX asset rating weekly percentage return that appears as the dependent variable while ABX
denotes the ratings tranche weekly percentage returns whose lagged values appear as explanatory variables. Two lags are
suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion. The sample runs from July 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009. The subscript ∗∗
denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX R2 β1 β2 p
AAA AAA 0.81 −4.77∗∗ -1.04 0.00∗∗
AA -1.29 1.31 0.36
A 1.44 2.48∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB −3.86∗∗ −3.54∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB- 4.21∗∗ -0.05 0.00∗∗
AA AAA 0.80 2.30∗∗ 2.87∗∗ 0.02∗∗
AA −7.20∗∗ −2.03∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A -0.46 1.96∗ 0.08∗
BBB 2.53∗∗ -0.24 0.03∗∗
BBB- 0.65 −1.74∗ 0.16
A AAA 0.49 1.53 0.73 0.30
AA −3.05∗∗ -1.64 0.01∗∗
A -0.02 0.59 0.83
BBB 0.57 1.35 0.40
BBB- 0.27 0.19 0.94
BBB AAA 0.45 0.91 2.06∗∗ 0.12
AA −2.16∗∗ −2.18∗∗ 0.08∗
A -1.38 1.24 0.32
BBB 0.82 1.29 0.40
BBB- 0.34 0.06 0.94
BBB- AAA 0.44 0.80 2.15∗∗ 0.10
AA -1.81 -1.40 0.19
A -0.61 0.27 0.82
BBB 2.08∗∗ 1.44 0.09∗
BBB- -0.11 0.02 0.99
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Table 4.10: VAR 2 Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results for the following VAR equation:
ABXt = α0 +
K∑
k=1
αkABXt−k + β0D1 +
K∑
k=1
D1(αk − βk)ABXt−k,
+δ0D2 +
K∑
k=1
D2(αk − δk)ABXt−k + γ0D3 +
K∑
k=1
D3(αk − γk)ABXt−k + t, (4.3)
in which D1 denotes a dummy variable for 2007, D2 denotes a dummy variable for 2008, D3 denotes a dummy variable for
2009, α0 denotes the 2006 constant term, β0D1 denotes the 2007 constant term, δ0D2 denotes the 2008 constant term, γ0D3
denotes the 2009 constant term, ABXt denotes the ABX ratings tranche weekly percentage returns included as a dependent
variable and K denotes lag length which, as before, is four weeks for the spliced ABX index and the ABX 06-1 vintage and two
weeks for the ABX 06-2 vintage, as determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at
the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Spliced ABX index
Dependent
Regressor AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
AA2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.32 0.34
A2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.83 0.05∗∗
BBB2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.84 0.39
BBB−2007 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.92 0.61
AAA2008 0.11 0.43 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
AA2008 0.13 0.04
∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.38 0.25
A2008 0.00
∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.22 0.42 0.00∗∗
BBB2008 0.25 0.14 0.30 0.13 0.16
BBB−2008 0.24 0.35 0.05∗∗ 0.50 0.85
AAA2009 0.02
∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
AA2009 0.03
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.56 0.30
A2009 0.68 0.01
∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB2009 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.83 0.34
BBB−2009 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.52 0.14
ABX 06-1 vintage
Dependent
Regressor AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
AA2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.32
BBB2007 0.07
∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.40
BBB−2007 0.57 0.05∗∗ 0.42 0.32 0.41
AAA2008 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.02∗∗
AA2008 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.38 0.31
A2008 0.02
∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.59 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB2008 0.07
∗ 0.67 0.19 0.29 0.69
BBB−2008 0.61 0.91 0.78 0.20 0.14
AAA2009 0.03
∗∗ 0.67 0.14 0.00∗∗ 0.02∗∗
AA2009 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.15
A2009 0.03
∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.25 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB2009 0.04
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.30
BBB−2009 0.04∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.22
ABX 06-2 vintage
Dependent
Regressor AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA2007 0.01
∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.22 0.16
AA2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.17
A2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.48 0.36 0.87
BBB2007 0.08
∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.25 0.45
BBB−2007 0.18 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.16 0.27
AAA2008 0.26 0.14 0.30 0.12 0.10
AA2008 0.34 0.00
∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.18
A2008 0.50 0.51 0.71 0.30 0.77
BBB2008 0.97 0.99 0.47 0.11 0.02
∗∗
BBB−2008 0.41 0.76 0.16 0.37 0.37
AAA2009 0.00
∗∗ 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.10
AA2009 0.07
∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.18
A2009 0.87 0.76 0.76 0.27 0.87
BBB2009 0.46 0.44 0.04
∗∗ 0.10 0.11
BBB−2009 0.21 0.43 0.07∗ 0.15 0.23
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Table 4.11: Sum Of Lagged Coefficients
Notes: This table reports results from the Wald test that the indicated coefficients from the following VAR equation sum to
zero:
ABXt = α0 +
K∑
k=1
αkABXt−k + β0D1 +
K∑
k=1
D1(αk − βk)ABXt−k,
+δ0D2 +
K∑
k=1
D2(αk − δk)ABXt−k + γ0D3 +
K∑
k=1
D3(αk − γk)ABXt−k + t,
in which D1 denotes a dummy variable for 2007, D2 denotes a dummy variable for 2008, D3 denotes a dummy variable for
2009, α0 denotes the 2006 constant term, β0D1 denotes the 2007 constant term, δ0D2 denotes the 2008 constant term, γ0D3
denotes the 2009 constant term, ABXt denotes the ABX ratings tranche weekly percentage returns included as a dependent
variable and K denotes lag length which, as before, is four weeks for the spliced ABX index and the ABX 06-1 vintage and two
weeks for the ABX 06-2 vintage, as determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at
the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Spliced ABX index
Dependent
Regressor AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA -2.75 -3.46 -0.01 -3.11 -4.31
p 0.00∗∗ 0.11 1.00 0.85 0.82
AA 2.89 4.37 7.14 10.17 11.32
p 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.20 0.07∗
A -0.73 0.28 0.32 4.06 8.51
p 0.32 0.71 0.79 0.19 0.01∗∗
BBB 14.35 6.80 7.54 -0.92 0.39
p 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.73 0.88
BBB- -13.84 -5.45 -6.00 0.43 -2.46
p 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.84 0.27
ABX 06-1 vintage
Dependent
Regressor AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA -2.72 -5.73 -18.31 -24.64 -28.69
p 0.01∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.04∗∗
AA 0.87 1.96 9.39 17.87 20.05
p 0.10 0.15 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A -0.23 0.87 1.45 2.95 7.94
p 0.56 0.35 0.28 0.15 0.01∗∗
BBB -0.22 0.18 1.82 -1.62 0.86
p 0.83 0.93 0.40 0.60 0.78
BBB- 1.28 3.83 -0.59 1.18 -1.61
p 0.30 0.11 0.72 0.60 0.48
ABX 06-2 vintage
Dependent
Regressor AAA AA A BBB BBB-
AAA 3.32 4.32 -7.67 -73.08 -65.28
p 0.00∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.53 0.10 0.08∗
AA -2.36 -1.12 28.07 172.11 145.45
p 0.00∗∗ 0.40 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.10
A 0.53 1.70 0.84 0.57 0.93
p 0.35 0.01∗∗ 0.49 0.86 0.81
BBB -0.59 0.57 1.64 -0.67 -1.23
p 0.40 0.49 0.12 0.71 0.49
BBB- 0.97 -0.13 -0.02 0.08 0.21
p 0.18 0.88 0.28 0.96 0.90
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Chapter 5
Analysing Contagion from the U.S. Subprime Mortgage-Backed
Securities Market
5.1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 induced global stock markets to plummet, caused fi-
nancial institutions to suffer massive losses and led economies worldwide into recession.
In its aftermath it became clear that it had originated in the relatively new and small
subprime mortgage-backed securities market (Gorton, 2009). Triggered by a declining
real estate market and the threat of vast defaults by borrowers, particularly in the
subprime sector, the crisis soon evolved from a real estate problem to a much broader
global credit crisis (Brunnermeier, 2008). By September 2008 liquidity had all but
come to a halt in already unstable financial markets and events such as the fall of Wall
Street giant Lehman Brothers and the nationalization of insurance powerhouse AIG
added to institutions’ growing reluctance to lend to one another (Bordo, 2008). The
U.S. government was forced to intervene in an effort to stem the spread of the crisis
even further, implementing strategies such as the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, which authorized the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion purchasing
troubled assets and supplying banks with capital, causing the Act to be dubbed the
“$700 billion bailout plan” by the media (Nothwehr, 2008). Despite such measures
market conditions continued to deteriorate, investor confidence remained low and the
crisis extended across markets and countries.
Contagion during such a catastrophic crisis is clearly of importance to investors and
financial institutions and so this chapter tests for its presence from the U.S. subprime
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mortgage-backed securities market, represented by the ABX.HE indexes, to several
fixed income, equity and volatility markets following the vector autoregressive (VAR)
framework outlined by Longstaff (2010).1 This chapter builds on Chapter 4 as it ex-
tends the test for contagion from within the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities
market to other markets which also became distressed during the financial turmoil.
As in Chapter 4 we adopt the definition of contagion presented by Forbes & Rigobon
(2002) as “an episode in which there is a significant increase in cross-market linkages
after a shock occurs in one market”. The spliced ABX index employed by Longstaff
(2010) is analysed, along with two traded ABX vintages in order to ascertain if there
are notable differences across the various ABX data sets.
The analysis in Longstaff (2010) is extended to include a “post-crisis” period of 2009
and is applied to two traded ABX vintages. Principal component analysis (PCA) is
then performed on the three ABX series and the main principal component is employed
in a further VAR analysis.
The VAR results provide little evidence of contagion from the spliced ABX index to the
financial market variables during the “post-crisis” period of 2009. Otherwise results for
this index are consistent with Longstaff (2010). The VAR analysis performed on two
traded ABX vintages suggests that there exist differences across vintages, as well as
across the traded and spliced indexes. During 2006 the ABX 06-1 vintage and financial
market variables are not subject to high levels of comovement and so behave mostly
independently of the each other. There is then evidence of contagion from this index
to the financial markets during the volatile 2007 “subprime-crisis” period, which dissi-
pates during the “global-crisis” period as liquidity dried up, before increasing slightly
in the 2009 “post-crisis” year, as markets rebounded.
1For a description of the ABX.HE indexes see Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.
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Analysis of the ABX 06-2 vintage suggests that significant relationships existed be-
tween the assets during the “pre-crisis” period of 2006, indicating interdependencies
among the assets, which is in striking contrast to the spliced and ABX 06-1 index.
There is evidence of contagion from the ABX 06-2 vintage in 2007, however it does
not affect the stock markets or general market volatility proxies in the same way as
the spliced and ABX 06-1 indexes. Evidence of contagion remains strong during 2008
and 2009, again in contrast to the other indexes.
Principal component analysis (PCA) indicates that all three ABX series examined ex-
perience a fall in commonality between 2006-2009, suggesting that the importance of
risk factors underlying the ABX changed as the crisis evolved. Therefore, in an effort
to parsimoniously capture the effect of ABX returns we include the main principal
component obtained as an explanatory variable in further VAR analysis, the results of
which reinforce the original VAR analysis. Overall the results highlight the differences
among the three ABX data sets analysed and suggest that splicing the ABX may im-
pact results. It also provides evidence that the traded ABX vintages are heterogeneous
assets that were subject to different risk profiles during the crisis.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 briefly outlines some
related literature while section 5.3 describes the data employed. Section 5.4 presents
preliminary analysis results and section 5.5 extends the analysis presented in Longstaff
(2010) to include a “post-crisis” period of 2009. Section 5.6 discusses the VAR analysis
performed on two traded ABX vintages. Section 5.7 presents the results of principal
component analysis and section 5.8 includes the main principal component obtained
in a further VAR analysis. A final section then concludes.
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5.2. Related Literature
The subject of contagion in financial markets has been investigated extensively in re-
cent years, providing a great deal of literature examining the subject.2 However, there
does not yet exist a general professional consensus concerning what constitutes con-
tagion, leading to various definitions and various methods of testing for its presence.
Pericoli & Sbracia (2003) present and discuss five frequently applied definitions of con-
tagion while Dungey et al. (2005) analyse methodologies used to test for contagion
and develop an encompassing factor-based model.3
There is a growing body of work analysing contagion during the subprime crisis, for
example Kim et al. (2010) investigate CDS spread fluctuations and expected default
frequencies for Asian borrowers, finding that losses are due to both global and region-
specific factors, while Cheung et al. (2010) examine relationships between global equity
markets and the TED spread, finding that linkages among global stock markets increase
during the crisis and the TED spread acts as a “fear” indicator.4 Abbassi & Schnabel
(2009) employ a VAR framework on U.S., U.K. and Euro area data in order to analyse
whether contagion may explain increasing repurchase agreement spreads. Evidence of
contagion in interbank money markets during 2007 is found and it is suggested that
liquidity problems are the main cause of this.
Liquidity and contagion during the subprime crisis are discussed by Adrian & Shin
(2008). Analysing the effect of asset price changes on a hypothetical balance sheet,
they highlight the “puzzle” of such a relatively small market causing widespread chaos
and suggest that asset prices alone may be sufficient to generate contagion.
2See Chapter 4, section 4.2 for a brief overview of contagion literature.
3For a comprehensive overview of various definitions of contagion, along with various methodologies
utilized to test for its presence, see Forbes & Rigobon (2001B).
4The TED spread is the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and on short-term
U.S. government debt.
139
Hwang et al. (2010) examine contagion effects from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis
to international stock markets using a dynamic conditional correlation generalized au-
toregressive conditional heteroskedastic (DCC-GARCH) model. During the subprime
crisis evidence of contagion in both emerging and developed countries is found, along
with evidence of a spillover effect of news concerning sovereign credit ratings.
Lee (2012) utilizes heteroskedasticity bias based on correlation coefficients on twenty
international stock markets, finding evidence of contagion in Hong Kong, Australia,
Taiwan and New Zealand.
Horta et al. (2008) employ a copula model in order to investigate whether the U.S.
subprime crisis affected the capital markets of several developed countries, finding ev-
idence of contagion with varying intensity across countries.
Despite the increasing body of literature examining contagion during the subprime
crisis, literature utilizing the ABX indexes to test for its presence during 2007-2009
is not as extensive. Longstaff (2010) utilizes the ABX indexes to represent the U.S.
subprime mortgage-backed securities market and tests for contagion from this proxy
to several fixed income, equity and volatility markets using a VAR framework.5
5.3. Data
This chapter treats Longstaff (2010) as the benchmark for testing for contagion from
the ABX indexes and so employs the spliced ABX index and financial market variables
utilized by that work. Data from two traded ABX indexes, the ABX 06-1 vintage and
the ABX 06-2 vintage, are also analysed in order to ascertain if splicing the data could
5For more on this see Chapter 4 section 4.2.
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influence the results.6 ABX data have been obtained from the Markit Group and
weekly (Wednesday to Wednesday) percentage returns are used in the analysis for the
period spanning 2006-2009. Following Longstaff (2010), the sample is divided into
one-year samples, with the labels “‘pre-crisis”, “subprime-crisis”, “global-crisis” and
“post-crisis” applied to calendar years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively.
5.3.1. Financial Market Variables
Longstaff (2010) employs weekly returns of the five assets comprising the spliced ABX
index to proxy for returns in the troubled subprime mortgage-backed CDO market. A
VAR framework is employed to test for contagion from this market to several equity,
volatility and fixed-income markets. Weekly changes in the constant maturity one- and
10-year Treasury yields are included to capture changes in the Treasury bond market
while changes in corporate bond spreads are measured as the difference between the
10-year Treasury yield and Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate yield indexes. Treasury
yield and corporate yield data have been obtained from the Federal Reserve Board.
Weekly returns for the S&P 500 index and the S&P 500 subindex of financial firms
capture changes in the U.S. stock market while changes in the VIX volatility index
provide a measure of market volatility. Data for these three VAR variables have been
obtained from the Bloomberg system.
[Insert Figure 5.1 about here]
Figure 5.1 plots the time series of these VAR variables over the entire sample period.
While the corporate spreads and VIX index are quite volatile throughout, the S&P 500
6The spliced ABX index is described in Chapter 4 section 4.3.1.
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index and S&P 500 subindex of financial firms become most volatile around mid-2008,
which coincides with the onset of the global credit crunch and increased volatility in
stock markets. Changes in the two Treasury yields become increasingly volatile from
2007 onwards, with the shorter maturity one-year bill experiencing most volatility in
2008. In fact, during that year the one-year constant maturity Treasury rate fell from
2.71% in January to 0.49% in December (Federal Reserve Board). The 10-year bond
continues to be quite volatile during the “post-crisis” period of 2009. This longer
maturity bonds’ rate ranges from a high of 5.25% to 2.20% over the sample period,
with the lowest values experienced from the end of 2008 through early 2009. These
movements are illustrated in Figure 5.2, which plots the two Treasury Bill rates over
the sample period.
[Insert Figure 5.2 about here]
As Mc Andrews et al. (2008) state, these Treasury securities contain liquidity premia,
with the 10-year bond usually containing larger liquidity than other Treasury bonds. It
is possible then that weekly changes in this longer maturity bond experience a greater
degree of volatility relative to the one-year Treasury Bill during the 2008-2009 period
because of the effects of the liquidity freeze in mid- to late-2008.
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics for weekly changes in each of the financial market
variables over the entire sample period.
[Insert Table 5.1 about here]
Not surprisingly, we observe negative means for the stock market and Treasury bond
market measures and positive means for weekly changes in the VIX index and the two
corporate spreads. Volatility is high for each financial market variable, but is highest
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for changes in the two Treasury Bills. As stated above, these Treasury notes are known
to contain liquidity premia (Mc Andrews et al. 2008) and high levels of volatility dur-
ing the subprime and liquidity crisis periods. It is clear that normality is rejected in all
cases, with the S&P 500 index experiencing the highest level of excess kurtosis, which
is unsurprising for stock returns (Campbell & Hentschel, 1992).
5.4. Preliminary Analysis
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics for weekly percentage returns of the three ABX
series under analysis over the sample period.
[Insert Table 5.2 about here]
Mean returns are negative in all asset tranches, and are monotonically related to credit
rating in the three indexes suggesting that these lower-rated securities were hit hardest
over the sample period. Standard deviations are high in all cases, indicating the high
volatility of returns. They do not appear to be inversely related to credit rating as,
based on these, the AA-rated asset is most volatile in the spliced ABX index, while
the BBB-rated asset is most volatile in the ABX 06-1 vintage and the A-rated asset
the most volatile in the ABX 06-2 vintage. This highlights differences between the
three indexes, suggesting that they are distinct assets in which ratings tranches behave
differently. Unsurprisingly almost all returns are negatively skewed and it is clear that
normality is rejected in all cases. As a preliminary examination of the relationships
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between the assets Table 5.3 reports raw correlation coefficients between the five ABX
tranches in each index and the financial market variables over the entire sample period.
[Insert Table 5.3 about here]
The ABX assets are positively correlated with the stock market and Treasury mar-
ket measures, suggesting that a decline in ABX returns corresponds to a decline in
these variables, and vice versa. Unsurprisingly the VIX index and corporate spread
measures are negatively correlated with ABX returns, indicating that a decrease in
ABX returns corresponds to an increase in market volatility and a widening of credit
spreads. Although these correlations imply that ABX returns are positively related to
changes in the stock market and Treasury market and negatively related to volatility
and corporate spreads this relationship may exist in “normal” market times and so it is
necessary to test for co-movement in excess of what is expected in tranquil conditions.
5.5. Extending Longstaff
We first replicate the results of Longstaff (2010), utilizing the VAR system employed
by that work:
Yt = α+
4∑
k=1
(βkYt−k + γkABXt−k) + t, (5.1)
in which Yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable.
Thus, there are seven dependent variables and the system is estimated separately
for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous variable.
As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and
so the VAR system is estimated for each of these. Also, as mentioned earlier the
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data are broken into distinct one-year periods. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC). Despite some limitations to this methodology, which will
be addressed in the subsequent chapter, its greatest advantage lies in its ability to
incorporate many financial variables simultaneously. Tables 5.4 - 5.7 report results
from the VAR performed on the spliced ABX index for 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009,
respectively. As the residuals are likely to have a non-constant variance, we follow
Longstaff (2010) by computing Newey-West adjusted standard errors. We therefore
report the Newey–West t-statistics for the γk coefficients in equation (5.1) along with
the R2s from the VARs and the p-values for the F-test that the γk coefficients are
jointly zero.7
[Insert Tables 5.4 - 5.7 about here]
There is little evidence of Granger-causality from the ABX returns to the financial
market variables during 2006. This is in striking contrast to the results presented for
2007, in which almost all assets are significantly affected by the spliced ABX returns.
It is this difference that constitutes contagion as it provides evidence of a significant
increase in cross-market linkages following a shock to the subprime mortgage-backed
securities market. Evidence of contagion then dissipates during 2008, with the onset of
the liquidity crisis. There is little evidence of contagion in 2009. The two stock market
measures are significantly affected by only the AA-rated ABX asset, while there is
almost no evidence of contagion from the ABX to the one-year Treasury Bill yield.
The two credit spreads are most significantly affected by ABX returns relative to the
other financial market variables, which could be due to credit markets rebounding
7Note that the results for the β coefficients are not reported in order to conserve space and also
as they do not provide any information regarding contagion from the ABX to the financial market
variables. Full results are available on request.
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following the liquidity crunch. These results support those presented in Longstaff
(2010) that contagion occurred from the spliced ABX returns to the financial market
variables in 2007 before dissipating in subsequent years.
5.6. Traded ABX Vintages VAR Analysis
The VAR framework presented in equation (5.1) is applied to two traded ABX vintages,
the ABX 06-1 vintage and the ABX 06-2 vintage. In Longstaff (2010) the analysis is
characterized by a tranquil period in which the ABX assets are independent of the
financial market variables, so enabling to test whether there exist significant increases
in the linkages between the assets following the onset of the crisis. We must therefore
establish that interdependencies between the traded indexes and the assets do not exist
during 2006 in order to appropriately apply the framework. Table 5.8 reports the VAR
estimation results for the tranquil “pre-crisis” period of 2006 for the ABX 06-1 vintage.
[Insert Table 5.8 about here]
There is little evidence of Granger-causality from ABX returns to the financial market
variables analysed as well as little evidence of price discovery during this tranquil
period, as few of the individual t-statistics are significant. This would suggest that
during 2006 these markets behave mostly independently of each other and are not
subject to high levels of interdependencies. This allows us to therefore test for co-
movement over and above what is expected in “normal” market conditions. Tables
5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 report VAR estimation results for 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively,
for the ABX 06-1 vintage VAR estimation.
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[Insert Tables 5.9 - 5.11 about here]
In 2007 almost every asset in the ABX 06-1 vintage Granger-causes subsequent changes
or returns in the financial market variables and the R2s are all quite high, particularly
relative to those reported for 2006. As this represents a significant change in the re-
lationship between these assets these results provide evidence of contagion from the
ABX 06-1 vintage to the financial market variables during the “subprime-crisis” period
of 2007.
Turning first to the two Treasury Bill yields, we see that all F-statistics are significant,
compared to very little significance in 2006, and there is significant predictive ability
of at least three weeks ahead in all cases. All significant t-statistics are positive in
sign, suggesting that a decrease in ABX returns corresponds to a decrease in Treasury
yields, thus indicating an increase in the value of Treasury bonds. This would suggest
that investors were turning to these “risk-free” securities during this turbulent crisis
period, thus indicating a flight-to-quality to “safe-haven” assets.
Turning to the two credit spreads, all F-statistics are significant, which is in striking
contrast to the results presented for 2006. In all cases ABX returns Granger-cause
subsequent changes in both the Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate spreads by up to four
weeks ahead, and all significant t-statistics are negative in sign. This suggests that a
decline in ABX returns corresponds to a widening of these corporate spreads during
the 2007 crisis period.
Almost all ABX asset returns have significant predictive power for subsequent returns
in both the S&P 500 index and the S&P 500 subindex of financial firms during the
subprime crisis. Almost all ratings tranches of the ABX have significant forecast ability
of up to four weeks ahead during 2007, and all significant coefficients are positive in
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sign, indicating that a negative shock to ABX returns translates to negative returns in
these stock indexes.
The results for the VIX index suggest that almost all ABX assets Granger-cause sub-
sequent changes in this index of the markets perception of volatility. The individual
t-statistics indicate significant price discovery of up to three weeks ahead during the
subprime crisis, and all significant coefficients are negative in sign, suggesting that a
shock to ABX returns translates to an increase in the VIX index. However, there is
slightly less evidence of contagion from the ABX 06-1 vintage to the VIX in 2007 than
from the spliced ABX index, indicating a stronger relationship between the riskier in-
dex to the measure of market volatility.
Table 5.10 indicates that evidence of contagion decreases in 2008 relative to the “subprime-
crisis” period of 2007. During the “global-crisis” period the only ABX asset that con-
sistently Granger-causes each financial variable analysed is the AAA-rated tranche,
while the two lower-rated assets show no significant forecast power at all. One possible
reason for this could be that during this period liquidity in financial markets had come
to almost a complete halt, as had trades in the now perceived to be “toxic” ABX. Also,
most of the lower tranches would have been wiped out by defaults so it is likely then
that the only ABX asset with any liquidity during this time would be the highest-rated
tranche, causing most contagion effects to emanate from this asset.
There is more evidence of contagion during the “post-crisis” period than during the
“global-crisis” period, which could be due to financial markets starting to bounce back
as investors began to re-enter following the crisis years. The two corporate spreads
are most vulnerable to contagion from the subprime mortgage-backed securities, which
could be due to remaining instability in credit markets following the crisis. There is
little evidence of contagion to the two Treasury Bill yields, consistent with investors no
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longer requiring a “safe haven” in this post-crisis era. There is slightly more evidence
of contagion from this index during 2008 and 2009 than from the spliced ABX index,
indicating that more linkages remained between the ABX 06-1 vintage and financial
markets in these years than between them and the spliced ABX index.
Turning to the ABX 06-2 vintage, issued on July 19, 2006. The results from the VAR
model presented in equation (5.1) provide evidence of interdependencies during the
“pre-crisis” of 2006. This implies that the above VAR framework cannot be employed
to test for linkages in excess of those experienced in “normal” market times. We there-
fore follow the methodology outlined in Chapter 4 and incorporate dummy variables
to account for crisis periods. We define three dummy variables. To account for the
“subprime-crisis” period of 2007 a dummy variable, D1, is included, taking a value
of one during 2007 and zero otherwise. To account for the “global-crisis” period of
2008 a dummy variable, D2, is included, taking a value of one during 2008 and zero
otherwise. To account for the “post-crisis” period of 2009 a dummy variable, D3, is
included, taking a value of one during 2009 and zero otherwise. The dummy variables
are thus defined as:
D1 =

0 if 2006
1 if 2007
0 if 2008
0 if 2009
, D2 =

0 if 2006
0 if 2007
1 if 2008
0 if 2009
, D3 =

0 if 2006
0 if 2007
0 if 2008
1 if 2009
.
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These dummy variables are then included in the following model:
Yt = α0 +
2∑
k=1
βkYt−k +
2∑
k=1
γkABXt−k,
+δ0D1 +
2∑
k=1
D1(βk − λk)Yt−k +
2∑
k=1
D1(γk − υk)ABXt−k,
+θ0D2 +
2∑
k=1
D2(βk − δk)Yt−k +
2∑
k=1
D2(γk − ηk)ABXt−k,
+φ0D3 +
2∑
k=1
D3(βk − ψk)Yt−k +
2∑
k=1
D3(γk − τk)ABXt−k,
+t, (5.2)
in which α0 denotes the 2006 constant term, δ0D1 denotes the 2007 constant term,
θ0D2 denotes the 2008 constant term, φ0D3 denotes the 2009 constant term, Yt denotes
the financial market variable included as a dependent variable, ABXt−k denotes the
ABX asset weekly percentage returns included as an independent variable. Two lags
are determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. This analysis allows us to test the
stability of the regression coefficients and if the coefficients on the dummy variables are
significant we conclude that contagion occurred. Table 5.12 reports VAR estimation
results for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. Reported are the p-values of the
F-test that the indicated variables are jointly zero.
[Insert Table 5.12 about here]
There is clearly evidence of interdependencies among the assets during the “pre-crisis”
period as changes or returns in almost all financial market variables are Granger-
caused by ABX returns. This is in striking contrast to the results presented for both
the spliced and the ABX 06-1 vintage, as during the tranquil period assets in these
two indexes behave mostly independently of the financial market variables. Turning
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to the 2007 “subprime-crisis” period there is evidence of contagion from the ABX 06-2
vintage to Treasury markets, corporate bond markets and the S&P 500 subindex of
financial firms. However, there is no evidence of contagion whatsoever from this index
to the S&P 500 index, suggesting that the ABX 06-2 vintage has no significant effect
upon S&P 500 index returns during 2007. It appears that its influence on stock prices
is limited to financial stocks. This is also in contrast to the results presented for both
the spliced ABX index and the ABX 06-1 vintage. Also, the VIX index is significantly
affected by only the two lower-rated assets during the subprime crisis, suggesting that
any risk transmitted to this measure of market volatility came from the riskier ABX
assets. In 2008 evidence of contagion actually increases, as now the S&P 500 index is
significantly affected by ABX returns. The only variable to which evidence of conta-
gion dissipates is the VIX index, which contrasts again to the results presented for the
spliced and 06-1 indexes. During the “post crisis” period of 2009 evidence of contagion
to the stock market proxy completely dissipates, indicating that there is no change in
the relationship between these markets in this year relative to 2006. Overall, these re-
sults suggest that there was a significant change in the relationship between the assets
comprising all three ABX indexes and the financial variables analysed, indicating con-
tagion under our definition and framework. Significant price discovery indicates that
this contagion was not transmitted through the “correlated information” channel of
contagion, as in this channel price changes should be instantaneous, and supports the
“risk-premium” channel of contagion, in which the distressed security holds predictive
power for subsequent returns of other assets.8 Evidence of contagion dissipates during
the 2008 “global-crisis” period as liquidity came to a halt, then increases somewhat
8For a detailed description of these channels for contagion see Chapter 4, section 4.2.
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during the 2009 “post-crisis” period, most likely because of markets rebounding fol-
lowing the crisis.
The results highlight some striking differences between the indexes analysed as there is
strong evidence of interdependencies among the assets in the ABX 06-2 vintage and the
financial market variables in 2006, while no such relationship exists between the ABX
06-1 vintage and the financial variables. As Dungey et al. (2013) state these assets
are “distinct in vintage of issuance” and our results also suggest that the two traded
vintages behave differently, reinforcing the heterogeneous nature of these assets. There
are also differences between the traded vintages and the spliced ABX index, for exam-
ple there is more evidence of contagion during the “global-” and “post-crisis” periods
from the traded vintages. This suggests that analysis of the spliced ABX index alone
may not provide a full and accurate picture of what was happening in this market over
the sample period. The sensitivity of these results is tested by including ABX returns
as an eighth endogenous variable in the VAR system, the results of which correspond
to the original results.9
5.7. Principal Component Analysis
In order to reduce the dimensionality of the noisy ABX returns principal component
analysis (PCA) is performed on the five assets comprising each ABX series under
analysis separately for each of the four years, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.10 With
noisy data such as the ABX we utilize these principal components in further analyses
in place of ABX returns in an effort to achieve clearer results. Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5
9Full results are available on request.
10See Chapter 3, section 3.6, for a detailed explanation of PCA.
152
present the relative importance of the principal components obtained in each of the
four years under consideration for each ABX series analysed.
[Insert Figures 5.3 - 5.5 about here]
Figure 5.3 illustrates that, on average, the main principal component underlying the
spliced ABX index falls by almost 40% between 2006 and 2009. This indicates that
the importance of the factors driving the variation in the spliced ABX index returns
changed over the sample period and commonality fell with each subsequent year. Turn-
ing to Figure 5.4, the relative importance of the main principal component underlying
the ABX 06-1 vintage remains almost constant between 2006 and 2007 before declining
by almost 20% by the end of the sample. This would suggest that the “global-crisis”
period of 2008 and subsequent “post-crisis” period of 2009 had a greater effect on the
common factors driving variation in the ABX 06-1 vintage than the “subprime-crisis”
period of 2007.
Figure 5.5, illustrating the relative importance of the principal components underlying
the ABX 06-2 vintage, indicates that again the relative importance of the main prin-
cipal component is quite high in 2006, suggesting a high degree of commonality in the
ABX 06-2 vintage during this “pre-crisis” year. This commonality then decreases once
the “subprime-crisis” period hits, and continues to fall until the end of the sample.
Overall, these results indicate that the three ABX series were all subject to a high
degree of commonality during the tranquil 2006 period. For the ABX 06-1 vintage
this commonality remains throughout the subprime crisis, but both the spliced index
and the 06-2 vintage experience falls of almost 10% between the two years. Once the
“global-crisis” period of 2008 occurs, the main principal component in all three indexes
falls by almost 10%, and continues to fall through the “post-crisis” period. The spliced
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ABX index experiences the greatest loss of commonality, which is unsurprising due to
its construction.
5.8. VAR Analysis using Principal Components
The VAR analysis presented in equation (5.1) is performed using the main principal
component obtained as an exogenous variable, instead of ABX returns, thus testing
if the main principal component Granger-causes subsequent changes or returns in the
seven financial market variables. The VAR specification therefore becomes:
Yt = α+
4∑
k=1
(βkYt−k + γkPC1,t−k) + t, (5.3)
in which Yt denotes the financial market measure, as described in section 5.3, included
as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent variables and the system
is estimated separately for each one. PC1 denotes that principal component 1 is the
exogenous variable. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
Tables 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 report VAR estimation results using returns from each of
the three ABX data sets under consideration.
[Insert Tables 5.13 - 5.15 about here]
Overall these results provide evidence of contagion from the ABX 06-1 vintage main
principal component to the financial market variables, along with significant price dis-
covery. There is evidence of interdependencies between the ABX 06-2 vintage main
principal component and the financial market variables in 2006, again indicating that
154
any evidence of linkages observed in subsequent crisis periods does not constitute conta-
gion, which corresponds to earlier results. Evidence of contagion from the spliced ABX
index main principal component is not as strong as there also exist interdependencies
during 2006.
5.9. Conclusions
This chapter analyses contagion from the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities
market, using the ABX.HE indexes to represent this market, via the VAR framework
presented in Longstaff (2010). The analysis in Longstaff (2010) is extended to include
a “post-crisis” period of 2009 and is applied to two traded ABX vintages. Principal
component analysis (PCA) is performed on the three indexes under consideration and
the main principal component is included in further a VAR analysis to investigate if
eliminating noise from the returns process provides clearer results.
The results provide little evidence of contagion from the spliced ABX index to the
financial market variables during the “post-crisis” period of 2009, as markets bounced
back following the crisis. Analyses of the traded ABX indexes provide evidence of
contagion during the crisis periods, however there are several key differences between
the results for the two vintages. Firstly, there is evidence of interdependencies among
the assets in the ABX 06-2 vintage and the financial markets analysed in the “pre-
crisis” period of 2006, a relationship not observed between the ABX 06-1 vintage
assets and the other financial markets. Secondly, there is no evidence of contagion
from the ABX 06-2 vintage to the S&P 500 index, while our results show strong
evidence of contagion from the ABX 06-1 vintage to equity markets. Finally, there
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is considerably more evidence of contagion from the ABX 06-2 vintage to the other
financial markets in the subsequent “global-crisis” and “post-crisis” period than from
the earlier issued vintage. These results highlight the heterogeneous nature of the ABX
vintages, a finding consistent with Dungey et al. (2013). Our results also highlight
differences between the traded ABX indexes and the spliced ABX index employed by
Longstaff (2010). For example, we find more evidence of contagion from the ABX
06-1 vintage to corporate bond and equity markets in the “post-crisis” period of 2009,
indicating continuing significant linkages between these markets following the crisis.
This indicates that analysis of the spliced ABX index may not provide and accurate
depiction of what was happening in these markets over the sample period.
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Figure 5.1: Financial Market Variables.
This figure illustrates weekly changes of the indicated financial market variables.
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Figure 5.2: Treasury Bill Rates.
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Figure 5.3: Relative Importance of Spliced ABX Index Principal Components.
This Figure illustrates the relative importance of principal components underlying
the spliced ABX index for the indicated year.
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Figure 5.4: Relative Importance of ABX 06-1 Vintage Principal Components.
This Figure illustrates the relative importance of principal components underlying
the ABX 06-1 vintage for the indicated year.
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Figure 5.5: Relative Importance of ABX 06-2 Vintage Principal Components.This
Figure illustrates the relative importance of principal components underlying the ABX
06-2 vintage for the indicated year.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics For ABX Weekly Percentage Returns
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for weekly percentage returns of the indicated ABX asset for the entire sample
period. Std. Dev. denotes standard deviation; Min. denotes minimum; Max. denotes maximum.The sample ranges from
January 19, 2006, to December 31, 2009.
Data set Rating Mean Std.dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max
Spliced ABX Index AAA -0.432 4.749 -0.072 2.709 -16.573 14.839
AA -1.338 5.852 -1.453 7.266 -29.754 21.416
A -1.410 5.799 -1.420 5.811 -28.786 18.773
BBB -1.604 4.764 -1.116 3.825 -21.429 13.595
BBB- -1.572 4.950 -1.107 4.468 -26.617 12.941
ABX 06-1 Vintage AAA -0.068 2.599 -0.555 9.487 -14.933 12.209
AA -0.386 5.571 0.720 11.475 -26.347 35.223
A -0.889 6.058 0.027 3.920 -19.908 24.216
BBB -1.323 5.762 -1.535 8.032 -32.947 21.367
BBB- -1.349 5.143 -1.978 7.814 -27.130 16.264
ABX 06-2 Vintage AAA -0.316 4.908 -0.495 3.794 -21.611 15.598
AA -1.209 6.255 -0.043 3.183 -22.713 22.821
A -1.447 6.400 -1.219 4.415 -30.747 14.484
BBB -1.442 6.398 -0.079 3.318 -23.259 25.172
BBB- -1.475 5.922 0.174 3.1364 -19.075 23.809
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Table 5.3: Raw Correlation Coefficients
Notes: This table reports raw correlation coefficients between the indicated variables (in weekly percentage changes) for the
entire sample period. The sample ranges from January 19, 2006, to December 31, 2009.
Spliced ABX
AAA AA A BBB BBB-
S&P 500 Index -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.06
S&P 500 Subindex -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.03
One-Year T-bill 0.15 0.26 0.24 0.15 0.10
10-Year T-bill 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.19 0.18
VIX Index 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.13
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.23 -0.16 -0.16 -0.08 -0.05
Baa Corporate Spread -0.30 -0.22 -0.21 -0.12 -0.08
ABX 06-1 Vintage
AAA AA A BBB BBB-
S&P 500 Index 0.36 0.37 0.25 0.24 0.25
S&P 500 Subindex 0.38 0.42 0.27 0.26 0.27
One-Year T-bill 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.27
10-Year T-bill 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.20
VIX Index -0.22 -0.25 -0.22 -0.20 -0.21
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.18 0.13 -0.12 -0.20 -0.21
Baa Corporate Spread -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.20
ABX 06-2 Vintage
AAA AA A BBB BBB-
S&P 500 Index 0.42 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.17
S&P 500 Subindex 0.44 0.27 0.21 0.16 0.17
One-Year T-bill 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.18
10-Year T-bill 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14
VIX Index -0.27 -0.19 -0.15 -0.15 -0.17
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.18 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14
Baa Corporate Spread -0.17 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16
164
Table 5.4: Spliced ABX Index 2006 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA -1.04 -0.30 0.29 0.29 0.08 0.91
AA 0.18 1.48 0.01 0.78 0.06 0.98
A -1.22 1.02 -1.21 -1.04 0.15 0.41
BBB -1.47 0.21 0.33 -0.55 0.08 0.91
BBB- -0.74 0.85 -0.56 -0.31 0.07 0.93
10-Year T-bill AAA 0.31 -0.25 1.33 0.65 0.07 0.89
AA 2.89∗∗ 2.64∗∗ 1.24 0.52 0.17 0.27
A -0.45 0.52 -1.37 -0.92 0.11 0.65
BBB -0.74 -0.41 -0.81 0.36 0.06 0.94
BBB- -0.48 0.91 -1.44 0.13 0.08 0.87
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA 1.59 0.16 0.92 -0.98 0.16 0.37
AA 2.17∗∗ 0.44 1.58 -1.57 0.28 0.04∗∗
A 1.55 -1.30 1.27 -1.06 0.18 0.28
BBB 1.51 -0.98 0.43 -0.16 0.10 0.76
BBB- -1.45 -1.02 1.14 -0.01 0.11 0.70
Baa Corporate Spread AAA 0.49 -1.46 −2.09∗∗ -0.68 0.17 0.40
AA -1.08 -0.39 -0.16 -1.46 0.24 0.12
A 1.11 −2.18∗∗ 0.25 -0.57 0.20 0.24
BBB 0.87 −1.87∗ -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.68
BBB- 0.37 −1.86∗ 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.63
S&P 500 Subindex AAA -1.36 -0.45 -0.96 0.86 0.19 0.19
AA −3.56∗∗ -0.36 -0.49 0.75 0.22 0.35
A −2.11∗∗ -1.31 -1.09 0.65 0.17 0.17
BBB -0.87 -1.25 −1.97∗ 0.73 0.20 0.48
BBB- -1.54 -1.27 -0.64 0.54 0.18 0.61
S&P 500 Index AAA -1.53 -0.04 -0.91 1.16 0.27 0.29
AA −4.11∗∗ -0.21 -0.82 1.04 0.30 0.18
A -1.33 -0.93 -1.17 0.79 0.28 0.26
BBB -0.62 -1.14 -1.41 1.20 0.23 0.55
BBB- -0.98 -1.08 -0.22 0.78 0.20 0.80
VIX Index AAA 1.14 -0.25 -0.86 -0.77 0.18 0.70
AA 2.10∗∗ -1.09 0.23 -0.46 0.16 0.84
A 1.41 0.13 -0.10 0.69 0.20 0.54
BBB 1.62 -0.35 -0.62 0.17 0.16 0.86
BBB- 1.71∗ -0.14 -1.29 1.09 0.20 0.48
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Table 5.5: Spliced ABX Index 2007 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA 0.04 2.52∗∗ 1.90∗ -0.28 0.40 0.00∗∗
AA 2.59∗∗ 1.36 3.44∗∗ -0.61 0.48 0.00∗∗
A -0.12 1.03 7.05∗∗ 2.06∗∗ 0.54 0.00∗∗
BBB 0.49 -0.18 3.75∗∗ 2.45∗∗ 0.43 0.00∗∗
BBB- 0.83 -0.11 3.56∗∗ 2.66∗∗ 0.39 0.00∗∗
10-Year T-bill AAA -0.46 7.02∗∗ 2.00∗∗ -0.22 0.33 0.01∗∗
AA 0.97 1.90∗ 1.71∗ 0.32 0.28 0.03∗∗
A 0.66 0.99 3.50∗∗ 1.97∗ 0.23 0.01∗∗
BBB 1.65 0.17 2.09∗∗ 1.92∗ 0.33 0.01∗∗
BBB- 2.68∗∗ -0.32 2.34∗∗ 2.65∗∗ 0.39 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA 1.01 −3.07∗∗ −2.62∗∗ 1.81∗ 0.34 0.02∗∗
AA -0.54 -1.31 −7.28∗∗ 2.07∗∗ 0.41 0.00∗∗
A 0.46 -1.60 −9.04∗∗ 0.51 0.45 0.00∗∗
BBB 0.14 -0.94 −2.22∗∗ -0.58 0.42 0.00∗∗
BBB- -0.25 -1.01 −2.22∗∗ -1.08 0.33 0.03∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread AAA 1.58 −5.89∗∗ −5.12∗∗ 1.54 0.53 0.00∗∗
AA -0.13 −2.58∗∗ −4.07∗∗ 1.22 0.52 0.00∗∗
A 0.72 −2.48∗∗ −4.67∗∗ -0.70 0.54 0.00∗∗
BBB -0.31 -0.96 −2.28∗∗ -1.28 0.45 0.00∗∗
BBB- -0.54 -1.12 −2.43∗∗ −2.56∗∗ 0.40 0.01∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex AAA 1.09 1.55 0.37 -0.48 0.36 0.41
AA 1.91∗ −2.13∗∗ 2.87∗∗ -0.10 0.47 0.02∗∗
A 2.43∗∗ -0.34 2.39∗∗ 0.46 0.51 0.01∗∗
BBB 1.77∗ 0.92 1.68∗ 1.29 0.50 0.01∗∗
BBB- 3.24∗∗ 0.76 2.08∗∗ 1.73∗ 0.52 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Index AAA 2.08∗∗ 2.84∗∗ 0.20 -0.40 0.29 0.09∗
AA 1.28 0.91 2.92∗∗ 0.23 0.30 0.09∗
A 1.35 0.78 3.11∗∗ 1.25 0.36 0.01∗∗
BBB 0.58 1.34 1.96∗ 2.68∗∗ 0.44 0.00∗∗
BBB- 1.92∗ 0.76 2.18∗∗ 3.19∗∗ 0.41 0.00∗∗
VIX Index AAA −4.15∗∗ −2.85∗∗ 1.55 0.46 0.34 0.05∗
AA −2.27∗∗ -0.90 -0.93 0.31 0.34 0.05∗
A −3.97∗∗ -1.42 −3.76∗∗ -0.61 0.44 0.00∗∗
BBB −1.82∗ −2.59∗∗ −2.82∗∗ −2.09∗∗ 0.52 0.00∗∗
BBB- −2.67∗∗ -1.63 −2.89∗∗ −2.82∗∗ 0.49 0.00∗∗
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Table 5.6: Spliced ABX Index 2008 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA -1.35 0.15 1.29 2.31∗∗ 0.12 0.43
AA -1.46 1.04 0.21 -0.04 0.09 0.64
A -1.09 1.21 -1.29 0.90 0.10 0.58
BBB −2.71∗∗ 0.40 -0.19 -0.14 0.11 0.51
BBB- −2.56∗∗ -0.10 -0.06 -1.00 0.12 0.44
10-Year T-bill AAA -0.51 2.30∗∗ 0.62 0.57 0.23 0.19
AA 0.80 2.69∗∗ -0.72 -0.33 0.26 0.09∗
A 0.46 1.53 -1.24 0.74 0.19 0.36
BBB -0.43 1.06 -0.41 0.33 0.13 0.86
BBB- -0.58 1.33 -0.82 -0.05 0.16 0.66
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA -0.63 -0.88 -0.31 0.81 0.22 0.78
AA -0.27 0.44 1.09 0.59 0.20 0.89
A -0.42 0.56 1.35 0.10 0.21 0.86
BBB 0.38 1.38 1.39 0.22 0.22 0.72
BBB- 0.41 2.00∗∗ 1.39 1.13 0.24 0.57
Baa Corporate Spread AAA -0.02 -0.62 1.40 1.07 0.23 0.53
AA 0.07 0.17 1.42 1.05 0.22 0.63
A 0.00 0.19 1.63 0.34 0.21 0.72
BBB 1.09 1.50 1.08 0.17 0.24 0.47
BBB- 0.91 1.71∗ 1.08 1.11 0.23 0.47
S&P 500 Subindex AAA -0.90 -0.14 0.45 -0.66 0.14 0.88
AA -0.02 0.16 -1.58 -1.29 0.16 0.73
A 0.57 -0.88 −3.01∗∗ -0.93 0.24 0.19
BBB -0.25 -1.16 0.41 -0.54 0.16 0.85
BBB- -0.39 -0.90 0.30 -1.00 0.15 0.82
S&P 500 Index AAA −2.19∗∗ 0.15 0.46 -1.47 0.25 0.06∗
AA −1.89∗ 0.75 −2.01∗∗ -0.87 0.25 0.07∗
A -1.41 0.37 −2.95∗∗ -0.36 0.21 0.17
BBB −1.74∗ -0.05 -0.99 -0.68 0.21 0.15
BBB- −1.81∗ -0.23 -1.26 -0.60 0.21 0.16
VIX Index AAA 2.07∗∗ 0.20 0.90 0.22 0.18 0.22
AA 2.70∗∗ -1.38 2.53∗∗ 0.03 0.29 0.02∗∗
A 2.39∗∗ -0.64 1.84∗∗ 0.65 0.16 0.32
BBB 1.50 0.58 0.55 0.72 0.19 0.21
BBB- 1.28 0.79 0.53 0.79 0.15 0.39
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Table 5.7: Spliced ABX Index 2009 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA -1.23 1.20 0.53 0.20 0.18 0.40
AA 0.85 -1.04 1.39 -0.47 0.19 0.27
A 0.04 0.28 1.35 -1.23 0.23 0.68
BBB -0.45 -0.80 1.34 0.63 0.17 0.19
BBB- -0.53 -1.04 1.54 0.43 0.19 0.09∗
10-Year T-bill AAA 0.89 0.23 -0.27 0.98 0.18 0.86
AA 1.42 -1.62 -0.06 -1.07 0.20 0.06∗
A 1.82∗ -1.01 0.49 −1.84∗ 0.26 0.18
BBB -0.18 -1.48 1.20 0.50 0.16 0.08∗
BBB- -0.33 -1.50 1.31 -0.17 0.19 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA -1.11 -0.43 0.42 -0.72 0.28 0.67
AA -0.95 0.51 0.00 −2.08∗∗ 0.31 0.02∗∗
A -1.01 0.15 -0.83 1.59 0.30 0.47
BBB 0.82 -0.20 −1.82∗ -0.29 0.27 0.00∗∗
BBB- 0.52 -0.03 −1.77∗ 0.08 0.26 0.03∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread AAA -1.44 -0.23 -0.07 -1.37 0.17 0.58
AA -0.74 0.92 -0.71 2.75∗∗ 0.16 0.01∗∗
A -0.52 0.33 -1.55 1.63 0.18 0.27
BBB 0.60 -0.33 -1.53 -0.09 0.13 0.04∗∗
BBB- 0.46 -0.13 -1.48 0.22 0.13 0.05∗
S&P 500 Subindex AAA 0.43 -1.01 -0.51 -0.92 0.11 0.24
AA 1.24 −2.81∗∗ -1.46 -0.10 0.20 0.00∗∗
A 0.69 -0.74 0.37 −2.32∗∗ 0.17 0.14
BBB 0.41 -0.95 -1.56 -0.55 0.12 0.24
BBB- 0.16 -0.97 -0.21 −1.68∗ 0.12 0.13
S&P 500 Index AAA 0.67 -0.38 -0.55 -0.94 0.04 0.46
AA 1.34 −3.29∗∗ -0.17 -0.86 0.12 0.00∗∗
A 1.47 -0.15 0.44 −1.95∗ 0.12 0.23
BBB 1.20 -0.82 −1.67∗ -0.42 0.05 0.26
BBB- 0.67 -0.40 -0.57 -1.25 0.04 0.15
VIX Index AAA -1.63 -0.28 0.61 2.15∗∗ 0.37 0.08∗
AA -1.08 1.22 0.55 1.38 0.34 0.19
A -0.36 0.68 -1.03 0.93 0.33 0.37
BBB −2.53∗∗ -0.39 0.93 0.75 0.35 0.05∗
BBB- −2.36∗∗ -0.37 0.30 1.26 0.34 0.05∗
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Table 5.8: ABX 06-1 Vintage 2006 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA -1.56 0.78 0.33 0.63 0.08 0.38
AA 0.40 0.98 -0.29 0.88 0.07 0.45
A -1.23 0.61 -1.54 -0.61 0.12 0.55
BBB -1.04 0.35 -0.71 -0.49 0.09 0.76
BBB- -0.72 1.40 -1.14 -0.23 0.09 0.43
10-Year T-bill AAA -0.21 0.78 1.17 1.86 0.10 0.22
AA 2.22∗∗ 3.03∗∗ 0.72 0.99 0.16 0.01∗∗
A -0.20 0.59 -1.13 -0.52 0.07 0.64
BBB -0.25 -0.08 -0.73 0.26 0.06 0.87
BBB- 0.09 1.06 -1.23 0.41 0.08 0.69
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA -0.72 0.27 0.23 -1.47 0.36 0.44
AA -0.79 -0.46 1.48 -0.10 0.37 0.53
A 0.45 0.93 3.19∗∗ 0.81 0.40 0.02∗∗
BBB 0.56 1.30 1.51 -0.34 0.39 0.27
BBB- 0.93 0.61 2.26∗∗ -0.05 0.41 0.05∗
Baa Corporate Spread AAA -0.79 -0.39 -1.20 −2.47∗∗ 0.47 0.00∗∗
AA -0.87 -1.23 0.99 -0.66 0.45 0.39
A -0.14 -0.54 1.43 0.27 0.43 0.42
BBB 0.23 0.18 1.07 -0.90 0.43 0.62
BBB- 0.33 -0.71 1.28 -1.23 0.43 0.43
S&P 500 Subindex AAA -0.15 2.26∗∗ -1.63 -0.34 0.22 0.12
AA −2.12∗∗ −1.86∗ -0.40 -0.63 0.25 0.00∗∗
A −2.39∗∗ −2.41∗∗ -1.18 -0.95 0.37 0.07∗
BBB −2.78∗∗ -1.61 -1.54 0.95 0.29 0.01∗∗
BBB- −1.93∗ -1.13 0.02 -0.17 0.23 0.11
S&P 500 Index AAA -0.95 1.66∗ -1.46 0.44 0.22 0.54
AA -1.51 -1.54 -0.73 0.08 0.22 0.16
A −2.23∗∗ −2.58∗∗ −2.61∗∗ -0.76 0.40 0.05∗
BBB -1.40 -1.36 -0.94 1.27 0.26 0.34
BBB- -1.54 -0.71 -0.03 0.37 0.20 0.41
VIX Index AAA 1.64 −1.81∗ -0.34 -0.58 0.16 0.07∗
AA 0.74 0.28 0.49 -0.16 0.10 0.96
A 1.66∗ 1.52 0.87 1.30 0.25 0.31
BBB 1.36 0.26 -0.79 -0.62 0.14 0.34
BBB- 1.64 -0.15 -1.23 0.61 0.13 0.00∗∗
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Table 5.9: ABX 06-1 Vintage 2007 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA 2.00∗∗ 3.89∗∗ 3.07∗∗ 0.65 0.33 0.00∗∗
AA 3.27∗∗ 2.83∗∗ 2.25∗∗ 0.01 0.44 0.00∗∗
A 2.57∗∗ 1.72∗ 3.66∗∗ -0.05 0.49 0.00∗∗
BBB 1.83∗ 1.18 3.59∗∗ 1.23 0.42 0.00∗∗
BBB- 1.74∗ 0.39 4.59∗∗ 2.06∗∗ 0.43 0.00∗∗
10-Year T-bill AAA 1.78∗ 4.53∗∗ 1.48 0.76 0.23 0.00∗∗
AA 0.47 4.32∗∗ 1.95∗ 2.16∗∗ 0.25 0.00∗∗
A 2.65∗∗ 1.73∗ 6.77∗∗ 1.18 0.34 0.00∗∗
BBB 3.34∗∗ 2.88∗∗ 5.91∗∗ 2.67∗∗ 0.40 0.00∗∗
BBB- 4.23∗∗ 1.82∗ 4.94∗∗ 4.11∗∗ 0.42 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA -0.96 −2.06∗∗ -0.81 −2.04∗∗ 0.19 0.00∗∗
A 3.34∗∗ 2.88∗∗ 5.91∗∗ 2.67∗∗ 0.40 0.02∗∗
AA -0.77 −2.31∗∗ −2.10∗∗ −3.57∗∗ 0.24 0.00∗∗
A -1.47 0.18 −3.71∗∗ −1.85∗ 0.25 0.00∗∗
BBB −1.86∗ 0.06 −2.00∗∗ −2.98∗∗ 0.21 0.02∗∗
BBB- −2.06∗∗ 0.30 −1.67∗ −3.08∗∗ 0.22 0.01∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread AAA −2.77∗∗ −3.45∗∗ −2.74∗∗ −5.36∗∗ 0.40 0.00∗∗
AA −3.18∗∗ −6.76∗∗ −2.72∗∗ −6.89∗∗ 0.43 0.00∗∗
A −2.62∗∗ -0.37 −5.50∗∗ −3.83∗∗ 0.48 0.00∗∗
BBB −3.51∗∗ -0.08 −5.04∗∗ −6.71∗∗ 0.44 0.00∗∗
BBB- −3.33∗∗ 0.12 −3.25∗∗ −7.14∗∗ 0.44 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex AAA 1.60 -0.79 -0.86 1.82∗ 0.37 0.02∗∗
AA 2.27∗∗ -1.26 0.93 1.65∗ 0.39 0.00∗∗
A 3.04∗∗ -1.54 4.32∗∗ -0.04 0.48 0.00∗∗
BBB 3.41∗∗ -1.10 3.08∗∗ 1.17 0.44 0.00∗∗
BBB- 3.21∗∗ -0.13 1.96∗ 2.56∗∗ 0.43 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Index AAA 1.44 0.60 -0.52 1.32 0.25 0.54
AA 1.92∗ 1.34 1.47 1.85∗ 0.27 0.00∗∗
A 3.38∗∗ -0.14 4.64∗∗ 0.85 0.38 0.00∗∗
BBB 2.22∗∗ -0.50 3.27∗∗ 3.16∗∗ 0.32 0.00∗∗
BBB- 2.76∗∗ 0.19 2.04∗∗ 3.70∗∗ 0.31 0.00∗∗
VIX Index AAA -1.50 -0.79 0.23 -0.60 0.20 0.47
AA −1.97∗ −2.33∗∗ −2.33∗∗ -1.29 0.25 0.01∗∗
A −3.85∗∗ -0.56 −4.55∗∗ -0.03 0.35 0.00∗∗
BBB −2.47∗∗ 0.23 −2.79∗∗ -0.62 0.30 0.05∗
BBB- −2.08∗∗ -1.25 −2.01∗∗ -1.64 0.25 0.05∗
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Table 5.10: ABX 06-1 Vintage 2008 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA 0.48 0.76 2.53∗∗ 2.28∗∗ 0.13 0.03∗∗
AA -0.09 0.24 2.31∗∗ 2.10∗∗ 0.16 0.02∗∗
A -0.05 -0.06 0.45 2.45∗∗ 0.13 0.06∗
BBB -0.00 0.94 0.53 0.02 0.09 0.73
BBB- 0.03 -0.77 0.99 0.69 0.10 0.05∗
10-Year T-bill AAA 0.47 2.27∗∗ 1.21 1.26 0.27 0.00∗∗
AA 0.92 3.08∗∗ 0.65 1.47 0.32 0.00∗∗
A 0.81 1.78∗ -0.89 2.00∗∗ 0.22 0.22
BBB 1.34 1.78∗ −1.77∗ 0.64 0.28 0.19
BBB- 0.89 1.63 -1.13 0.97 0.23 0.26
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA -0.05 −2.94∗∗ 0.86 0.57 0.40 0.00∗∗
AA -0.76 −2.14∗∗ 2.89∗∗ 0.64 0.43 0.05∗
A -0.35 -1.03 2.81∗∗ 0.11 0.38 0.07∗
BBB -0.64 -1.27 1.87∗ 0.25 0.40 0.40
BBB- -0.11 -0.92 1.45 0.02 0.37 0.60
Baa Corporate Spread AAA -0.45 −4.66∗∗ 1.39 1.00 0.30 0.00∗∗
AA -0.80 −1.98∗ 3.33∗∗ 1.02 0.33 0.01∗∗
A -0.09 -1.02 3.04∗∗ 0.32 0.28 0.02∗∗
BBB -0.40 -1.24 1.71∗ 0.41 0.26 0.33
BBB- 0.60 -1.26 1.41 0.48 0.24 0.50
S&P 500 Subindex AAA −2.42∗∗ 0.03 -1.27 −1.73∗ 0.21 0.05∗
AA -1.24 0.17 -1.48 -1.06 0.15 0.15
A -0.16 -0.46 -1.50 0.45 0.10 0.44
BBB 1.22 -0.86 -1.56 0.28 0.12 0.27
BBB- 1.16 -1.52 -1.28 -0.06 0.13 0.15
S&P 500 Index AAA −3.80∗∗ 0.75 0.06 −2.13∗∗ 0.32 0.00∗∗
AA −2.02∗∗ 0.80 -0.25 -1.21 0.24 0.14
A -1.02 -0.04 -1.09 0.28 0.13 0.65
BBB -0.23 0.25 -1.62 0.48 0.12 0.53
BBB- -0.64 -0.38 -0.93 -0.10 0.12 0.75
VIX Index AAA 1.86∗ -0.87 0.85 1.10 0.12 0.00∗∗
AA 1.63 0.09 1.14 -0.24 0.13 0.10
A 1.35 -0.51 0.94 -0.80 0.10 0.61
BBB -0.57 -0.06 1.24 -0.86 0.08 0.61
BBB- -0.12 0.63 0.55 -0.19 0.06 0.85
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Table 5.11: ABX 06-1 Vintage 2009 VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkABXt−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous
variable. As there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the VAR system is estimated for
each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Y ABX γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill AAA 1.48 0.13 -0.44 0.25 0.16 0.31
AA 0.80 -1.40 0.27 0.79 0.19 0.49
A 1.11 −2.25∗∗ -0.43 0.19 0.21 0.03∗∗
BBB 1.92∗ 0.65 -0.44 -0.91 0.20 0.28
BBB- 0.91 -0.44 -0.47 -0.86 0.17 0.70
10-Year T-bill AAA −1.72∗ 1.04 1.71∗ 0.92 0.26 0.03∗∗
AA -1.58 1.13 1.92∗ -0.39 0.32 0.01∗∗
A -1.01 0.61 0.85 -0.74 0.18 0.12
BBB 1.26 0.07 -0.25 -1.44 0.17 0.50
BBB- 1.95∗ 0.13 -1.23 2.62∗∗ 0.19 0.06∗
Aaa Corporate Spread AAA -0.86 −2.56∗∗ -1.61 -1.63 0.36 0.00∗∗
AA -0.21 −2.07∗∗ −1.94∗ 0.23 0.35 0.02∗∗
A 0.14 −2.71∗∗ -0.29 1.76∗ 0.29 0.01∗∗
BBB −1.90∗ −2.10∗∗ 0.88 3.32∗∗ 0.33 0.01∗∗
BBB- −3.07∗∗ −1.78∗ 2.68∗∗ 5.22∗∗ 0.36 0.00∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread AAA 0.35 −2.05∗∗ -1.56 -1.19 0.22 0.00∗∗
AA 0.40 −1.97∗ −1.90∗ 0.17 0.22 0.00∗∗
A 0.20 −2.98∗∗ -0.31 1.66∗ 0.17 0.00∗∗
BBB −1.94∗ −3.20∗∗ 1.08 2.81∗∗ 0.22 0.01∗∗
BBB- −2.72∗∗ −1.74∗ 2.02∗∗ 2.57∗∗ 0.21 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex AAA -0.76 0.04 0.39 −1.75∗ 0.13 0.02∗∗
AA −2.80∗∗ 0.44 0.22 -0.74 0.14 0.05∗
A −2.31∗∗ -0.40 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.02∗∗
BBB −2.33∗∗ −1.75∗ 0.49 0.06 0.19 0.02∗∗
BBB- -1.24 0.98 0.33 -1.05 0.15 0.49
S&P 500 Index AAA -0.27 0.96 0.26 -0.89 0.04 0.12
AA −2.66∗∗ 1.37 0.37 0.50 0.09 0.01∗∗
A −2.88∗∗ -0.39 0.88 1.11 0.12 0.00∗∗
BBB -1.22 -1.38 -0.15 0.27 0.05 0.19
BBB- 0.01 0.91 -0.15 -0.53 0.02 0.84
VIX Index AAA -0.42 -0.09 -0.48 0.76 0.30 0.82
AA 0.22 -0.36 -0.08 0.48 0.30 0.96
A 1.62 1.46 1.18 -0.65 0.41 0.00∗∗
BBB −2.16∗∗ 1.35 1.65∗ 1.58 0.37 0.08∗
BBB- -1.60 0.37 0.90 1.14 0.32 0.35
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Table 5.12: ABX 06-2 Vintage VAR Estimation Results
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
Yt = α0 +
2∑
k=1
βkYt−k +
2∑
k=1
γkABXt−k,
+δ0D1 +
2∑
k=1
D1(βk − λk)Yt−k +
2∑
k=1
D1(γk − υk)ABXt−k,
+θ0D2 +
2∑
k=1
D2(βk − δk)Yt−k +
2∑
k=1
D2(γk − ηk)ABXt−k,
+φ0D3 +
2∑
k=1
D3(βk − ψk)Yt−k +
2∑
k=1
D3(γk − τk)ABXt−k,
+t,
in which α0 denotes the 2006 constant term, δ0D1 denotes the 2007 constant term, θ0D2 denotes the 2008 constant term,
φ0D3 denotes the 2009 constant term, Yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable, ABXt−k
denotes the ABX ratings tranche included as a dependent variable. Two lags are determined by the Akaike Information
Criterion. Reported are the p-values of the F-test that the indicated coeffi-
cients are jointly zero. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Dependent
Regressor One-yrTbill 10-yrTbill AaaSprd BaaSprd S&P500 S&PSub VIX
AAA2006 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.03∗∗
AA2006 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A2006 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB2006 0.03
∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.84
BBB−2006 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.91
AAA2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.89 0.02∗∗ 0.21
AA2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.87 0.00∗∗ 0.53
A2007 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.60 0.00∗∗ 0.73
BBB2007 0.05
∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.61 0.00∗∗ 0.05∗∗
BBB−2007 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.57 0.00∗∗ 0.04∗∗
AAA2008 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗
AA2008 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.60
A2008 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.69
BBB2008 0.02
∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.20
BBB−2008 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.19
AAA2009 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.37 0.09∗ 0.00∗∗
AA2009 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.32 0.02∗∗ 0.00∗∗
A2009 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.19 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗
BBB2009 0.00
∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.25 0.07∗ 0.69
BBB−2009 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.22 0.04∗∗ 0.13
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Table 5.13: Spliced ABX Index VAR Estimation Results 2
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkPC1,t−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. PC1,t−k denotes that principal component one is included as an
exogenous variable. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
2006
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 -0.92 0.93 -0.61 -0.37 0.68 0.46
10-Year T-bill PC1 -0.64 0.63 -1.56 0.44 0.08 0.23
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 1.80
∗ 1.58 2.39∗∗ -0.40 0.43 0.00∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 1.47 0.40 1.77
∗ -1.22 0.45 0.01∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 -1.51 -1.55 -1.43 0.74 0.25 0.01
∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 -1.00 -1.47 -0.63 0.92 0.21 0.53
VIX Index PC1 1.84
∗ -0.25 -0.93 0.28 0.12 0.04∗∗
2007
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 -0.28 -0.52 −7.24∗∗ −1.85∗ 0.49 0.00∗∗
10-Year T-bill PC1 -1.23 -0.55 −3.83∗∗ −2.13∗∗ 0.35 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 0.22 -0.22 2.55
∗∗ 1.78∗ 0.22 0.01∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 0.01 -0.85 5.37
∗∗ 4.22∗∗ 0.47 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 −2.48∗∗ -0.35 −2.62∗∗ -1.60 0.49 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 -1.31 -1.12 −2.82∗∗ −2.07∗∗ 0.41 0.00∗∗
VIX Index PC1 2.87
∗∗ −2.09∗∗ -0.15 −2.75∗∗ 0.24 0.01∗∗
2008
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 -0.77 -0.99 0.76 1.47 0.13 0.48
10-Year T-bill PC1 0.35 -0.89 −1.67∗ 3.01∗∗ 0.26 0.05∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 −2.64∗∗ -0.59 0.87 −5.37∗∗ 0.52 0.00∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 −2.45∗∗ -0.90 0.28 −4.17∗∗ 0.37 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 1.39 1.12 -0.48 1.78
∗ 0.17 0.44
S&P 500 Index PC1 1.58 0.69 -0.09 1.96
∗ 0.21 0.27
VIX Index PC1 -1.16 0.62 -1.16 −2.71∗∗ 0.15 0.06∗
2009
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 1.25 -1.15 -1.09 -0.08 0.18 0.35
10-Year T-bill PC1 -1.03 0.33 0.26 -0.28 0.18 0.89
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 1.21 0.14 -0.44 -0.03 0.27 0.45
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 1.38 -0.17 0.16 0.62 0.15 0.66
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 -0.68 1.43 0.42 1.24 0.14 0.03
∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 -1.01 0.70 0.39 1.29 0.07 0.17
VIX Index PC1 2.10
∗∗ 0.16 -0.44 −2.36∗∗ 0.39 0.05∗
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Table 5.14: ABX 06-1 Vintage VAR Estimation Results 2
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkPC1,t−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. PC1,t−k denotes that principal component one is included as an
exogenous variable. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
2006
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 -0.81 1.08 -1.01 -0.33 0.09 0.60
10-Year T-bill PC1 -0.01 0.84 -1.06 0.36 0.07 0.76
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 0.80 0.84 2.14
∗∗ -0.08 0.41 0.09∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 0.26 -0.53 1.25 -1.14 0.43 0.43
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 −2.32∗∗ -1.27 -0.44 0.24 0.25 0.04∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 -1.61 -0.90 -0.31 0.68 0.22 0.39
VIX Index PC1 1.62 -0.04 -1.01 0.24 0.13 0.03
∗∗
2007
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 −2.01∗∗ -1.01 −3.83∗∗ -1.23 0.46 0.00∗∗
10-Year T-bill PC1 −3.31∗∗ −2.35∗∗ −6.02∗∗ −2.74∗∗ 0.39 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 1.75
∗ -0.20 2.11∗∗ 3.02∗∗ 0.23 0.01∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 3.07
∗∗ 0.05 4.47∗∗ 7.13∗∗ 0.46 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 −3.85∗∗ 1.02 −3.30∗∗ -1.63 0.46 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 −2.47∗∗ 0.18 −3.19∗∗ −3.38∗∗ 0.34 0.00∗∗
VIX Index PC1 2.64
∗∗ 0.50 2.91∗∗ 0.88 0.30 0.03∗∗
2008
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 -0.06 0.07 -0.89 -1.24 0.11 0.44
10-Year T-bill PC1 -0.87 −2.10∗∗ 1.57 -1.57 0.28 0.03∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 0.32 1.66
∗ −2.99∗∗ -0.01 0.40 0.03∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 0.03 1.86
∗ −3.23∗∗ -0.40 0.29 0.01∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 -0.21 0.63 2.08
∗∗ -0.14 0.11 0.32
S&P 500 Index PC1 1.05 -0.75 1.33 0.08 0.14 0.56
VIX Index PC1 -0.81 0.36 -1.09 0.56 0.08 0.83
2009
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 -1.19 1.42 -0.13 -0.65 0.19 0.46
10-Year T-bill PC1 1.60 -0.98 −1.77∗ 0.53 0.31 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 0.23 2.42
∗∗ 1.59 -0.43 0.34 0.01∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 -0.31 2.30
∗∗ 1.55 -0.38 0.21 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 3.25
∗∗ -0.34 -0.30 0.83 0.16 0.01∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 2.87
∗∗ -1.12 -0.40 -0.39 0.10 0.00∗∗
VIX Index PC1 -0.31 -0.04 -0.06 -0.38 0.29 0.98
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Table 5.15: ABX 06-2 Vintage VAR Estimation Results 2
Notes: This table reports results from the following VAR estimation:
yt = α +
4∑
k=1
βkYt−k + γkPC1t−k + t,
in which yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable. Thus, there are seven dependent
variables and the system is estimated separately for each one. PC1t−k denotes that principal component one is included as an
exogenous variable. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Reported are Newey-West adjusted
t-statistics, R2s and p-values of the F-test that the γ coefficients are jointly zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
2006
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 1.23 1.78
∗ -0.38 2.02∗∗ 0.36 0.32
10-Year T-bill PC1 0.90 0.70 −3.41∗∗ −2.42∗∗ 0.58 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 2.88
∗∗ 1.92∗ 2.50∗∗ 0.13 0.71 0.00∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 2.97
∗∗ 1.10 2.05∗∗ -0.42 0.73 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 0.05 -1.59 -0.22 0.03 0.24 0.00
∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 2.99
∗∗ -0.84 2.28∗∗ 0.76 0.55 0.00∗∗
VIX Index PC1 -0.13 -1.04 −2.72∗∗ -0.43 0.71 0.00∗∗
2007
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 -0.48 0.19 −5.29∗∗ −1.65∗ 0.52 0.00∗∗
10-Year T-bill PC1 -1.39 -0.52 −6.35∗∗ −2.02∗∗ 0.43 0.00∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 0.59 -0.58 3.44
∗∗ 1.48 0.24 0.00∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 0.68 -1.31 5.05
∗∗ 3.81∗∗ 0.47 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 −3.10∗∗ -0.03 −3.39∗∗ −2.00∗∗ 0.49 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 −1.71∗ -0.67 −3.02∗∗ −1.82∗ 0.38 0.00∗∗
VIX Index PC1 2.38
∗∗ 1.48 2.32∗∗ 0.69 0.37 0.00∗∗
2008
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 0.45 0.53 -1.14 -1.02 0.12 0.38
10-Year T-bill PC1 -0.69 −1.76∗ 0.90 -1.36 0.22 0.21
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 0.16 1.08 −1.90∗ -0.16 0.37 0.32
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 -0.16 0.99 −2.26∗∗ -0.70 0.28 0.14
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 0.22 0.94 1.25 -0.07 0.11 0.74
S&P 500 Index PC1 1.29 0.09 1.01 0.21 0.17 0.58
VIX Index PC1 -1.08 -0.09 -0.77 0.45 0.10 0.79
2009
Y X γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 R
2 p
One-Year T-bill PC1 0.79 2.09
∗∗ −3.60∗∗ 1.71∗ 0.35 0.01∗∗
10-Year T-bill PC1 0.58 -0.18 −2.75∗∗ 2.89∗∗ 0.30 0.02∗∗
Aaa Corporate Spread PC1 -0.90 1.99
∗ 1.96∗ −3.95∗∗ 0.39 0.00∗∗
Baa Corporate Spread PC1 -0.45 1.52 1.89
∗ −4.38∗∗ 0.25 0.00∗∗
S&P 500 Subindex PC1 1.51 0.68 -0.91 1.66
∗ 0.14 0.03∗∗
S&P 500 Index PC1 0.86 0.09 −1.77∗ 2.75∗∗ 0.11 0.10
VIX Index PC1 2.25
∗∗ -0.03 2.02∗∗ −2.33∗∗ 0.38 0.01∗∗
176
Chapter 6
A Regime Switching Analysis of Contagion from the U.S. Subprime
Mortgage-Backed Securities Market
6.1. Introduction and Related Literature
This chapter addresses some of the methodological limitations of the original VAR
analysis of Longstaff (2010), employed in Chapters 4 and 5, to test for contagion
from the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities market to government, corporate,
volatility and equity markets during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. As in Chapters 4
and 5 we adopt the definition of contagion presented by Forbes & Rigobon (2002) as
“a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock occurs in one market”. To
extend the VAR framework of Longstaff (2010), a time-varying transition probability
Markov-switching VAR (TVTP MS-VAR ) model, developed by Filardo (1994), is em-
ployed. In the model both variances and coefficients are allowed to switch discretely
between two regimes; a non-crisis regime characterized by low volatility and a crisis
regime classified by high volatility. This framework allows regimes to be determined
endogenously by the data, a feature not present in the original application employed
by Longstaff (2010), in which regimes are imposed exogenously. It also enables the
transition probability matrix for a switch in regime to be driven by an ABX asset,
another aspect not present in the original methodology. We treat the ABX indexes as
our possible source of contagion and are interested in analysing asset market interac-
tions in low- and high-volatility regimes triggered by the subprime mortgage-backed
securities market.
Regime switching approaches to testing for contagion were initially used primarily in
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business cycle research, as in Hamiliton (1989) and, in recent years, in currency crisis
literature, such as in Mandilaras & Bird (2010). They argue the use of a regime switch-
ing methodology, highlighting such advantages as the fact that the endogenous choice
of crisis and non-crisis periods eliminates the need to select regimes a priori. Analysing
European exchange rates during the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) they find that
a Markov-switching VAR is an appropriate methodology as it successfully identifies the
eleven realignments of the ERM. Using a multivariate version of the Forbes & Rigobon
(2002) contagion test they find evidence of contagion in the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS). Billio et al. (2005) review Markov switching models in contagion analysis
by analysing the 1997 Hong Kong stock market crash, treating contagion as a struc-
tural break in the data generating process during a crisis. They also point out that
one advantage of Markov-switching models is the endogenous identification of crisis
periods from sample data, along with the fact that such models can sufficiently handle
theoretical issues such as nonlinearity.
Using a CDS index to represent the U.S. credit default market, Guo et al. (2011) test
for cross-market contagion among this market, a U.S. stock market, real estate market,
and energy market during the 2007 crisis using a Markov-switching vector autoregres-
sive (MS-VAR) framework. They find that stock market and oil shocks are driving
forces behind credit default market and stock market variations, respectively.
Markov-switching models with time-varying transition probabilities have been applied
mainly in currency crises literature, such as Peria (2002), Brunetti et al. (2008) and
Mouratidis (2008).
In this chapter we adopt a TVTP MS-VAR analysis, which is performed on both the
spliced ABX index employed by Longstaff (2010) and a traded ABX vintage. We de-
termine two regimes, a non-crisis regime characterized by low volatility and a crisis
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regime classified by high volatility. The watershed of regimes occurs in mid-2007, with
the crisis regime dominating thereafter until the end of the sample, suggesting that
imposing a crisis regime to begin in January 2007, as in Longstaff (2010), is not ap-
propriate. Although we observe an increase in the correlation between the ABX asset
and the majority of financial variables analysed when the regime switches from a non-
crisis to a crisis state we do not observe any evidence of price discovery in the VAR
coefficients and so we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no contagion from the ABX
indexes analysed to the financial market variables during the crisis regime, a result in
direct contrast to that presented by Longstaff (2010). This may be due to the timing
of market events and the transmission of shocks through other channels, such as real
estate and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) markets. The results also highlight
differences between the spliced ABX index and the traded vintages, suggesting that
analysis of the spliced ABX index alone may not provide an accurate depiction of what
was happening in this market over the sample period and splicing the data may influ-
ence results.
A number of robustness checks are performed, including trivariate TVTP MS-VAR
analyses. The results suggest some evidence of contagion from the ABX market to
the other financial markets, although contagion is not as widespread as that reported
in Longstaff (2010). This indicates that accurately timing the onset of the crisis is
crucial, and the original application may have induced persistence due to employing
four lags and ignoring the structural break that occurred in mid-2007.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes the data
analysed while section 6.3 discusses the results of a rolling VAR analysis. Section 6.4
describes the time-varying transition probability Markov-switching VAR framework
and specifies the model employed. Section 6.5 presents the results of a number of
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robustness checks. A final section then concludes.
6.2. Data
As mentioned earlier this chapter analyses the spliced ABX index and financial market
variables analysed by Longstaff (2010), as well as one traded ABX vintage, the ABX
06-1. Chapter 2, section 2.3.1, describes the ABX indexes in detail and Chapter 4,
section 4.3.1 describes the spliced ABX index. Longstaff (2010) analyses weekly re-
turns of the five assets comprising the spliced ABX index to proxy for returns in the
distressed subprime mortgage-backed CDO market. He tests for contagion from this
market to several equity, volatility and fixed-income markets, described in Chapter 5,
section 5.3.1. As we are estimating a highly nonlinear model we include one proxy for
each financial market mentioned in an effort to reduce the number of coefficients to
be estimated and yield more accurate results. We therefore include weekly percentage
changes of the S&P 500 index, the VIX index and the Aaa-rated corporate spread. A
Treasury bond spread is created by subtracting the short-term yield from the long-term
yield. Weekly percentage changes of this spread are included to account for changes
in the Treasury market. As with the ABX indexes the financial market variables data
range from January 19, 2006, to December 31, 2009.
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6.3. Rolling Vector Autoregressive Analysis
To test for contagion Longstaff (2010) divides the data into three distinct periods; a
“pre-crisis” period for 2006, a “subprime-crisis” period for 2007 and a “global-crisis”
period for 2008, therefore allowing the VAR coefficients to vary by year. This frame-
work assumes that the system switches from a non-crisis to a “subprime-crisis” regime
on January 1, 2007, and to a “global-crisis” regime on January 1, 2008. If this is a
reasonable assumption we should observe a change in coefficient behaviour at these
times. Therefore, as a preliminary analysis of the stability of the coefficients in the
VAR system, a rolling VAR is estimated with a window width of 24. This window
width is chosen as there are relatively few observations in the data sets analysed.1 The
VAR specification estimated is as follows:
Yt = α+
4∑
k=1
(βkYt−k + γkABXt−k) + t, (6.1)
in which Yt denotes the financial market measure included as the dependent variable.
Thus, there are four dependent variables and the system is estimated separately for
each one. ABXt−k denotes the ABX asset included as an exogenous variable. As
there are five ratings classes there are five ABX assets in each ABX series and so the
VAR system is estimated for each of these. Four lags are suggested by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC).
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 present the rolling VAR coefficients and confidence bands over
the entire sample period employing the spliced ABX index and ABX 06-1 vintage
1Various alternative window widths have also been employed and the results do not change consid-
erably.
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AAA rated assets, respectively, as explanatory variables and the four aforementioned
dependent variables. In order to conserve space lag one coefficients only are presented.2
[Insert Figures 6.1 - 6.2 about here]
These figures indicate that the coefficients are not stable over the 2006-2009 period.
We observe very little movement in the coefficients prior to mid-2007, after which all
become relatively volatile. This suggests that imposing the crisis regime to begin in
January 2007, as in Longstaff (2010), may not be appropriate and provides motivation
for further analysis.
6.4. Time-Varying Transition Probability Markov-Switching Vector
Autoregressive (TVTP) Analysis
This chapter aims to analyse the effect of shocks to the subprime mortgage-backed
securities market on different financial markets during the crisis of 2007-2009 following
the framework outlined in Longstaff (2010). To this end, a VAR framework is appro-
priate. However, the results of the rolling VAR analysis presented above suggest that
imposing a crisis regime to begin in January 2007 may not be realistic as coefficient
behaviour remains relatively stable during early 2007.
We therefore employ a two-state Markov-switching VAR with time-varying transition
probabilities, thus allowing regimes to be selected endogenously by the data. Two
states are chosen due to the relatively short length of our data and the fact that aca-
demic literature analysing the crisis suggests once the U.S. real estate bubble burst
in early 2007 markets remained in contraction until June 2009 (National Bureau of
2Full results are available on request.
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Economic Research). Also, casual analysis of ABX index returns and the financial
market variables suggest that two regression lines would better fit the data than one.3
This is also backed up by the results of the rolling VAR analysis presented above.
In order to test for “a significant increase in cross-market linkages following a shock in
one market”, we include an ABX asset as an endogenous variable in the VAR frame-
work to examine the relationship between this market and the other financial markets
analysed. We include the AAA-rated asset because this tranche would have been the
largest in the CDO structure (approximately 80%) and would have been the most
liquid, particularly when the crisis hit. Should we observe a significant difference in
the relationships between the ABX asset and the financial market variables once the
system enters a crisis regime we can then conclude evidence of contagion, following our
definition and framework.
This approach also requires the selection of an “information variable”, i.e. a variable
that determines the transition probability matrix for a switch in regime. As we are
analysing contagion from the ABX market, this trigger should come from within the
ABX assets. However, as we include the AAA-rated asset as an endogenous variable
in the VAR we must select a variable outside of the system. We therefore choose the
next highest rating, the AA-rated asset. Thus, our TVTP MS-VAR analysis includes
the AAA-rated asset within the VAR model, with regime changes dependent upon the
behaviour of lagged AA-rated asset returns.
The coefficients obtained depend upon the regime that the system is in at a particular
3See Figures 3.1 - 3.3 and Figure 4.1.
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time. With two states we have:
Yt =

(xt)(b1), st = 1
(xt)(b2), st = 2
, (6.2)
in which st denotes the state of the system at time t and is determined by a Markov
chain calculated from a transition matrix which groups the probabilities that one state
is followed by another. The first set of coefficients applies to regime one while the
second set applies to regime two. The data determine the probability of the regime
being in a particular regime at a particular time.
6.4.1. Model Specification
Our model takes the form:
yi,t = α(st) +
2∑
k=1
βk(st)yi,t−k + sti,t, (6.3)
st ∈ {1, 2} ,
sti,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2st),
in which yi,t is an n dimensional time series vector of dependent variables, α is a
matrix of state dependent intercepts, β1 . . . βk are matrices of the state dependent
autoregressive coefficients, sti,t is a state dependent noise vector and st is an unobserved
random variable that causes the system to change from regime to another. We assume
st follows a first-order Markov process in which the current regime, st relies only on the
regime one period in the past, st−1. We therefore examine two discrete states, denoted
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as s1 and s2. s1 represents a low-volatility, “non-crisis” regime while s2 represents
a high-volatility, “crisis” regime. Four lags were initially employed but, due to the
highly nonlinear nature of the model and the relatively large number of coefficients to
estimate, led to imprecise estimates and difficulty in converging to a global maximum.
Three lags also led to this problem. Also, results obtained using three and four lags in
the estimation were insignificant. We therefore employ a two lag model which, as we
will show later, is sufficient to capture any serial correlation in this system.
In the fixed transition probability model, the regime follows a first order Markov-chain:
p[st = 1|st−1 = 1] = p11,
p[st = 2|st−1 = 2] = p22,
p[st = 2|st−1 = 1] = p12,
p[st = 1|st−1 = 2] = p21, (6.4)
in which p11 denotes the probability of the system remaining in state 1 at time t, given
that the system was in state 1 at time t-1; p21 denotes the probability of the system
switching to state 2 from state 1; p22 denotes the probability of the system remaining
in state 2 at time t, given that the system was in state 2 at time t-1; p12 denotes the
probability of the system switching to state 1 from state 2.
In order to allow the transition between regimes to depend upon the behaviour of the
AA-rated ABX asset we employ the time-varying transition probability specification of
Filardo (1994). As Filardo (1998) highlights, allowing the probability of switching from
one regime to another to depend upon the behaviour of underlying fundamentals offers
more flexibility than the fixed transition probability model and provides advantages
such as capturing complex temporal persistence, allowing expected duration of a regime
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to vary across time and recognising systematic changes in the transition probabilities
before and after turning points. In this case:
p[st = 1|st−1 = 1] = p11(zt),
p[st = 2|st−1 = 2] = p22(zt),
p[st = 2|st−1 = 1] = p12(zt),
p[st = 1|st−1 = 2] = p21(zt), (6.5)
in which zt denotes our information variable, lagged ABX AA-rated asset weekly per-
centage returns.
The justification for including lagged ABX returns is outlined by Filardo (1998), which
provides a set of sufficient conditions to justify the use of Hamilton’s (1989) method
for TVTP models. This is due to the fact that the inclusion of additional data, zt, in
the unconditional likelihood function implies the need to jointly estimate the param-
eters of the y and z processes. Conditional exogeneity between zt and St validates
Hamilton’s (1989) approach for the TVTP model. As Filardo (1998) states: “In
general, the information variables that govern time-variation in the transition prob-
abilities must be conditionally uncorrelated with the state of the Markov process”. In
this case zt−1 is considered to be predetermined with respect to St. Given y1, z1 is
conditionally uncorrelated with S1 and the conditional likelihood function is given by
piθ(z1 | y1, S1) = piθ(z1 | y1). In other words ABX returns one period ago are considered
to be predetermined with respect to the state of the system this period. We model the
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transition probabilities as a logistical functional form:
p(zt) =
exp(θp0 +
∑K1
k=1 θpkzt−k)
1 + exp(θp0 +
∑K1
k=1 θpkzt−k)
,
q(zt) =
exp(θq0 +
∑K2
k=1 θqkzt−k)
1 + exp(θq0 +
∑K2
k=1 θqkzt−k)
. (6.6)
The model is estimated using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm presented
by Hamilton (1990) in which we suppose {yt}Tt=1 is the sample path of a time series
that depends on {st}Tt=1 as follows:
(yt | st = i;αi) iid∼ N(µi, σ2i ), (6.7)
where αi = (µi, σ
2
i ), i = 1, 2. The density of yt conditional upon st is:
f(yt | st = i;αi) = 1√
2piσi
exp
(−(yt − µi)2
2σ2i
)
. (6.8)
Let θ = (α′, β′, ρ)′ be the vector of all model parameters. The complete-data log
likelihood in terms of indicator functions may be expressed as:
logf(y
T
, sT | zT ; θ) = I(s1 = 2)[logf(y1 | s1 = 2;α2) + logρ]
+I(s1 = 1)[logf(y1 | s1 = 1;α1) + log(1− ρ)])
+
T∑
t=2
{I(st = 2)logf(yt | st = 2;α2) + I(st = 1)logf(yt | st = 1;α1)
+I(st = 2, st−1 = 2)log(p22t ) + I(st = 1, st−1 = 2)log(1− p22t )
+I(st = 2, st−1 = 2)log(1− p11t ) + I(st = 1, st−1 = 2)log(p11t )}, (6.9)
where f denotes any density and underlining denotes past history of the variable from
187
t = 1 to the variable subscript. As the complete data are not observed the complete-
data log likelihood cannot be constructed in practice but the incomplete-data log like-
lihood may be obtained by summing over all possible state sequences:
logf(y
T
, | zT ; θ) =
(
log
2∑
s1=1
2∑
s2=1
...
2∑
sT=0
f(y
T
, sT | zT ; θ)
)
, (6.10)
then maximise w.r.t θ. However, this is computationally intractable as {st}Tt=1 may
be realised in 2T ways. We therefore follow EM algorithm for maximisation of the
incomplete-data likelihood as proposed by Diebold et al. (1994).
6.4.2. Spliced ABX Index TVTP MS-VAR Results
Turning first to the spliced ABX index analysis, we plot the smoothed probabilities of
the system being in a crisis regime. We calculate these probabilities as follows:
P (st = i|FT ; θ), i = 1, 2, (6.11)
in which FT denotes the collection of all observed variables up to and including time
T , in other words all information in the sample, and θ is the vector of parameters
(α(st), βk(st), σ
2
st, p11, p22, p12, p21). Smoothed estimates are then computed via the
backward recursion algorithm as presented by Kim (1994) and Hamilton (1994). Figure
6.3 illustrates the smoothed probabilities obtained from the spliced ABX index analysis.
[Insert Figure 6.3 about here]
These suggest that the watershed of regimes occurs mid-2007, with the crisis regime
dominating thereafter until the end of the sample. This suggests that exogenously
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imposing the crisis regime to begin in January 2007, as in Longstaff (2010), may not
be realistic. Furthermore, treating 2007 as a single period for analysis ignores the
structural break that occurs midway through the year and thus may create problems
for the original analysis. We observe a fall in these probabilities between July and
September 2008, which may be an effect of splicing the data.
Our first task is to classify two regimes, a low-volatility non-crisis regime and a high-
volatility crisis regime. Table 6.1 reports means and standard deviations for each
variable in each regime, along with the coefficients on the transition probabilities.
These coefficients can be viewed as a measure of persistence of a regime. Significant
coefficients indicate that the regime under consideration is persistent, that is, it is
highly likely that whatever state prevails at t− 1 will prevail at t.
[Insert Table 6.1 about here]
The results reported in Table 6.1 indicate that two regimes are identifiable. The stan-
dard deviation of each variable increases following the switch in regimes, and standard
deviations are statistically different from zero in regime two, the crisis regime. Also,
significant coefficients on the indicated transition probabilities suggest that the crisis
regime is persistent.
Table 6.1 reports that the ABX AAA-rated asset mean returns become increasingly
negative after the regime switch, as expected. However, S&P 500 index mean returns
actually increase. This may be due to the S&P 500 experiencing losses much later than
the spliced ABX index. The Treasury spread mean falls slightly following the switch
in regimes, indicating that this spread narrowed following the crisis. Intuitively this
is not the result we expect, but the change is relatively small. The mean changes of
the corporate spread become negative following the regime switch implying that this
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spread narrowed during the crisis and the VIX becomes negative in the crisis regime,
indicating a decrease in this variable. These results suggest that, given the long du-
ration of the ABX crisis, investors became optimistic about general market volatility
and corporate bond markets earlier than they did about any potential recovery in the
market for subprime mortgage-backed securities. Also, the crisis was not coincident
across markets and so would have affected them at different times depending on market
events.
As a preliminary analysis of how the relationship between the ABX asset and the fi-
nancial market variables may have changed following the crisis, Table 6.2 reports the
correlation coefficients between them in each regime.
[Insert Table 6.2 about here]
The correlation between the ABX asset and the S&P 500 index increases following
the switch from a non-crisis to a crisis regime, as expected. Although the ABX asset
is negatively correlated with each other financial market variable in both regimes, it
becomes less so after the switch in regimes. This indicates that, although still negative,
there was increase in the correlation between these assets once the crisis hit the system.
However, as shown by Forbes & Rigobon (2002), an increase in correlation does not
necessarily constitute contagion. We therefore examine the coefficients on the AAA-
rated ABX variable in each of the indicated VAR equations in order to ascertain if there
was any change in the relationships between these assets after the switch in regimes.
Results are reported in Table 6.3. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
[Insert Table 6.3 about here]
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Following our definition of contagion as a significant change in cross-market linkages
following a shock in one market we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no contagion
based on the results presented in Table 6.3. None of the coefficients are statistically
different from zero in either regime suggesting that the ABX had no significant effect
on the financial market variables in either non-crisis or crisis times. This result is in
direct contrast to that presented in Longstaff (2010) in that we find no evidence of any
lead-lag relation between ABX returns and changes in the financial market variables
analysed, no forecast power from the ABX and, thus, no evidence of price discovery.
We do, however, find evidence of Granger-causality from some of the financial market
variables to the spliced ABX index during the non-crisis period.4 Specifically, stock
market returns and changes in the VIX index Granger-cause subsequent returns in
the spliced ABX index. These interdependencies then dissipate in the crisis regime,
suggesting that these assets behaved independently during the turbulent period as
investors exited the asset-backed security sector. This indicates that, as the crisis
evolved from a subprime security-backed problem to a broader global crisis risks were
propagated through other channels. Possible channels include real estate market and
the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. It is likely that shocks were
filtered through such markets before reaching the financial markets examined here,
meaning that that risk transmission to these financial variables was not instantaneous.
Next, we perform the analysis using the ABX 06-1 vintage in order to ascertain if
splicing the data could influence the results obtained.
4In order to conserve space these are not reported here. Full results are available on request.
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6.4.3. ABX 06-1 Vintage TVTP MS-VAR Results
Figure 6.4 illustrates the smoothed probabilities of the system being in a crisis regime.
[Insert Figure 6.4 about here]
Again it is clear that the watershed of regimes occurs in mid-2007, with the risky
regime dominating thereafter until the end of the sample. In comparison to Figure
6.3 these smoothed probabilities exhibit less spikes. This difference is probably due to
the fact that the ABX 06-1 vintage is a continuous variable and so avoids the jumps
induced by splicing the indexes together.
Next we classify a low-volatility non-crisis and a high-volatility crisis regime by analysing
the volatility of the variables in each state. Table 6.4 reports means and standard de-
viations for each variable in each regime, along with the coefficients on the transition
probabilities.
[Insert Table 6.4 about here]
As the standard deviation of each variable increases following the watershed of regimes
we can easily identify a non-crisis and a crisis regime. Again, all crisis regime stan-
dard deviations are highly significant and the significant coefficients on the indicated
transition probabilities suggest that the crisis regime is persistent.
Turning to the means of each variable in both regimes, Table 6.4 reports that, unsur-
prisingly, the mean returns of the AAA-rated ABX asset and the S&P 500 index both
become negative in the crisis period. This is in contrast to the results presented for
the spliced ABX index, in which the S&P index expected mean increases following the
regime switch. This suggests that in the VAR system driven by changes in the actual
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traded ABX asset the S&P 500 index began to fall earlier than in that driven by the
spliced ABX index asset, indicating differences between the two ABX series examined.
The mean of the Treasury bond changes becomes positive following the watershed of
regimes implying that this spread widened during the crisis as the difference between
short- and long-term Treasury bonds increased. Again both the corporate spread and
VIX mean changes become negative, although not statistically significant, pointing to
investor sentiment regarding these markets improving earlier than that regarding the
ABX market.
Table 6.5 reports that the correlation between the AAA-rated ABX asset and the other
financial market variables in both regimes.
[Insert Table 6.5 about here]
The ABX asset becomes more correlated with the S&P 500 index and the corporate
spread following the watershed of regimes. However, it becomes negatively correlated
with both the VIX and the Treasury bill spread, suggesting that a fall in the ABX
corresponds to an increase in changes in both the VIX and the government spread.
Table 6.6 provides the coefficients on the AAA-rated ABX variable in the indicated
VAR equations.
[Insert Table 6.6 about here]
Again, we observe no significant coefficients and so we fail to reject the null hypothesis
of no contagion from the ABX 06-1 vintage to the financial market variables exam-
ined. As mentioned earlier this could be because the shocks were transmitted through
different channels, such as the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market, before
reaching equity, Treasury, corporate bond and volatility markets. As in the spliced
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ABX index analysis we find the stock market and volatility market measures Granger-
cause ABX 06-1 vintage returns in the non-crisis regime, indicating that before the
crisis hit these markets significantly affected the asset-backed security market. This
is reasonable, given that during this time these assets were growing in popularity and
were closely monitored by market participants as a means of gauging the subprime
market risk and so had links with equity market conditions and general market volatil-
ity. During 2007, however, there is no evidence of linkages among the financial market
variables and either ABX series. As the subprime crisis hit, investors began to rapidly
reassess the risk of these products, subsequently exiting this market. Trades in these
securities slowed down as concerns regarding counterparty risk increased and general
market liquidity dried up. Risks from the ABX quickly became overshadowed by credit
shortages and the ability of institutions to roll over debt. It is likely then that these
risks transmitted to markets in a more rapid fashion than those emanating from the
ABX. The ABX market is closely linked to the ABCP market and the real estate mar-
ket so it is likely that these markets would have been negatively affected by its collapse
sooner than the financial markets analysed here. Risk may then have filtered down to
these markets through these channels.
Clearly, these results are in striking contrast to those obtained by Longstaff (2010).
Firstly, we find no evidence of cross-market contagion. Also, many of the expected
means and correlations are considerably different among the two data sets. Finally,
the ex-post smoothed probabilities suggest that exogenously imposing a crisis regime
to begin in January 2007 may not be appropriate. It is therefore important that we
address why these differences may occur. Other than the clear differences between the
the methodology employed in this chapter and that in Longstaff (2010), in the original
application of the VAR Newey-West adjusted t-statistics were used in order to account
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for non-constant variances in each distinct period. In our framework, although the
variances differ across the two regimes, they are constant within each regime itself,
which may influence results.
As discussed above the spliced ABX index is a combination of the four ABX vintages,
spliced together at each subsequent vintage issuance date. The dominant index is
therefore the 07-2 vintage, which would be the riskiest of the four as it was issued in
July 2007 and backed by loans originated in early 2007.5 To investigate the differ-
ence between the spliced and traded results the differences in the ex-post smoothed
probabilities of a crisis regime are calculated. These are illustrated in Figure 6.5.
[Insert Figure 6.5 about here]
A value of minus one indicates a point at which the spliced ABX index VAR system
results report a zero probability of the system being in a crisis regime but the ABX 06-1
vintage system results report a probability of one. Figure 6.5 illustrates that between
2007 and 2008 a difference of this magnitude, or close to it, occurred numerous times.
Based on the time line of the crisis it is not reasonable to assume that the system was
not in a crisis regime at these points during this volatile period. This may be due to
the introduction of the riskier ABX 07-1 and ABX 07-2 vintages into the spliced index
during 2007. The assets underlying these riskier vintages would have been relatively
illiquid during this time and it may be the halt in trading that occurred as investors
and institutions were reassessing risks that causes this result.
As well as contrasting to the findings presented by Longstaff (2010), the results from
the TVTP MS-VAR analysis are surprising, as they suggest that the financial markets
examined experienced no interactions during the crisis regime. In order to investigate
5See Figure 2.7 for raw ABX prices.
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this further we perform a number of robustness checks. Firstly, we perform several di-
agnostic tests on the standardized expected residuals from the above models. Secondly,
we re-perform the TVTP MS-VAR analysis employing the BBB-rated ABX asset as
an endogenous variable in an effort to ascertain if contagion many have emanated from
this riskier asset. Finally, we perform trivariate TVTP MS-VAR analyses in order to
address if the methodology, and in particular the dimensionality of our application,
may have influenced the results.
6.5. Robustness Checks
6.5.1. Diagnostic Tests on Standardized Expected Residuals
Due to the state variable st, residuals are unobservable so we must calculate the stan-
dardized expected residuals. Following Maheu & McCurdy (2000) and using equation
(6.3) these are calculated as follows:
∑
st,...st−1
Yi,t − E[Yi,t]|st, ..., st−1, Yi,t−1
σ(st)
P (st, ..., st− 1|Yt−1). (6.12)
Table 6.7 presents the results of diagnostic tests on these residuals.
[Insert Table 6.7 about here]
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.7 report the LM test for serial correlation in the standard-
ized expected residuals of each variable examined in both analyses. For the majority
of variables we cannot reject the null of no serial correlation at both one and four lags.
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To test for Normality we use the Anderson-Darling test. Column 5 indicates that the
majority of expected standardized residuals in the spliced ABX analysis are normally
distributed but in most cases for the ABX 06-1 vintage analysis we reject normality.
We find considerable evidence of ARCH effects at both lags one and four. Such a result
suggests that an alternative approach, such as a switching ARCH model, may be more
appropriate. However, given the relatively short time span of the data such a model
may prove difficult to estimate. It should also be noted that, as Maheu & McCurdy
(2000) point out, “since we do not know the asymptotic distribution of the LB statistic
using the standardized expected residuals, specification tests should be interpreted with
caution.”
6.5.2. TVTP MS-VAR Analysis 2
In order to check the robustness of the above results the analysis is repeated with
various ABX endogenous variables and various ABX information variables. Firstly, all
other ABX assets are included in each analysis as an information variable in place of
the AA-rated asset and the results do not change qualitatively. Next, the BBB-rated
ABX asset is included as an endogenous variable in each analysis, in place of the AAA-
rated asset.6 Figure 6.6 illustrates the smoothed probabilities of the system being in
a crisis regime for the spliced ABX index analysis.
[Insert Figure 6.6 about here]
These probabilities suggest that the watershed of regimes occurs in mid-2008, which
is clearly an unexpected result, based on what we know regarding the evolution of
6The BBB- rated asset has also been included but, possibly due to stagnant prices during the crisis
regime, provided imprecise estimates.
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the crisis. As discussed above, the spliced ABX index is dominated by the ABX 07-2
vintage, the riskiest vintage, and so trading in the lower tranches of this index would
have frozen once the crisis hit in 2007. This could possibly have caused the results
presented in Figure 6.6. Table 6.8 reports the coefficients on the ABX variable in the
indicated VAR equation.
[Insert Table 6.8 about here]
We again fail to reject the null hypothesis of no contagion as we observe no significant
difference in the relationships between the ABX asset and the financial market vari-
ables. We also observe no persistence in the crisis regime.
Turning now to the ABX 06-1 vintage analysis, Figure 6.7 plots the smoothed proba-
bilities of the system being in a crisis regime.
[Insert Figure 6.7 about here]
Comparing Figure 6.7 to Figure 6.6 the results appear to be more reasonable. We can
identify the watershed of regimes as occurring in mid-2007, although the smoothed
probabilities appear to spike more than those presented in the main analysis. Table
6.9 reports the coefficients on the ABX variable in the indicated VAR equation.
[Insert Table 6.9 about here]
We again observe no evidence to support contagion from the ABX to the financial
market variables, however we do observe some persistence in the crisis regime. Overall
these results indicate that our main analysis is robust.
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6.5.3. Trivariate TVTP MS-VAR Analysis
Our results are unusual as they suggest that during the crisis regime all financial
markets examined behaved independently, suggesting that the fact that they all expe-
rienced an increase in volatility and an increase in correlation with one another was
coincidental. One reason we may observe such results could be a consequence of the
large number of parameters in the model that require simultaneous estimation from a
relatively short data set. A highly nonlinear model such as the TVTP MS-VAR model
employed is extremely sensitive to the inclusion of many variables and lags (Manzan,
2004). Therefore, in an effort to reduce the dimensionality of the model, and to obtain
clearer results, we employ one lag trivariate TVTP MS-VARs using the system pre-
sented in equation (6.3). We use every possible pair of financial market variables plus
the AAA-rated ABX asset in the system, yielding six separate trivariate models for
each ABX series. Tables 6.10 - 6.13 report the coefficients on the ABX variable in the
indicated VAR equation for the spliced ABX index and ABX 06-1 vintage analyses.
[Insert Tables 6.10 - 6.13 about here]
In order to conserve space we do not present the means, standard deviations or
smoothed probabilities.7 However, as before, two regimes are easily identified as volatil-
ity increases once the system enters a crisis regime for every variable. Mean returns
are also reasonable, for example S&P 500 mean returns become negative in the crisis
regime. The crisis regime is also persistent in all estimations and the smoothed prob-
abilities again suggest that the system entered a crisis regime in mid-2007.
Turning first to the spliced ABX index analyses, Tables 6.10 and 6.11 suggest that
7Full results are available on request.
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there is some evidence of contagion from the ABX asset to the S&P 500 as ABX re-
turns Granger-cause subsequent stock market returns in the crisis regime. However,
the coefficients are statistically different from zero at only the 10% level. There is also
evidence of significant linkages between U.S. Treasury and corporate debt markets in
the crisis regime, which could be indicative of a “flight to quality” by investors.
Tables 6.12 and 6.13 also report evidence of contagion between government and cor-
porate bond markets in the ABX 06-1 vintage analyses. There is also evidence of
increased sensitivity to the ABX market in all other markets in the traded vintage
analyses, although not present in each pair analysed.
These results again highlight the differences between the spliced and traded vintages
and also shed some light on the observed differences in results between our original
analyses and those reported in Longstaff (2010). They indicate that when the cri-
sis is correctly identified there is indeed evidence of increased interactions between
the financial markets analysed in the crisis regime, however this contagion is not as
widespread as that suggested in Longstaff (2010). Again, this could be due to the tim-
ing of market events and contagion filtering down from markets more closely related
to the asset-backed securities market to the financial markets examined, meaning we
would not observe a link as direct as that reported in Longstaff (2010). The results
we present are in fact more consistent with those reported in Longstaff (2010) for the
“global-crisis” period of 2008, in which there is little evidence of contagion.8 This sug-
gests that the credit crisis led to decreased linkages between the ABX market and the
other financial markets, as investors were rapidly exiting the asset-backed securities
market and concerns were turning more toward liquidity.
In terms of methodology, the original application essentially ignored the structural
8See Table 5.6.
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break that occurred in 2007, indicating that accurately dating the crisis is crucial to
the analysis. Employing a four lag model, as in Longstaff (2010) and failing to take
into account the structural break in mid-2007 could induce persistence in the model
(Perron, 2006) causing the differences in results.
6.6. Conclusions
This chapter analyses contagion from the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities
market by following and extending the VAR framework presented in Longstaff (2010).
In order to do so we employ a Markov-switching VAR with time-varying transition
probabilities. We apply the analysis to both the spliced ABX index employed by
Longstaff (2010) and a traded ABX vintage, the ABX 06-1. The results allow us to
determine a low-volatility non-crisis regime and a high-volatility crisis regime. We also
determine, via ex-post smoothed probabilities of the system being in crisis regime,
that the watershed of regimes occurs in mid-2007, with the risky regime dominating
thereafter until the end of the sample. Our VAR analysis suggests that the ABX did
not serve as a source of contagion to these markets during the 2007-2009 crisis, which
is in striking contrast to the findings of Longstaff (2010).
In an effort to reduce the dimensionality of the model, and better capture contagion,
we employ trivariate VAR analyses, the results of which yield some tentative evidence
of contagion, although not as widespread as that reported by Longstaff (2010). Dating
the crisis appears to be crucial, as in the original application the crisis period is an
amalgamation of the tranquil start to 2007 followed by a turbulent second half. Again,
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breaking the crisis at the end of that year does not receive any support in our regime-
switching model and in fact, our overall results are more in line with Longstaff’s (2010)
reported 2008 results in which there is little or no evidence of contagion.
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Figure 6.1: Spliced ABX Index Rolling VAR Coefficients. Window width = 24.
The solid black lines are point estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 6.2: ABX 06-1 Vintage Rolling VAR Coefficients. Window width = 24.
The solid black lines are point estimates; the dashed lines are confidence bands.
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Figure 6.3: Spliced ABX Index TVTP MS VAR Smoothed Probabilities.
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Figure 6.4: ABX 06-1 Vintage TVTP MS VAR Smoothed Probabilities.
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Figure 6.5: Smoothed Probabilities Differences.
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Figure 6.6: Spliced ABX Index TVTP MS VAR Smoothed Probabilities
Endogenous ABX variable: BBB asset.
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Figure 6.7: ABX 06-1 Vintage TVTP MS VAR Smoothed Probabilities
Endogenous ABX variable: BBB asset.
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Table 6.1: Spliced ABX Index TVTP MS-VAR Estimation Results 1
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations of the indicated variables in the non-crisis and crisis regimes
estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
2∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level. θ
denotes the coefficient on the indicated transition probability.
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
µ σ µ σ
ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.24 1.79 -0.58 6.01
(-0.36) (1.70∗) (-0.35) (2.71∗∗)
S&P 500 Index 0.09 1.97 0.26 2.87
(0.14) (1.68∗) (0.33) (2.10∗∗)
Treasury Bill Spread 1.91 8.45 1.81 15.27
(0.97) (2.24∗∗) (0.38) (1.65∗)
Aaa Corporate Spread 1.72 10.70 -2.40 15.90
(0.44) (1.44) (-0.72) (2.23∗∗)
VIX Index 0.56 2.36 -0.95 3.58
(0.70) (1.75∗) (-0.92) (1.70∗∗)
θp1 = 2.23
∗ θq1 = 2.73∗∗
θp2 = 0.34 θq2 = 0.05
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Table 6.3: Spliced ABX Index TVTP MS-VAR Estimation Results 1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the AAA ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
2∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
β1 β2 β1 β2
S&P 500 Index -0.35 -0.25 0.02 0.07
(-1.01) (-0.64) (0.18) (0.45)
Treasury Bill Spread 1.66 0.34 -0.48 0.47
(0.94) (0.19) (-0.54) (0.56)
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.53 -0.63 0.12 -1.13
(-0.31) (-0.26) (0.15) (-1.19)
VIX Index 0.31 0.25 -0.01 -0.01
(0.79) (0.47) (-0.05) (-0.03)
212
Table 6.4: ABX 06-1 Vintage TVTP MS-VAR Estimation Results 1
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations of the indicated variables in the non-crisis and crisis regimes
estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
2∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.θ
denotes the coefficient on the indicated transition probability.
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
µ σ µ σ
ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.34 0.92 0.22 3.08
(-0.89) (2.11∗∗) (0.21) (2.39∗∗)
S&P 500 Index 0.47 1.58 -0.23 3.31
(0.78) (2.10∗∗) (-0.23) (2.19∗∗)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.54 7.46 3.69 16.31
(-0.16) (1.46) (0.75) (2.10∗∗)
Aaa Corporate Spread 1.49 8.44 -1.41 16.54
(0.47) (1.90∗) (-0.37) (2.18∗∗)
VIX Index 0.08 1.86 -0.53 4.13
(0.12) (2.49∗∗) (-0.41) (2.61∗∗)
θp1 = 2.27
∗ θq1 = 2.90∗
θp2 = 0.74 θq2 = 0.07
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Table 6.6: ABX 06-1 Vintage TVTP MS-VAR Estimation Results 1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the AAA ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
2∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
β1 β2 β1 β2
S&P 500 Index -0.54 0.13 -0.12 0.01
(-0.63) (0.13) (-0.30) (0.02)
Treasury Bill Spread 1.13 -1.65 -0.47 0.79
(0.24) (-0.39) (-0.27) (0.45)
Aaa Corporate Spread -4.34 -1.37 0.40 -1.16
(-0.82) (-0.34) (0.21) (-0.52)
VIX Index 0.11 -0.21 0.27 0.07
(0.08) (-0.19) (0.59) (0.14)
215
T
a
b
l
e
6
.7
:
D
ia
g
n
o
st
ic
T
es
ts
O
n
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
E
x
p
ec
te
d
R
es
id
u
a
ls
N
o
te
s:
L
M
(k
)
is
th
e
B
re
u
sc
h
-G
o
d
fr
e
y
L
a
g
ra
n
g
e
M
u
lt
ip
li
e
r
te
st
fo
r
n
o
se
ri
a
l
c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
u
p
to
la
g
k
,
A
R
C
H
(k
)
is
th
e
L
a
g
ra
n
g
e
M
u
lt
ip
li
e
r
te
st
fo
r
th
e
A
R
C
H
e
ff
e
c
ts
o
f
o
rd
e
r
k
,
N
o
rm
a
li
ty
is
th
e
A
n
d
e
rs
o
n
-D
a
rl
in
g
te
st
fo
r
th
e
n
u
ll
o
f
n
o
rm
a
li
ty
.
T
h
e
su
b
sc
ri
p
t
∗∗
d
e
n
o
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
e
l;
th
e
su
b
sc
ri
p
t
∗
d
e
n
o
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
e
l.
S
p
li
ce
d
A
B
X
In
d
ex
A
n
al
y
si
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
L
M
(1
)
L
M
(4
)
A
R
C
H
(1
)
A
R
C
H
(4
)
N
or
m
al
it
y
A
B
X
A
A
A
-r
at
ed
A
ss
et
0.
04
2
.7
2∗
16
.1
6∗
∗
9
.3
2∗
∗
5
.6
3∗
∗
S
&
P
50
0
In
d
ex
0.
05
0.
43
4
.6
6∗
∗
3
.6
1∗
1.
30
T
re
a
su
ry
B
il
l
S
p
re
ad
1.
40
1.
43
3
.6
9∗
2
.4
5∗
1.
89
A
a
a
C
or
p
o
ra
te
S
p
re
ad
0.
29
0.
01
0.
04
3.
70
∗∗
0.
98
V
IX
In
d
ex
0.
06
0.
05
8.
01
∗∗
8
.6
7∗
∗
1.
57
A
B
X
06
-1
V
in
ta
ge
A
n
al
y
si
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
L
M
(1
)
L
M
(4
)
A
R
C
H
(1
)
A
R
C
H
(4
)
N
or
m
al
it
y
A
B
X
A
A
A
-r
at
ed
A
ss
et
0.
90
8
.0
3∗
∗
3.
79
∗
5
.6
5∗
6
.6
1∗
∗
S
&
P
50
0
In
d
ex
0.
13
3
.0
8∗
1.
35
0.
62
3
.5
8∗
∗
T
re
a
su
ry
B
il
l
S
p
re
ad
2.
15
0.
30
0.
87
4.
34
∗∗
2
.5
8∗
∗
A
a
a
C
or
p
o
ra
te
S
p
re
ad
0.
02
0.
75
4
.7
2∗
∗
6
.4
6∗
∗
1.
17
V
IX
In
d
ex
0.
12
0.
02
2.
66
8
.1
8∗
∗
4
.1
3∗
∗
216
Table 6.8: Spliced ABX Index TVTP MS-VAR Estimation Results 2
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the BBB ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
2∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
β1 β2 β1 β2
S&P 500 Index -0.02 0.13 0.07 -0.15
(-0.17) (0.90) (0.01) (-0.03)
Treasury Bill Spread 0.10 -0.07 1.18 0.11
(0.15) (-0.11) (0.04) (0.01)
Aaa Corporate Spread 0.19 -0.26 -0.34 -0.35
(0.33) (-0.44) (-0.01) (-0.01)
VIX Index 0.02 -0.14 0.14 0.19
(0.13) (-1.15) (0.02) (0.04)
θp1 = 1.57 θq1 = 0.03
θp2 = -0.05 θq2 = 2.56
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Table 6.9: ABX 06-1 Vintage TVTP MS-VAR Estimation Results 2
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the BBB ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
2∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
Non-Crisis Regime Crisis Regime
β1 β2 β1 β2
S&P 500 Index -0.16 0.09 0.04 -0.02
(-0.76) (0.60) (0.09) (-0.04)
Treasury Bill Spread 0.42 -0.14 0.36 -0.06
(0.47) (-0.17) (0.12) (-0.04)
Aaa Corporate Spread 0.06 -0.10 -0.46 -0.29
(0.05) (-0.10) (-0.20) (-0.17)
VIX Index 0.14 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01
(0.68) (-0.39) (-0.03) (-0.01)
θp1 = 1.55
∗∗ θq1 = 2.07∗∗
θp2 = 0.16 θq2 = 0.02
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Table 6.10: Spliced ABX Index Trivariate VAR Estimation Results 1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the AAA ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
1∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, S&P 500 Index, Aaa Corporate Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated asset S&P 500 Index 500 0.00 0.18
(0.86) (1.16)
Aaa Corporate Spread 0.00 0.01
(0.48) (0.48)
S&P 500 Index ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.96 -0.08
(-0.13) (-1.50)
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.02 -0.01
(-0.72) (-0.98)
Aaa Corporate Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -5.79 0.15
(-0.06) (0.48)
S&P 500 Index -0.02 -0.29
(-0.72) (-0.55)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, S&P 500 Index, VIX Index
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset S&P 500 Index 0.00 0.56∗∗
(0.38) (2.16)
VIX Index 0.00 0.40∗∗
(0.42) (2.33)
S&P 500 Index ABX AAA-rated Asset 0.01 −0.10∗
(0.01) (-1.74)
VIX Index 0.07 0.15∗
(0.23) (1.90)
VIX Index ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.13 0.13
(-0.04) (1.62)
S&P 500 Index 0.22 -0.23
(0.62) (-1.36)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, S&P 500 Index, Treasury Bill Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset S&P 500 Index 0.00 0.16
(0.79) (1.00)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.00 0.01
(-1.11) (0.26)
S&P 500 Index ABX AAA-rated Asset 2.25 −0.10∗
(0.37) (-1.66)
Treasury Bill Spread 0.02 0.00
(0.44) (0.01)
Treasury Bill Spread AAA 48.80 0.05
(0.77) (0.13)
S&P 500 Index 0.02 -0.27
(0.03) (-0.56)
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Table 6.11: Spliced ABX Index Trivariate VAR Estimation Results 2
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the AAA ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
1∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, Treasury Bill Spread, VIX Index
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset Treasury Bill Spread -0.00 -0.01
(-0.04) (-1.54)
VIX Index 0.08 0.01
(0.60) (-0.79)
Treasury Bill Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.03 9.98∗
(-0.09) (1.82)
VIX Index -0.01 -0.02
(-0.03) (-0.35)
VIX Index ABX AAA-rated Asset 0.10 5.49
(1.29) (0.67)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.01 0.33
(-0.03) (0.44)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, VIX Index, Aaa Corporate Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset VIX Index -0.01 0.07
(-0.79) (0.67)
Aaa Corporate Spread 0.00 0.01
(0.31) (0.25)
VIX Index ABX AAA-rated Asset -2.03 0.13∗
(-0.28) (1.69)
Aaa Corporate Spread 0.02 0.02
(0.86) (1.34)
Aaa Corporate Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -12.07 0.06
(-0.25) (0.18)
VIX Index 0.22∗ 0.66∗∗
(1.79) (3.52)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, Treasury Bill Spread, Aaa Corporate Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset Treasury Bill Spread -0.00 0.01
(-0.95) (0.37)
Aaa Corporate Spread 0.00 0.01
(0.05) (0.47)
Treasury Bill Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.68 0.16
(-0.09) (0.53)
Aaa Corproate Spread -0.02 0.22∗∗
(-0.21) (2.11)
Aaa Corporate Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -5.63 0.04
(-0.15) (0.13)
Treasury Bill Spread 0.69∗∗ 0.22∗
(3.66) (1.76)
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Table 6.12: ABX 06-1 Vintage Trivariate VAR Estimation Results 1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the AAA ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
1∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, S&P 500 Index, VIX Index
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset S&P 500 Index −0.06∗∗ 0.51∗∗
(-5.84) (3.33)
VIX Index −0.03∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(-3.82) (2.69)
S&P 500 Index ABX AAA-rated Asset 0.94 -0.25
(1.41) (-1.52)
VIX Index -0.11 0.16
(-1.20) (1.60)
VIX Index ABX AAA-rated Index -0.48 0.32∗∗
(-0.43) (2.70)
S&P 500 Index 0.57∗ -0.27
(2.44) (-1.37)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, S&P 500 Index, Treasury Bill Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset S&P 500 Index 0.18 −0.05∗∗
(1.21) (-3.60)
Treasury Bill Spread 0.00 0.01∗∗
(0.08) (4.41)
S&P 500 Index ABX AAA-rated Asse -0.19 3.57∗∗
(-1.25) (2.43)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.00 0.05∗∗
(-0.12) (3.15)
Treasury Bill Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.01 3.57∗∗
(-0.01) (2.43)
S&P 500 Index -0.55 0.06
(-0.58) (0.12)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, S&P 500 Index, Aaa Corporate Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset S&P 500 Index 0.00 0.15
(1.23) (1.52)
Aaa Corporate Spread 0.00 0.01
(0.33) (0.43)
S&P 500 Index ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.53 -0.11
(-0.09) (-0.75)
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.02 -0.01
(-0.79) (-0.94)
Aaa Corporate Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -1.20 0.34
(-0.04) (0.42)
S&P 500 Index 0.40 -0.15
(0.39) (-0.26)
221
Table 6.13: ABX 06-1 Vintage Trivariate VAR Estimation Results 2
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the AAA ABX asset variable in the indicated financial market variable equation in
the non-crisis and crisis regimes estimated from the following TVTP MS-VAR specification:
yit = α(St) +
1∑
k=1
βk(St)yit−k + 
st
it ,
in which yt denotes the financial market variable included as a dependent variable (ABX AAA asset weekly percentage
returns, S& P 500 Index weekly percentage returns, weekly percentage changes in Treasury Bill spread, weekly percentage
changes in Moody’s Aaa corporate spread or weekly percentage changes in VIX Index). The information variable triggering a
change in regime in the above estimation is ABX AA asset lagged weekly percentage returns. T-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. The subscript ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; the subscript ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level.
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, Treasury Bill Spread,VIX Index
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset Treasury Bill Spread −0.00∗ 0.02
(-1.70) (0.17)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.00 0.04
(-0.67) (0.03)
Treasury Bill Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset 13.74 -6.19
(0.41) (-0.21)
VIX Index 0.43 -0.97
(1.09) (-0.17)
VIX Index ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.85 -2.91
(-0.08) (-0.89)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.03 -0.08
(-0.62) (-0.50)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, VIX Index, Aaa Corporate Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset VIX Index 0.00 0.01
(0.79) (0.37)
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.00 0.01
(-0.91) (0.20)
VIX Index ABX AAA-rated Asset -8.26 0.20
(-0.47) (0.31)
Aaa Corporate Spread -0.00 0.01
(-0.91) (0.20)
Aaa Corporate Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -0.52 0.30∗∗
(-0.16) (2.59)
VIX Index -0.67 0.36
(-0.72) (0.85)
VAR Variables: ABX AAA-rated Asset, Aaa Corporate Spread, Treasury Bill Spread
Dependent Independent Non-Crisis β Crisis β
ABX AAA-rated Asset Aaa Corporate Spread 0.01 0.01
(0.17) (0.26)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.01 0.23∗
(-0.95) (1.68)
Aaa Corporate Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset -2.05 0.37
(-0.16) (0.41)
Treasury Bill Spread 0.75∗∗ 0.23∗
(4.00) (1.68)
Treasury Bill Spread ABX AAA-rated Asset 2.12 -0.63
(0.11) (-0.72)
Treasury Bill Spread -0.03 0.20∗
(-0.28) (1.69)
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
7.1. Overview of Thesis
This thesis focuses on three topical issues in relation to the financial crisis of 2007-2009,
undertaking a thorough empirical investigation of these issues by examining what be-
came the focal point of the crisis, the U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities market,
as represented by its only available proxy, the ABX.HE indexes.
Understanding the recent crisis and what led to its development and transmission is of
central importance to financial institutions, policy makers and investors worldwide. As
a consequence of a growing literature attempting to shed light on the subject we em-
pirically examine the risk underlying the ABX indexes, and how this risk evolved over
the crisis. We analyse contagion within this market, and the persistence of any shocks
observed. Finally, we investigate how risk may have transmitted from this market to
other asset markets by testing for contagion from the ABX to several fixed income,
equity and volatility markets during the crisis.
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of the crisis and what led to it, including
a description of the ABX indexes that are the focus of this thesis.
Chapter 3 analyses risk factors underlying the ABX indexes and how these may have
changed over the duration of the crisis. The analysis yields some interesting results.
Firstly, it is suggested that the ABX indexes are distinct in their vintage, subject to
different risk profiles, consistent with Dungey, Dwyer & Flavin (2013). Secondly, clear
differences also emerge between the different ratings classes comprising the indexes,
indicating that they were affected differently by risk factors over the crisis, a result
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that corresponds to that presented by Fender & Scheicher (2008). Finally, the results
allow us to observe how the importance of risk factors changed as the crisis evolved
from the real estate sector to impact credit markets and market-wide liquidity. For
investors and institutions trading these products these results suggest that they should
be treated as heterogeneous assets, and not simply as a continuation of the previous
issuance. For policy makers it suggests that the risk of the assets underlying each
index should be carefully assessed independently of other vintages. It also highlights
the importance of assessing links that may exist between different players in financial
markets, and perhaps improving stress testing to better assess what losses may occur
should one of those players default.
Chapter 4 tests for contagion within the ABX indexes, following and modifying the
VAR framework outlined by Longstaff (2010), to better understand these complex se-
curities. The spliced ABX index employed by Longstaff (2010) is analysed, along with
two traded vintages. Our results reveal further interesting facts regarding the U.S.
subprime mortgage-backed securities market. Firstly, we observe evidence of conta-
gion within the three ABX series during the subprime crisis period of 2007. Secondly,
contagion emanates mainly from the higher-rated assets in the traded vintages. Finally,
any persistent shocks originate in the higher-rated assets in the traded vintages but the
lower-rated assets in the spliced index. This again highlights the heterogeneous nature
of the traded indexes, and also suggests considerable differences between the traded
vintages and spliced index. For institutions and investors trading these tranched as-
sets it suggests that, once the common shock hit the system, risk transmitted from the
lower- to higher-rated assets, as described in Coval, Jubak & Stafford (2009), causing
the latter to be hit by massive losses also. This indicates that the ratings of these
products essentially did not matter once the crisis occurred. From a policy perspective
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it highlights the need for more stringent regulation regarding the construction of such
securities, and particularly in terms of how they are rated, to halt the migration of
risk in such a way.
Chapter 5 investigates contagion from the ABX indexes to several fixed income, equity
and volatility markets during the crisis, again following the VAR framework employed
by Longstaff (2010), applying the analysis to two traded vintages. Our results are
broadly in line with the original study with evidence of widespread contagion to the
financial markets analysed during the 2007 “subprime-crisis” period, which then dis-
sipates in the 2008 “global-crisis” period as liquidity came to a halt, before increasing
slightly in 2009 as markets rebounded. However, this application requires regimes to
be imposed exogenously on the data so, in an effort to develop a more appropriate
approach to the question, the methodology is extended in Chapter 6.
Therefore Chapter 6 re-examines the issue of contagion from the subprime mortgage-
backed securities sector of the financial system by employing a more suitable econo-
metric technique. Specifically we employ time-varying transition probability Markov-
switching properties in order to allow regimes to be imposed endogenously by the data.
The results provide some interesting facts regarding the crisis and the role that the
ABX played in it. Firstly, we find that the watershed of regimes occurs in mid-2007,
with the risky regime dominating thereafter until the end of the sample. Secondly,
although we do observe some evidence of contagion in the crisis regime, that contagion
is not as widespread as reported by Longstaff (2010). This implies that accurately
timing the onset of the crisis is crucial to the analysis. We conclude that this result
may be observed due to markets more closely related to the ABX, such as the ABCP
market, being affected by shocks sooner than those examined in this chapter, and then
transmitting those shocks to other markets. For academics, these results highlight
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the importance of taking account of structural breaks that may occur in data when
performing similar analyses. Failure to do so can lead to employing high-order au-
toregressive processes, thus over-estimating persistence, and influencing conclusions.
In terms of the subprime mortgage-backed securities sector, they indicate that, once
real estate concerns became overshadowed by concerns regarding liquidity and coun-
terparty risk and investors began rapidly exiting the ABS market, the ABX indexes
were not a strong source of contagion to the financial markets examined.
7.2. Future Research
This thesis presents a number of possible avenues for future research. Firstly, in order
to investigate the question of contagion from the ABX indexes further, a number of
different channels of contagion could be investigated. Longstaff (2010) also approaches
this issue by analysing contagion from the ABX to several proxies for liquidity, namely
changes in the aggregate amount of ABCP outstanding, the total weekly value of
settlement failures by primary dealers in Treasury, agency, mortgage and corporate
bond markets and the weekly ratio of trading volume for the S&P 500 subindex of
financial firms to the total trading volume for the S&P 500 index. It may be interesting
to incorporate these variables in our TVTP MS-VAR model to examine contagion from
the ABX market to these liquidity variables.
There are also a number of alternative methodologies regarding contagion and price
discovery from the ABX market to other financial markets such as the conditional
correlation method presented by Forbes & Rigobon (2002) and a switching ARCH
model. These alternatives may better account for the conditional heteroscedasticity
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in the system but the trade-off will be their inability to deal with large numbers of
financial assets.
As it is possible that contagion may have been more widespread among markets more
closely related to the ABX market before affecting the financial markets examined in
this thesis it may also be useful to extend our analysis to include the ABCP market
and other types of ABS markets to further investigate this issue.
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